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The bid mark-up decision is considered important and complex from a construction 
contractor‟s perspective. This study aims at examining contractors‟ risky bid mark-up decisions in 
a competitive bidding setting from a descriptive research school of thought. 
Grounded to Prospect Theory and One-Reason Decision Model, a contingency-based 
theoretical framework of three scenarios was developed to explain and to predict bid mark-up 
decisions in lights of four identified determinants, namely: perceived „rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, 
„project backlogs‟, and „project strategic importance‟. 
The three scenarios according to this framework were verified by means of a self-
administered survey in Singapore construction industry. By using taxonomic approach, five 
groups of bidders with distinctive bid profiles were identified and the associated bid mark-ups 
were calculated. Characteristics of the groups were found in agreement with pertinent scenarios of 
the theoretical framework. One group of bidders (n=16) supported Scenario 1 of the framework in 
which participating bidders had considered the reported project bid as having high strategic 
importance to their organizations and hence made aggressive, low bid mark-ups. Another group 
(n=4) supported Scenario 2 where bidders deemed the reported projects being non-strategically 
important and assessed their own companies‟ project backlogs being above aspirations; and 
therefore made risk averse, high bid mark-ups. Three different groups (n=22, n=5, and n=3) 
respectively supported different subsets of Scenario 3 of the framework. Scenario 3 refers to 
conditions where bidders perceive the observed projects as having low strategic importance and 
their own companies had performed below aspirations for at least one of the three performance-
related determinants and hence made low bid mark-ups. The verified framework could be used by 
contractors to improve their own bidding strategy in anticipating the likely behavior of the 
competitors. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Bid Mark-ups 
Construction contractors define „bid mark-ups‟ differently1. Consistent with the finding by 
Hegazy and Moselhi (1995), this research defines the bid mark-up decision as a contractor‟s 
decision making process to determine the monetary value in terms of percentage which needs to 
be added on top of the estimated firm overhead, project direct and indirect costs, and contingency. 
It follows the traditional cost-plus strategy in the sense that the total project bid price is 
determined by summing up all the relevant cost elements as mentioned previously and marking 
them up by a certain percentage to cover the expected project profit margin. 
The bid mark-up decision is deemed crucial and complex from a contractor‟s business 
perspective. It has a direct bearing towards contractors‟ well-being in the long run. For 
construction firms, performing projects for other organizations (the project owners, clients) is 
their core business. Doing projects and earning adequate profits from the projects are key factors 
for contractors‟ sustainable survival and growth (Egemen and Mohamed, 2007). Tenah and 
Coulter (1999) asserted that mark-up determinations in construction competitive bidding projects 
were “more critical than ever” (p.39). Shash (1995) argued that bid mark-up decisions had a direct 
effect to the firms‟ business. Arditi et al. (2000) conducted an analysis using a series of U.S. 
business failure records which were compiled in (Dun and Bradstreet, 1989-1993) to identify 
factors affecting contractors‟ business failures in construction industry. It was found that out of 
twenty identified factors; contractors‟ insufficient profits were positioned on top of the list, 
accounting for about a quarter of the entire reported business failures in construction industry. 
Discussing the finding, Arditi et al. (2000) argued that insufficient profit could be attributed 
                                                          
1 For example, study by Hegazy and Moselhi (1995) in US and Canada found that 44% of respondents included only 
profit margin in the bid mark-up, 33% included profit and contingency, 17% included profit and general overhead, 4% 
included profit, general over head, and contingency, 3% included profit, general and project overhead, and contingency. 
Moreover, it was found that the definition of the base cost varied. Forty percent used (direct cost + project overhead + 
general overhead) as a base cost in which the percentage of mark-up would be added, 27% used (direct cost + project 
overhead), 33% used only the direct cost.   
2 
mainly to the highly competitive construction environment and a difficulty on determining the 
right bid mark-ups.  
In many occasions, project contracts are pursued by contractors participating in a competitive 
bidding process.  Contractors compete with each other to win a contract on the basis of project bid 
price and other criteria (Shash, 1995). An open announcement or a selective invitation usually 
precedes the bidding. Eligible contractors may then decide whether or not to participate in the 
particular bidding process. Once a contractor has decided to take part on the process, a major 
decision for the contractor is to decide the „right‟ level of monetary value of the bid mark-up for 
the project being offered. The „right‟ decision on bid mark-ups is vital for contractors to secure 
business objectives of their own organizations. 
Determining bid mark-up values is surely not an easy task even for the most seasoned 
contractors‟ bidders.  In the lowest-cost-as-a-winner bidding system2, the traditional key decision 
trade-off includes determining the mark-up value low enough to increase the chance to win the 
contract yet high enough to earn expected profit (Akintoye and Skitmore, 1992). Moreover, 
winning a particular project contract is not necessarily good news from a contractor‟s financial 
perspective. In many occasions, contractors may win bids only to find out later that the actual 
revenues are substantially lower than the costs required delivering the projects. In a lump sum 
contract (for explanation refer to (Shash, 1995)), such a situation implies that contractors earn  
negative profits even though they win the contract. In construction industry, the condition of 
winning the bid but losses the project often occurred (Betts and Brown, 1992). In a more general 
context of auctions, the term winner‟s curse was used to reflect the situation (Bazerman, 1998; 
Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983).   
Empirical research supported the assertion that a traditional goal of maximizing the expected 
project profit was not always the case in project bids. According to Friedman (1956) and Oo et al. 
(2007), bid mark-up strategy might be driven by various motivations other than maximizing 
profits, such as: minimizing expected losses, minimizing profit for competitors, maintaining 
                                                          
2 Assuming that the efficiency level of the competing bidders is on par and the estimated total costs are similar across 
different bidders (see for instance (Tenah & Coulter 1999)). 
3 
current level of capacity, and strategic concerns (e.g. market penetration). Empirical findings also 
suggested that bid mark-up decisions were performed mostly by senior management by using 
subjective judgment, gut feeling, and heuristics (Ahmad and Minkarah 1988; Egemen and 
Mohamed 2007; Mochtar and Arditi 2001; Ofori 1993). 
Bidding process is a tense process. Betts and Brown (1992) asserted that a short tendering 
timeline combined with extensive document requirements were commonly observed. In addition, 
knowing the (usually large) number of competing bidders put more pressure on the contractor side 
during the process. This might be compounded by delayed feedbacks from prospective key sub-
contractors which purposely withhold their work package quotations until the last minutes to 
prevent other competing sub-contractors making an advantage on early disclosures (Ling and Liu, 
2005).  Fayek et al. (1998) and Wallwork (1999) mentioned that the decision of bid mark-ups was 
often carried out shortly before the tender submission. Pressures during the process may affect 
emotional responses of the decision makers (Xu and Tiong, 2001). 
The fact that a bid mark-up decision is a difficult, tense process and it heavily relies on 
human judgment suggests that the process is prone to human errors. The limited mental 
processing capability of human decision makers may cause errors in judgment which could 
eventually lead to less than optimum decisions. It was argued by Hogarth (1980) that judgmental 
biases were likely to occur on conditions where tasks were characterized by the following 
attributes: high level of stress, high complexity, and high procedural uncertainty. The bid mark-up 
decision seems to fit all the conditions leading to judgmental biases. 
1.2 Motivation 
This current study is motivated by the fact that some research opportunities in bid mark-up 
studies could still be identified as fully elaborated in Chapter 2. Past empirical studies in the 
prescriptive stream mainly focused on developing tools or methods to aid bid decisions with a 
rather overemphasis on an objective to maximize profits. On the other hand, majority of studies in 
the descriptive decision theory camp aimed at identifying a wide range of determinants affecting 
bid mark-ups. The wide coverage results in limited in-depth analysis leading to few insights 
4 
which could be learned from the studies. In addition, the studies often assumed isolated, 
independent relationships between respective determinants and bid mark-ups thus overlooked the 
possible interrelationships among determinants. Contingency effects were not accounted in the 
studies leading to a less than accurate prediction and explanation of bid mark-ups. Last but not 
least, most studies did not explicitly incorporate a relevant theory of risky decision making. This 
would hinder the development of a rigorous theoretical model on bid mark-up decisions. 
Accordingly, a research is needed to address the identified research opportunities and, in turn, to 
advance the existing knowledge in a practically important and complex topic of bid mark-up 
decisions.  
1.3 Objective 
This research aims at investigating risky bid mark-up decisions of senior management from 
construction contractors in a competitive bidding setting. In particular, the specific objective is to 
develop and to empirically verify a contingency-based theoretical framework which explains and 
predicts bid mark-up decisions. 
1.4 Scope 
This research can be categorized as a quantitative research under the descriptive decision 
theory school of thought. This research is not to develop a method or technique to assist bid mark-
up decisions as studies in the prescriptive camp to be described later. The unit of analysis of this 
research is individual decision makers or bidders. In particular, the targeted respondents are senior 
managers from Singapore construction contractors who directly involve in bid mark-up decisions. 
The invited Singapore contractors are those with tendering limits at least SGD 5 Millions or 
Grade C1 for the General Building (CW01) category. Research is to be limited to the context of 
competitive bidding. 
1.5 Contribution 
This study promises two significant contributions. From an academic standpoint, this 
research provides an advancement of knowledge on competitive bid mark-up decisions. In 
5 
particular, it extends the existing studies by providing an alternative theoretical model for 
examining bid mark-up decisions from a contingency perspective. The model is believed to be 
parsimonious and theoretically grounded, and it is supported by past relevant empirical findings. 
Furthermore, the theoretical model is verified by means of an empirical study.  
In the long-run, for researchers in the descriptive decision theory camp, this research could 
be seen as a starting point for a series of studies focusing on identifications of the possible 
existence of judgmental biases in bid mark-up decisions. If evidence of such studies supports the 
speculation, procedures might be developed to minimize biases leading to quality improvement of 
bid decisions. For prescriptive researchers, this research may provide a further motivation to 
venture beyond an objective of profit maximization when developing models to aid bid mark-up 
decisions. 
From a practical perspective, this research can help to reveal the general pattern of bid mark-
up behavior in a competitive setting in light of the selected determinants. The verified framework 
could be used by contractors which mostly depend on gut feelings to improve their own bidding 
strategy in anticipating the likely behavior of the competitors. 
Results of this study would also complement the more quantitative tools of bid decisions 
which were developed under the prescriptive decision theory camp as asserted by Boughton 
(1987): 
“[Outcome of quantitative bidding models] … must be evaluated in light of judgements concerning 
the competitors‟ current economic and psychological predisposition. A qualitative profile of 
competitors should be developed that would include an evaluation of each competitor‟s workload, 
financial situation, attitude toward risk, and overall management philosophy. This qualitative 
assessment places emphasis on the current and likely future behavior of the competition rather than on 
the past.” [pp. 92-93]. 
1.6 Organization of the Report 
The remainder of this report is organized as follow. Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant 
literatures on risky decision making and bid mark-up decisions. It elaborates the existing studies 
6 
on bid mark-ups and highlights some research opportunities. Chapter 3 focuses on theoretical 
model development. Chapter 4 provides information on the procedure of developing the survey 
instrument. Main empirical study administration is described in Chapter 5 while results and 
discussions of the empirical analysis are presented in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 provides conclusion of 






2 Past Studies on Bid Mark-up Decisions  
In this section, existing literatures relevant to studies of bid mark-ups are reviewed. Section 
2.1 provides a brief literature review on past studies pertinent to human risky decision making. 
Section 2.2 elaborates Prospect Theory which is considered as one the most influential descriptive 
theory of decision making. Section 2.3 highlights distinctions of two research camps of individual 
decision making, namely: prescriptive and descriptive. Sections 2.4 and 2.5describes past studies 
in bid mark-ups from the prescriptive and descriptive camps. Section 2.6 presents an elaboration 
on specific key studies of bid mark-up decisions which serve as an empirical foundation for this 
study. 
2.1 Decision under Uncertainty: the Risky Choice Problem 
Scholars in the domain of cognitive psychology, economics, and management have a great 
interest on examining human decision making behavior in the face of uncertain outcomes. The 
topic is particularly appealing because virtually any decision making process involves uncertainty. 
In the most generic level, decision making under uncertainty may also be represented as an 
acceptance of a gamble (Kahneman and Tversky 1984). A typical simple choice problem 





  Figure 2.1 Case 1 of a Revised Version of Allais Paradox (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
In case 1, decision makers are required to choose between two alternatives or prospects, 
namely: A or B. Prospect A has uncertain outcomes with three possibilities: a 2,500 monetary unit 











on the other hand, has a sure outcome of 2,400. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) argued that risky 
choice problems (as exemplified in Case 1) may represent a broad problem of decision making 
under uncertainty. 
The traditional way of selection among prospects is by using simple calculation of expected 
monetary value (EMV). EMV for each prospect is calculated as the sum of products of probability 
and its associated pay-off. Rational decision makers will choose a prospect with the highest EMV. 
In Case 1, prospect A with an EMV of 2,409 will be normatively preferred to B with an EMV of 
2,400. 
According to Kahneman and Tversky (1984) and Bazerman (1998), Daniel Bernoulli first 
proposed concepts of expected utility to substitute the EMV. According to Bernoulli, degree of 
pleasure (or utility) perceived by decision makers is not necessarily linearly associated with the 
monetary value or wealth of a prospect. Decision makers will rationally select an alternative with 
the highest expected utility which does not always bear the maximum EMV as suggested by the 
non-linear relationship. Bernoulli argued that on the face of uncertain outcomes, different decision 
maker might behave differently. Their behaviors reflect one of three risk preferences: risk 
seeking, neutral, or averse. Figure 2.2 depicts three different risk preferences in a utility function. 
Risk aversion is modeled by a concave curve, risk neutral by a linear curve, and risk seeking by a 






Figure 2.2 Utility Function according to Utility Theory 
 
9 
Revisiting Case 1, according to UT, the selection of the prospects depends on the risk 
preference of the decision maker. For risk averse decision makers, Prospect B may be preferable 
because they prefer a sure pay-off with less monetary value to a risky choice which bears higher 
EMV. For the same case, risk neutrals or risk seekers will choose Prospect A. Risk neutrals will 
compare the EMV of the risky choice and the sure pay-off and choose the one with higher worth. 
For risk takers, they are willing to take a risky choice which bears lower EMV compared to the 
sure prospect.  While utility theory acknowledges three types of risk preferences, the most 
commonly used assumption in analysis is that decision makers are risk averse (Nickel & 
Rodriguez 2002).  
Since the pioneering work of UT by Bernoulli, the original concept of expected utility has 
been extended by many scholars. Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) developed the axioms of 
UT which should govern the preferences of any rational decision makers. Hence the development 
of UT can be seen as using deductive approach grounded to some first principles (axioms). 
Behaviour of decision makers who comply with the axioms will be consistent to rational decision 
making procedures which attempt to maximize expected utility (Clemen and Reilly 2001). 
Reversely, violations of the axioms will result in decisions which do not maximize the expected 
utility. 
Many empirical works in the field was carried out to test the descriptive and predictive 
powers of UT. In a number of occasions, some violations of UT had been reported concerning UT 
as a descriptive model. One of the most prominent cases is the Allais Paradox (Allais 1953) cited 
by (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Case 1 presented earlier is part of a pair of a choice problem 
representing the revised version of Allais Paradox. The complementary choice problem is 
depicted on Figure 2.3. Using the revised hypothetical choice problem, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) conducted a study and found that the majority of subjects chose B in Case 1 (see Figure 
2.1) and C in Case 2 (Figure 2.3). Analysis of individual choices indicated that a majority of 








Case 1: U(2400) > 0.33 x U(2500) + 0.66 x U(2400)  0.34 x U(2400) > 0.33 x U(2500) 
Case 2:         0.34 x U(2400) < 0.33 x U(2500) 
Case 1 and Case 2 show inconsistency of preference of the decision makers from a 
perspective of UT. Choosing prospect B in Case 1 and C in Case 2 is in the contrary to UT 
because it is not possible for a rational decision makers to switch alternatives in two “identical” 





Figure 2.3 Case 2 of a Revised Version of Allais Paradox (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
The results of Allais Paradox and other relevant studies indicated that UT was unable to 
describe the actual behavior of decision makers under uncertainty in many occasions. The 
majority of decision makers violate axioms of UT and consequently they do not behave rationally. 
Hence while the role of UT as a prescriptive model prevails, its descriptive position becomes 
questionable (Levy, 1997). 
2.2 Prospect Theory (PT) as a Descriptive Model 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), proposed Prospect Theory (PT) as an alternative to UT for a 
descriptive model of human decisions under uncertainty. Propositions of PT is consistent to the 
bounded rational model of human by Simon (1957). Simon (1957) suggested that while human 
intends to be rational, the rationality is constrained or bounded. Hence it is argued that deliberate 
thinking is not common by most people; people tend to rely on simplified rules (heuristics) and 
consider particular mental concepts which come more easily to mind (accessibility) when making 










outcomes against natural reference points are more accessible than the absolute values – a 
conjecture which is consistent to the bounded rational model. Hence risky decision according to 
PT is reference-dependent. 
Grounded to experimental studies of hypothetical choice problems, Kahneman and Tversky 
found that majority of subjects of the study did not behave rationally as suggested by UT. The 
pattern of departure from rationality was found to be systematic for most subjects and was 
formulized in some propositions. Main propositions of Prospect Theory include framing and loss 
aversion to be described in the followings passages. 
2.2.1 Framing 
According to PT, the behavior of decision makers indicated by the chosen prospect depends 
on the way the choice problems are presented (i.e. problem framing). Most people will 
systematically become risk averse when the problem is framed as a gain. When the identical 
problems are presented as a loss, most decision makers tend to be risk seeking agents (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1979). It is argued that, in line with the accessibility concept described earlier, a 
different presentation of risky choice problems would evoke different features of the problem to 
the decision makers‟ mind and mask the others leading to a different risk attitude. Figure 2.4 






Figure 2.4 Value Function of Prospect Theory 
12 
Framing effect can be seen as a direct violation to the invariance axiom of UT (Kahneman 
and Tversky 1984; Clemen and Reilly 2001). Invariance, according to UT, refers to a notion that 
the only information required by decision makers to make a choice is the probabilities and 
associated pay-offs for the prospects. In the study conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) it 
was found among other things that despites the identical information  of „probabilities‟ and „pay-
offs‟ imposed in the choice problems, subjects behaved differently depending on the way the 
problem was presented. Empirical evidence to support „framing effect‟ is numerous. For instance, 
Qualls and Puto (1989) conducted a questionnaire-based study to examine behavior of industrial 
buyers in fleet companies. Results of the study supported the framing effect. 
Scholars have extended the concept of framing beyond „the way the problem is presented‟. 
Decision makers utilize subjective framing inherent to his or her decision process even though the 
problem at hand is not explicitly framed in a particular way. In an experimental study by Elliot 
and Archibald (1989), a choice problem of medical treatment was neutrally presented to subjects. 
No particular gain (survival rates) or loss (mortality rates) was explicitly imposed in the problem. 
After selecting the preferred prospect, subjects were asked to explain on how they had actually 
framed the problem. The result supported the notion that subjects who had subjectively framed 
the problem as a gain tend to be risk averse and those who had framed it as a loss tend to be risk 
seeking. 
Decision makers seem to utilize a certain mental reference point or status quo by which the 
possible outcomes of the alternatives are gauged. In a monetary term, the evaluation of outcomes 
of prospects are not based on the final state of the wealth (i.e. existing wealth of the decision 
makers plus or minus the respective prospect outcome) as suggested by UT. Instead, the outcomes 
are judged against the reference point. For instance, if the amount of wealth of prospects is lower 
than the mental reference point, they will perceive the problem in a loss domain and tend to 
behave as risk seekers. On the contrary, if the amount of outcomes is higher than the reference 
point, the problem is seen in the domain of gain and they become risk averse. 
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Decision makers do not use a common, universal frame to see a risky choice. Subjective 
frame can be related to norms, habits, expectancies of the decision makers (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1986), as well as organizational climates (Qualls and Puto 1989). The selection of the 
reference point (which in some cases is done unconsciously) is crucial to the framing and 
eventually the risk preference of the decision makers (Bazerman 1998). 
2.2.2 Loss Aversion 
PT recognizes that the degree of satisfaction gained by an additional wealth is not the same as 
the degree of dissatisfaction perceived due to decrease of equal amount of wealth. Most people 
respond to losses in a more significant way than to gains; they are loss averse (Bazerman 1998). 
For instance, people tend to refuse a fair bet since the negative value of the expected utility of the 
possible loss is greater than the positive value of expected utility from the possible gain (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1981). Loss aversion is depicted in Figure 5.4a by a steeper slope of the curve in 
the domain of loss. Empirical evidence of individual-level decision making to support Loss 
Aversion from an environmental context is presented by Gregory (1986). In a corporate strategic 
management context, Fiegenbaum (1990a) by analyzing secondary data found that, among other 
things, some evidence to support loss aversion did exist. 
In summary, it is argued that PT is a generalization of UT (Edwards 1996). The relationships 
between parameters which are used by the two theories are depicted on Table 2.1. UT 
normatively uses outcome probabilities of a prospect as weighting factors, while in reality most 
decision makers use decision weights. Decision weight in PT is a non-linear function of 
probability. Degree of satisfaction in UT is related to the total accumulated wealth by choosing a 
prospect. PT asserts that it is related to the change of wealth viewed from a reference point.  
Finally, alternatives are normatively evaluated by means of maximum expected utility in UT. On 




Table 2.1 Comparison between Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory 
Parameter Utility Theory Prospect Theory 
Weighting factor Probability, p Decision weight, π=f(p)  
Degree of satisfaction Utility, u = f(x) 
x is accumulated wealth 
Value, v = f(x) 
x is change of wealth against a reference point 
Overall value of a prospect Expected Utility 
    = ∑ p.u 
Expected Value 
  = ∑ π.v 
 
 
2.3 Prescriptive and Descriptive: the Two Research Camps 
From the previous discussions some essential points with regards to the studies in human 
decision making could be summarized as follows. The decision making field of study could be 
classified into two camps, namely: prescriptive and descriptive decision theory school of thoughts  
(Bazerman, 1998). The two camps differ in research paradigms or worldviews, ultimate goals, 
and assumptions as follows. 
The ultimate goal of studies under the prescriptive school of thought is to develop 
methods or tools to assist decision making process. Prescriptive studies assume that due to the 
complexity of decision problems, it is essential to equip decision makers with certain tools. As the 
name suggests, the tool should have feature(s) to prescribe or provide suggestion to an optimal 
decision.  
Models which are developed under this category reflect the normative, ideal condition of 
decision making process provided that all assumptions are satisfied. A major assumption 
commonly applied in the models is that human is a fully rational decision maker in the sense that 
he or she has self-interest to maximize his or her own well-being. The rational tools provide 
prescriptions on “how a decision should be made rather than describing how decision is made” 
(Bazerman, 1998, p. 4, original emphasis). The prescriptive camp would also acknowledge that 
final decisions are up to the decision makers to make because the tools are not intended to replace 
the role of decision makers. 
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Researchers under the descriptive decision theory school of thought would develop their 
works based on an underlying assumption that human rationality is bounded (Bazerman, 1998; 
Simon, 1957). It was argued in Bazerman (1998) that, in the real world, a full rationality of 
human decision process is not feasible due to: (a) lack of complete relevant information for 
problem definition (b) time and cost constraints to acquire information (c) memory limitation of 
the decision makers to retain useful information, and (d) cognitive limitation to fully analyze all 
possible alternatives and to calculate the optimal choice.  
For descriptive researchers, decision makers are seen to be satisficing (i.e. satisfying and 
sufficing) rather than optimizing. That is, a good enough decision is adequate for bounded 
decision makers. Instead of fully incorporating all relevant information and making a systematic 
decision process to maximize own preferences, bounded decision makers are assumed to utilize 
heuristics or rule of thumbs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Heuristics serve as a mental shortcut 
to find an acceptable (instead of optimal) solution in the face of limited information and cognitive 
capability. Heuristics are simplified strategies to make faster decisions with less cognitive efforts 
to deal with everyday‟s complex decisions (Shu and Bazerman, 2010). Scholars in the descriptive 
stream argued that while heuristics in many cases are useful, the process is prone to human errors 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Researchers in cognitive psychology have identified various 
systematic errors in judgment (i.e. biases) both in deterministic and stochastic environment (Mak 
and Raftery, 1992; Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). In other words, bounded rationality and hence 
heuristics, in some occasions, may lead to decisions which depart from rationality. 
For descriptive researchers, the goal of carrying out research is to understand the actual 
behavior of the decision makers and to compare the actual behavior to an ideal, rational behavior. 
If systematic judgmental deviations in certain circumstances are observed, strategies to minimize 
biases or departures from rationality can be developed, for instance: de-biasing (Bazerman, 1998). 
For another example, a similar method had been applied for project cost estimating by using an 
approach called „outsider view‟ to minimize the identified optimistic bias (Flyvbjerg, 2003; 2006; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2004a; Flyvbjerg et al., 2004b; 2005; Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Lovallo and 
Kahneman, 2003).                                                      
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2.4 Prescriptive Studies in Bid Mark-up Decisions 
A large body of literatures had reported studies to develop methods or tools or models to 
assist the determination of optimum bid mark-up values (e.g.: (Dias and Weerasinghe, 1996; 
Dozzi et al., 1996; Friedman, 1956; Li and Love, 1999; Skitmore and Pemberton, 1994; Wang, 
2002)). Empirical studies on the actual implementation of prescriptive models in construction bid 
decisions painted a rather pessimistic pattern.  
A recent study by Egemen and Mohamed (2007) indicated a low utilization of prescriptive 
models in the industry. It was found that 92.5% of respondents had never used any statistical and 
mathematical model for bid mark-ups. Furthermore 97.5% of respondents claimed intuition as the 
most preferred method. Similarly, Mochtar and Arditi (2001) found only 14.3% of the 
respondents had reported the use of probability and mathematical models compared to 50.5% who 
reported the use of intuition. The findings confirmed an earlier study by Ahmad and Minkarah 
(1988) which found that there were few implementations of such models.  
Gates (1983) argued that prescriptive models appealed academics more than practitioners. 
Wanous et al. (2000) asserted that the limited use of the prescriptive models might be caused by 
their impracticality. The models, it was further argued, were too sophisticated for practitioners yet 
oversimplified the complex process of bid mark-up decisions – i.e. unrealistic assumptions. 
Prescriptive models often assume the followings: (a) maximizing the expected profit is the only 
goal of bidding (Runeson and Skitmore, 1999; Shash, 1993); (b) bidder have accumulated past bid 
histories on competitor‟s (Boughton, 1987); (c) competitors will act in the future as they have in 
the past (Boughton, 1987; Shash, 1993); (d) no systematic changes of bid behaviors of 
competitors (Runeson & Skitmore, 1999). 
2.5 Descriptive Studies in Bid Mark-up Decisions  
It is argued that studies of bid mark-up decisions which strictly follow the established 
concepts and procedures under the descriptive camp as elaborated earlier are rather limited. 
Nevertheless, findings from many past empirical studies could serve as a good reference for this 
study. This section provides a brief elaboration on such studies with an emphasis on depicting 
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general methodological patterns and findings as well as highlighting possible future advancement 
from a descriptive decision theory camp perspective. 
Twelve most relevant past studies on bid mark-up decisions were reviewed and summarized 
in Table 2.2. The key studies were carried out in a competitive bidding environment where 
contracts were awarded to bidders offering the lowest bid prices. The studies examined bid mark-
up practices in various countries, including Singapore (Chua and Li, 2000; Dulaimi and Shan, 
2002; Ling and Liu, 2005; Oo et al., 2008), United States (Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988; de 
Neufville and King, 1991; Mochtar and Arditi, 2001), Turkey and North Cyprus (Egemen and 
Mohamed, 2007), UK (Shash, 1993), Syria (Wanous et al., 2000), Saudi Arabia (Shash and 
Abdul-Hadi, 1993), and Australia (Fayek et al., 1998). The reviewed studies offer a great 
variation in methodological aspects, to name a few: sample size, level of granularity of the 
observed determinants, and the utilized measurement scales.  
The main objective of majority of the past studies was identifying significant factors 
(determinants) which affect bid mark-up decisions. For instance, Ling and Liu (2005) by means of 
a questionnaire survey had identified key determinants affecting bid mark-up decision and in 
particular those which were ranked differently by successful and less successful contractors in 
Singapore. Practitioners might learn from the insights to select which determinants need to be 
considered when deciding bid mark-ups. Dulaimi and Shan (2002) conducted a similar survey in 
Singapore construction industry. The specific goal was to investigate whether contractors of 
different sizes would rank the order of importance of determinants differently. It was found that 
large-size contractors focused on determinants related to the nature of the construction work. 
Medium-size contractors tend to consider more on the state of their own organizations when 
deciding bid mark-ups. Table 2.3 provides a summary of identified determinants by the twelve 





Table 2.2 Past Studies on Construction Bid Mark-up Decisions 
No Author(s) Context Method Key Objective(s) 
[1] Oo et al. (2007) 
  




Literature review, controlled 
bidding experiment by postal 
survey, subjects: 49 Senior 
managers  
Investigate factors which would 
have a significant bearing on bid 
mark-up decisions 
[2] Egemen and 
Mohamed (2007) 
Turkey and North 
Cyprus Construction 
Industry 
Literature review, pilot semi 
structured interview, 
questionnaire survey (80 
respondents)  
Develop a knowledge-based 
system model to support a 
strategic-oriented decision of 
bidding process 







Literature review, questionnaire 
survey, 29 out of 142 invited 
respondents (20% of response 
rate)  
Investigate whether contractors’ 
performance would have a 
significant bearing on the 
factors that would influence the 
bid mark-up decisions 








Literature review, questionnaire 
survey, 32 out of 150 (21.3% of 
response rate) from medium- and 
large-size contractors* 
Investigate whether contractor 
size would have a significant 
bearing on the factors that 
would influence the bid mark-up 
decisions 




Questionnaire survey, 91 out of 
top 400 US contractors (22.75% 
of response rate)  
Identify pricing strategy in the 
US construction industry 





Literature review, interview with 
6 experienced practitioners,  AHP-
based questionnaire (19 out of 
153 G7 & G8** contractors, 
12.4% of response rate)  
Develop a bid reasoning model 
(end goal). The interim result 
provided a description on 
determinants of bid mark-ups  
[7] Shash (1993) UK Construction 
Industry 
Discussions with experts and 
questionnaire survey, 
respondents:  top managers in 
top contractors (85 out of 300, 
28.3% of response rate)  
Identify factors affecting bid 
decisions  




Semi-structure interview with six 
experts; questionnaire survey, 
respondents: top management in 
top contractors (182 respondents 
out of 300)  
Develop a parametric model to 
aid bid decisions (end goal).  The 
interim result provided a 
description on determinants of 
bid decisions (bid-or-no-bid and 
bid mark-ups)  





Literature review, questionnaire 
survey; respondents: top 
management of classified 
contractors (71 out of 300, 24% of 
response rate)  
Identify factors affecting bid 
decisions 




Literature review, controlled 
laboratory experiment, 30 
contractors  
Determine the premiums of 
‘risk’ and ‘need for work’ in a 
competitive bidding context 
grounded on Utility Theory 





respondents: top general 
contractors 
Identify factors affecting bid 
decisions 





Questionnaire survey  (30 out of 
37, 81.1% of response rate) and 
follow-up interviews 
Study tendering practices of 
construction contractors 
 Notes: * Medium-size contractors: tendering limit up to SGD 10 M; large-size: unlimited; 
            ** G7 contractors: tendering limit up to SGD 50 M; G8: unlimited. 
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Table 2.3 Significant Factors Affecting Bid Mark-up Decisions according to Past Studies 




[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12]
> required rate of return v v v v v v 6
> annual contract value, revenue, 
market share
v v 2
> current workload (bid or project) v v v v v v v 7
> availability of qualified staff v v v v v v v 7
> need for work v v v v v v 6
> availability of equipment required v v v v 4
> continuity in employment of key 
personnels
v v 2
Project complexity v v v v v v v 7
> project size v v v v v v v v 8
> project cash flow v v v v v v v 7
> reliability of estimations v v v v v v 6
> contractual arrangement v v v v v 5
> scale of liquidated damages v v v v v 5
> similar experience v v v v 4
> degree of technological difficulty v v v v 4
> degree of safety, hazard v v v v 4
> past profit in similar projects v v v v 4
> involvement in process v v v 3
> expertise in management v v 2
> client identity, relationship with client, 
consultant
v v v v v v v v v v 10
> quality of tender documents                     v v v v v v v 7
> time available for bid preparation v v 2
> number and identitiy of competitors v v v v v v v v 8
> availability of other projects, market 
demand
v v v v v v v 7
> overall economy v v v v v 5
> resource price fluctuations v v 2









NATURE OF THE BID AND PROJECT
 
 Notes: *   Refer to Table 2.2 for the numbering codes of the studies; 
             ** ‘Med’ refers to medium-size contractors with a tendering limit up to SGD 10 M; ‘large’ for large-size contractors 
with unlimited tendering limits; 
              v Denotes significant
3
.  
                                                          
3 Due to the variations on the way the past studies had shortlisted the factors, summary in Table 2.3 simply follows the 
original cut-offs which had been used by respective studies. For instance, Dulaimi & Shan (2002) related significant 
factors affecting bid mark-up decisions to the top ten factors as identified in their study. Accordingly, Table 2.3 marks 
only the related top ten factors as being significant under the study of Dulaimi and Shan. 
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There were only few past studies which attempted to go beyond identifying determinants 
which potentially affect bid mark-ups. The few studies aimed at investigating the relationships 
between identified determinants and bid mark-up decisions. Some of such studies had applied an 
experimental approach, namely: de Neufville and King (1991) and Oo et al., (2007). Experiments 
were used to elicit bid mark-up responses from subjects on specific hypothetical projects in light 
of few manipulated determinants. Oo et al. (2007), for instance, studied four pre-selected 
determinants to predict bid mark-up decisions, namely: number of bidders, market conditions, 
project type, and size. By systematically manipulating the values of determinants the researchers 
were able to examine the pattern of bid mark-up decisions of the subjects. It was found that 
Singapore contractors viewed the number of bidders, market conditions, and project types as 
important determinants on bid mark-up decisions. Project size was deemed unimportant by 
subjects. 
One of the challenges on applying an experimental procedure, especially in a new domain, is 
external validity (Friedman and Cassar, 2004; Levin et al., 1983; Levy, 1997; 2003). External 
validity is the extent to which results of an experiment can be extrapolated beyond the laboratory 
settings (Cohen and Manion, 1980). This is a question whether experimental subjects would 
behave candidly to reflect their actual behavior in the real bidding setting or they would simply 
react to the provided stimulus as presented in the form of hypothetical bid cases. 
Surveys were often carried out when researchers aimed at eliciting general perceptions of 
respondents over a wide range of individual determinants affecting bid mark-up decisions. The 
wide coverage of determinants by the studies might also lead to a setback. For instance, Dulaimi 
and Shan (2002) examined forty determinants which were grouped into five categories of project 
characteristics, project documentation, contractor characteristics, bidding situation, and economic 
environment. Such studies did not provide in-depth analysis of the relationships between essential 
determinants and bid mark-ups. In addition, the wide array of determinants which were included 
in past studies might inhibit the adoption of findings and insights in a real bid decision making 
context. Bidders might see the findings as too complicated due to the large number of the 
determinants and they could experience a problem in translating the results into a particular 
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context of a bid mark-up decision they are experiencing. The assertion seems logical since past 
studies usually requested summary judgment of respondents on respective determinants in general 
bidding context, the adoption of such results on specific, individual context of bid could be 
problematic. In addition, due to bounded rationality, bidders might not be able to consider all 
identified determinants when determining bid mark-ups (Egemen and Mohamed, 2007). Hence, 
from a practical perspective, it is argued that the broad coverage of past studies could put some 
challenges on adopting the finding in a real bid context. 
The assumption of isolated individual relationships between determinants against bid mark-
ups could also be questionable. Majority of past survey studies treated each relationship between 
a single determinant and bid mark-ups in isolation. From a practical perspective, it could be 
argued that the effect of a particular determinant towards bid mark-ups is conditional. For 
instance, in one bid occasion, a contractor‟s own „revenue‟ could be seen as a very important 
determinant affecting a bid mark-up decision. In another occasion, the „revenue‟ might be seen as 
a much less important determinant because the bidder thinks that the project has a high strategic 
value. In this case, the „project strategic importance‟ subdues „revenues‟ in the bid mark-up 
decisions. Thus, the effect of „revenues‟ towards bid mark-ups is contingent towards „project 
strategic importance‟. Since most past studies did not consider the possible contingent effect of 
determinants towards bid mark-ups, it could lead to a less than accurate prediction and 
explanation of bid mark-ups. 
Another important consideration relevant to studies of bid mark-up decisions is the need to 
incorporate pertinent theories. Most past empirical studies in the bid mark-ups did not explicitly 
incorporate a theory of risky decision making (exception:  (de Neufville and King, 1991)). Theory 
in general can be used to assist the development of a more realistic model to describe social 
phenomenon – in this case the bid mark-ups. In the words of Neuman (2000):  
“Being explicit about the theory makes it easier to read someone else‟s research or to conduct your 
own. An awareness of how theory fits into the research process produces better designed, easier to 
understand, and better conducted studies “(p. 40). 
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A prominent theory has its own philosophical root, paradigm, assumptions, and research 
methods (Punch, 2000). The incorporation of theory of individual decision making in a bid mark-
up study will help researchers to view and to tackle the observed problem with a more robust 
logical thinking. Relevant theories would also assist researchers in utilizing deductive logics and 
incorporating past empirical observations to predict and to explain the general pattern of bid 
mark-up decisions. 
The call for more research which explicitly incorporates relevant theories is apparent in the 
domain of general project management (Koskela and Howell, 2008) and in the more specific area 
of construction project management (Fellows and Liu, 2000). Relevant to the current discussion, 
the need of theory to guide research in the area of pre-bid price estimating is also evident (Gunner 
and Skitmore, 1999). 
From the above literature review, the general pattern of existing studies had been identified. 
Some research opportunities have also been highlighted to provide a direction to develop a 
specific research objective which is already presented in Section 1.3. To address the identified 
research opportunities and hence to extend the existing knowledge on bid mark-up decisions, this 
current study needs to develop a theoretical framework of bid mark-up decisions which is 
parsimonious, considers the contingent effect, and explicitly incorporates pertinent theories of 
risky decision making. By parsimonious the framework would only include few, key determinants 
to enable in-depth analysis and to provide deeper insights. A parsimonious model would facilitate 
an easier utilization by bidders. By considering the contingent effects, a more accurate 
explanations and predictions of bid mark-ups could be expected. Explicitly incorporating 
pertinent theories would improve the theoretical rigor of the framework. The framework would 
also need to be verified by an empirical study. 
2.6 Categories of Determinants affecting Bid Mark-up Decisions 
Past empirical studies provided a long list of possible determinants affecting bid mark-up 
decisions as reported previously in Table 2.3. To facilitate development of a parsimonious 
framework and to gain a reasonable depth of analysis given research constraints, the scope of the 
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theoretical framework was carefully limited. It was done by firstly classifying all identified 
determinants and then carefully excluding groups of determinants which were considered less 
important. Few determinants from the remaining group(s) which were deemed important for 
predicting and explaining bid mark-up decisions were retained. These key determinants were then 
used for theoretical model development. The procedure is explained in the following passages.  
In this study, reported determinants which were summarized in Table 2.3 were classified into 
three main categories, namely: „external factors‟, „nature of the bid and project‟, and „contractor‟s 
own state‟. It follows a categorization which had been developed by Egemen and Mohamed 
(2007) through extensive interviews with experienced bidders and literature reviews. After careful 
deliberations as described in the following paragraphs, it was decided that this study would be 
focusing on examining key determinants under the „contractor‟s own state‟. As a consequence, all 
determinants which were classified under „external factors‟ and „nature of the bid and project‟ 
categories were excluded from the analysis.  
‘External factors’ is a group of indentified determinants affecting bid mark-up decisions 
which in most cases are beyond the control of the contractors. Ling and Liu (2005) used the term 
„economic situations‟ to represent pertinent determinants while Oo and Lo (2007) reported the 
similar determinants under the „market environment‟ category. Three highly interrelated 
determinants which were prominently reported in many past studies under this category as 
presented in Table 2.3 were „number of competitors‟, „overall economy‟ (i.e. either booming or 
recession) and „availability of other potential projects‟. Eight, seven and five out of the twelve 
studies had respectively reported the importance of „number of competitors‟, „availability of other 
projects‟ and „overall economy‟.  
It could be argued that exclusion of the above three key determinants under the „external 
factors‟ would not greatly affect the validity of the theoretical model. It is because the empirical 
studies of both pilot and main surveys were carried out on a single time window of August to 
November 2009. In general, all collected data for this study was taken from contractors which 
were having experienced similar conditions of poor „overall economy‟ (Lim, 2009) and hence low 
‟availability of other potential projects‟ and high „number of competitors‟. Since small variations 
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of the respective three determinants across respondents were expected, the inclusion of the 
determinants would not provide much insight. The effect of the exclusion towards theoretical 
model validity could be considered minimum. 
‘Nature of the bid and project’ is a group of identified determinants which reflect the 
inherent condition of the bid process and the project from the specific contractor‟s perspective. 
This group is further classified into two sub-groups: „project complexity ‟and „tendering 
processes‟. Past studies grouped the related determinants under the classification of „project 
characteristics‟ (Dulaimi and Shan, 2002; Ling and Liu, 2005) or „project-specific factor‟ (Oo et 
al., 2007). The summary in Table 2.3 provides detail accounts on the determinants under the 
„nature of the bid and project‟ category. Project size, past similar experience, and degree of 
technological difficulty are among determinants under the sub-group of „project complexity‟. 
Chua and Li (2000) grouped the similar determinants under the category of „risk‟. Client identities 
and quality of tender documents are among determinants under „tendering processes‟.    
The sub-group of determinants under „project complexity‟ could represent the degree of 
difficulty in managing projects. For instance, the larger the project, the more challenging it is to 
manage. A large project is often characterized by more work packages to be carried out and more 
stakeholders (e.g. clients, subcontractors, vendors) which needs to be managed by the project 
team. For another example, the extent to which the observed project is similar to the past projects 
would also reflect the degree of difficulty in executing the project. Lessons from past projects 
could be readily transferable to a new, similar project hence it could to some extent reduce the 
procedural uncertainty and difficulty in managing the new project.    
 The relationship between „project complexity‟ and the bid price is simple and direct. The 
more difficult a project the higher the premium is sought after by a contractor (de Neufville and 
King, 1991; Fayek et al., 1998). In part it is because the contractor needs more buffer or 
contingency to anticipate the emerging risks of managing a more difficult project. Referring to the 
applied definition of bid mark-up in Section 1.1, contingency cost is not part of bid mark-ups; 
rather it is one of the key elements of the base cost on which the bid mark-up to be added. 
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Accordingly instead of affecting bid mark-ups, determinants under this category would affect the 
estimated project base cost. Hence the determinants could be safely excluded from the analysis. 
The determinants under the sub-group „tendering processes‟ reflect the degree of difficulty 
on carrying out the tendering process from a contractor‟s perspective. For instance, a well-
established client with numerous projects to offer usually provides standardized bidding 
procedures across different bids. Contractors with past experience on the bids from the same 
client would find less difficulty on following the standardized procedure. For another example, 
the quality of the tender documents provided by the client could also be associated with the 
difficulty on the contractor‟s side to do the bid process. In the case where low quality of tendering 
documents are provided by the client (e.g. incomplete, inconsistent, or ambiguous); extra efforts 
and resources would be required by the contractor to verify and clarify the documents. In some 
extreme cases, the contractor may need to amend the tendering documents with standards or best 
practices.             
The relationship between „tendering processes‟ and the bid price is also simple and direct. 
The more difficult the tendering process, the higher the requirement (quality or quality) for the 
resources to carry out the tender (Shash, 1993). For instance, a more difficult tendering procedure 
may require more senior engineers and experienced estimators. A less demanding tendering 
process may require fewer resources in terms of their quality and quantity. The cost related to 
resource requirements for the tendering purpose is usually absorbed by the firm‟s overhead cost. 
Referring to the applied definition of bid mark-up in Section 1.1, the firm‟s overhead cost is not 
part of bid mark-ups; rather it is part of the project base cost. Hence determinants under the sub-
group of ‟tendering processes‟‟ could also be excluded from the analysis.    
Since two categories of determinants could be canceled out without significantly 
compromising the overall research merit, the subsequent discussion would focus on analyzing and 
building a theoretical model which includes a few selected key determinants from the third 
category: „contractor‟s own state‟. 
‘Contractor’s own state’ is a group of determinants which reflect contractor‟s performance at 
the time a particular bidding is carried out. It may be reflected by financial (e.g. rate of returns) or 
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non-financial indicators (e.g. company workload). Further elaboration on determinants under this 
category is provided in Chapter 3 for the basis of the theoretical model development. 
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3 Theoretical Model 
In this chapter, development of a theoretical model which provides conjectures to the 
relationships between determinants and bid mark-ups is elaborated. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
the bid mark-up decision is defined as a contractor‟s decision making process to determine the 
monetary value in terms of percentage which needs to be added on top of the estimated firm 
overhead, project direct and indirect costs, and contingency to reflect the project profit margin. 
The model was built upon the following principles: being parsimonious and grounded to relevant 
theories, being supported by past empirical studies, and considering contingent effects. 
Firstly, the selected determinants of bid mark-up decisions and a control variable are 
elaborated. Secondly, individual propositions between respective determinants and the bid mark-
up decisions are posited. In particular, three posited individual propositions involving „rate of 
returns‟ (X1), „revenues‟ (X2), and „project backlogs‟ (X3) are grounded to Prospect Theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), while a proposition involving „project strategic importance‟ (X4) 
is mainly grounded to past studies. Subsequently, based on One-reason Decision Model (Todd, 
2002), a contingency framework which integrates all individual relationships is developed. The 
framework considers the interrelationships among determinants against bid mark-ups.   
3.1 The Selected Four Determinants and a Control Variable 
It is mentioned previously that there is one remaining category of determinants which needs 
to be considered when developing the theoretical framework, namely: „the contractor‟s own 
state‟. This category could be further divided into two sub-categories: „financial‟ and „non 
financial‟ perspectives. Two interrelated determinants which were reported under „financial 
perspectives‟ were „rate of returns‟ and „revenues‟4. The two determinants indicate the perception 
of a contractor‟s bidder toward their own company financial performances at the time a project 
bid is evaluated. The two determinants were included in the theoretical model.  
                                                          
4 A separate empirical study by Ling and Peh (2005) provided evidence that construction practitioners regarded „rate of 
return‟ and „revenue‟ as key financial performance indicators of contractors. 
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Referring to Table 2.3, under the „non-financial perspectives‟ sub-group, „current workload‟ 
and „availability of qualified staff‟ were the two most frequently reported determinants affecting 
bid decisions. „Current workload‟ was reported in (Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988; Chua and Li, 
2000; Dulaimi and Shan, 2002; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; Ling and Liu, 2005; Shash, 1993) 
and „availability of qualified staff‟ was reported in (Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988; Chua and Li, 
2000; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; Fayek et al., 1998; Ling and Liu, 2005; Shash and Abdul-
Hadi, 1993; Wanous et al., 2000). „Current workload‟ was related to the contractor‟s utilization 
level of its internal resources to carry out bidding processes and to execute projects, while 
„availability of qualified staff‟ could be interpreted as the extent to which internal skilled workers 
was available for conducting bids and projects
5
. Since the two variables seemed overlapping, for 
the purpose of this research, the two were combined and the term „project backlogs‟ was used to 
represent a bidder‟s perception on the current and near-future utilization of company resources. 
Another important determinant which was often overlooked by bid researchers is the 
strategic value of a project
6
. „Project strategic importance‟ is a bidder‟s subjective perception on 
the inherent value of the observed project beyond the immediate monetary benefits, provided that 
the contractor wins the bid. It is related to the utility of the project in responding to or anticipating 
long-term objectives of the organization (Betts and Ofori, 1992; Boughton, 1987; Chinowsky and 
Meredith, 2000). When evaluating project strategic importance, bidders would take a long-term 
perspective beyond what the specific project would contribute in terms of direct profits and 
revenues (Egemen and Mohamed, 2007). They might include: to improve the firm‟s reputation 
(Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; Fayek et al., 1998) and to deter new competitors (Male, 1991). 
This determinant of „project strategic importance‟ was included in the theoretical model.  
 „Contractor size‟ was selected as a control variable or covariate for the study7. By including 
the covariate in this study, the effect of „contractor size‟ towards bid mark-ups could be isolated 
                                                          
5 The cited empirical studies did not provide precise definitions on the reported determinants. 
6 Most past studies reported in Table 2.2 did not explicitly identify this variable. An exception was a work by Egemen 
and Mohamed (2007). 
7 In an experimental setting where it is originally utilized, a covariate is a variable affecting the dependent variable 
which cannot be systematically controlled a-priori by means of a design of experiment; hence it needs to be controlled 
29 
or controlled and relationships between determinants and bid mark-ups might be investigated 
more accurately.  
„Contractor size‟ was considered relevant in this study because past empirical studies found 
that „contractor size‟ mattered with respect to bid mark-up decisions. The specific relationship 
between the variable and bid mark-ups was less than clear. Empirical studies found that 
contractors from different size groups behaved differently in terms of bid mark-up decisions 
(Dulaimi and Shan, 2002; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; Shash and Abdul-Hadi, 1993). 
Specifically, Egemen and Mohamed (2007) found that large-sized contractors paid more 
considerations on the strategic aspect of the project than small-sized firms did. Shash and Abdul-
Hadi (1993) found that three groups of contractors (small, medium, large) had different 
perceptions on the significance of factors affecting bid mark-ups. In an attempt to explain the 
different mark-up behavior across groups of contractors, Dulaimi and Shan (2002) argued that 
capability and resource limitations on smaller-sized firms resulted in bidders‟ emphasis on their 
own conditions (e.g. company cash flow) when deciding bid mark-ups. In contrast, they further 
argued, large-sized contractors which were familiar with large scale projects would focus on the 
complexity and the risks of such projects. Kale and Arditi  (2002) asserted that larger contractors 
had more extensive resources and different cost structures compared to smaller firms and might 
result in a different prioritization of factors affecting bid mark-ups. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statistically during analysis. The procedure would ensure that the effect of the covariate or control variable on the 
dependent variable is isolated; leading to a more powerful analysis the relationship between independent variables and 
the dependent variable. Empirical evidence from the cited publications suggests that „contractor size‟ may be 
considered as a moderator instead of a control variable. A moderator is a third variable on a causal relationship which 
affects the strength or signs of relationships between a determinant and the dependent variable (Venkatraman, 1989). In 
a sense, a moderator is a special case of a control variable with supports of theoretical or empirical foundations (Wu and 
Zumbo, 2008).  The inclusion of a moderator in a theoretical model serves as an enhancement of the original direct 
causal model. In this study, the utilization of „contractor size‟ as a „moderator‟ is considered. Due to the limited sample 
size, the pertinent statistical analyses of moderation effects could not be performed. Based on a power analysis, a 
moderated regression analysis (Braumoeller, 2004; Venkatraman, 1989) could not be performed due to the small 
sample size (i.e. the minimum sample size is 90 (Hair et al., 2006) for a power level of 0.8 (Cohen, 1988) and an 
expected medium effect size) while the available data is 50). A sub-group analysis (Venkatraman, 1989) of two-way 
ANOVA (Wu and Zumbo, 2008) or its non-parametric equivalent (i.e. Friedman analysis) could not be performed 
either because of the unbalance data among the sub-groups cells (i.e. some cells contain zero sample). Accordingly the 
role of the „contractor size‟ variable is downplayed in this study and it is simply considered as a control variable. Since 
the moderator is modeled as a control variable, there is a loss of opportunity for this study to refine the theory – i.e. to 
understand the moderating effect of „contractor size‟ towards the relationships between the determinants against „bid 
mark-ups‟. Nevertheless, since the effect of „contractor size‟ is controlled, results of the current analysis will not be 
affected by variations of the contractor size. 
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Summing up, for the purpose of this bid mark-up study, perceptions of bidders toward their 
own companies performance in terms of „rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, and „project backlogs‟; and 
the „project strategic importance‟ of a particular project were selected as independent variables 
(determinants) for predicting and explaining bid mark-up decisions. „Contractor size‟ was chosen 
as a control variable. Detailed operational definitions of the four determinants and the control 
variable are explained in Section 3.4. 
3.2 Posited Individual Propositions 
Many scholars argued that in order to avoid a spurious relationship in developing a 
theoretical model, a posited causal relationship must be grounded into theories (Neuman, 2000; 
Wu and Zumbo, 2008). A statistically significant result of a correlation between two variables is 
less than conclusive and should not be interpreted as a causal relationship without, among other 
things, a support of a formal theory.  In this bid mark-up study, model development was grounded 
to relevant theories in order to address the above concern.  
3.2.1 Relationships between Performance-related Determinants and Bid Mark-ups 
a. Prospect Theory 
In this study, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) was utilized as a formal 
theory to assist development of three individual propositions involving performance-related 
determinants, namely: „rate of returns‟ (X1), „revenues‟ (X2), and „project backlogs‟ (X3) against 
„bid mark-up decisions‟ (Y). There were two main rationales of utilizing Prospect Theory in this 
study. Firstly, Prospect Theory was considered being relevant for the study. Secondly, the theory 
was deemed robust and influential. Elaboration on the two rationales is described in the following 
passages. 
 As mentioned earlier, Prospect Theory was considered relevant because it provides 
descriptive (as opposed to prescriptive) propositions of risky decision making (Edwards, 1996; 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Accordingly it fits with the research camp on which this 
particular study belongs. Prospect Theory attempts to explain a general, systematic pattern of 
decision makers‟ behavior under uncertainty which often departs from rationality (Bazerman, 
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1998). Necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for the applicability of Prospect Theory are: (i) 
there are at least two alternatives or prospects in which the decision maker needs to select (Levin 
et al., 1998) (ii) every alternative leads to outcome(s) and at least one of the outcomes is uncertain 
(i.e. it involves a risky choice as opposed to riskless choice e.g. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991)). 
Edwards (1996) argued that Prospect Theory could be expanded to any field that deals with 
individuals making decisions under uncertain outcomes. The bid mark-up study meets all the two 
necessary conditions since bidders have virtually infinite choices (ranging from very high mark-
up to mark-down (Oo et al., 2007)) and the outcome of a bid decision is highly uncertain due to 
many factors, including decisions from other bidders and unforeseen future events. 
Prospect Theory is by far among the most influential formal theory of risky decision making 
(Hastie and Dawes, 2001) which provides a relatively closer description to reality compared to 
other competing theories under the same school of thought
8
. Propositions of Prospect Theory had 
been widely verified in various domains, including environmental conservation (Bhattacharjee et 
al., 1993; Mayer, 1995) marketing and consumer behavior (Hardie et al., 1993), finance (Montier, 
2007), economics (Roth, 1995). In addition, a meta-analysis by Kühberger (1998) involving 136 
empirical studies with a combined number of participants of nearly 30,000 concluded that framing 
effect as a relevant conjecture of Prospect Theory was robust.  
A proposition of Prospect Theory relevant to the bid mark-up study is framing effect. 
Framing in this theory reflects the way a particular risky problem is viewed or seen by a decision 
maker. A particular framing of a decision maker would lead to a systematic pattern of decisions 
exhibiting a certain risky behavior (risk averse – risk seeker). Framing effect conjectures that 
decision makers tend to be risk seeking when a risky choice problem is framed as a loss (in a 
                                                          
8 There exist alternative descriptive theories of individual risky decision making. Loomes and Sugden (1982), for 
instance, developed Regret Theory which attempted to explain behavior of decision makers who anticipated feelings of 
regret (or rejoice) associated with possible decision alternatives. The authors conceded that Regret Theory did not 
explain framing effects and had a less explanatory coverage than Prospect Theory. Shafir et al. (1993) developed 
Advantage Model as an alternative explanation of Prospect Theory. The authors admitted that the model was inferior 
compared to Prospect Theory and it had a narrower range of applicability. 
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negative domain) and to be risk averse when the same problem is framed as a gain (in a positive 
domain) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)
9
. 
b. Framing Effect in a Bid Mark-up Context 
In order to accurately predict and explain bid mark-up decisions on the basis of Framing 
Effect, precise understanding of the elements of its propositions needs to be further elaborated. In 
particular, the following questions need to be addressed: 
(i) What constitutes „loss‟ (or negative domain) and „gain‟ (or positive domain) of framing in 
the context of bid mark-up decisions; 
(ii) What constitutes „risk seeking‟ (or taking riskier decisions) and „risk averse‟ (taking less 
risky decisions) in the context of bid mark-up decisions.  
By satisfactorily answering the two above questions, the proposition of Framing Effect could be 
correctly utilized in the bid mark-up context. 
To answer the first question, the concept of framing is better understood by introducing 
another concept, namely reference points. Reference point in Prospect Theory reflects a subjective 
point which is used by a decision maker as a basis to compare possible outcomes of alternatives 
or prospects
10
. Prospect Theory suggests that decision makers in the face of risky choice problems 
conduct „editing‟. During the editing phase, the available alternatives or prospects are compared 
each other not in their absolute values of the alternative outcomes but in relative values against a 
                                                          
9As earlier noted, framing is a key concept which differentiates Prospect Theory and Utility Theory. It was often argued 
that framing effect was considered as a direct violation to invariance axioms – an essential principle of Utility Theory 
and any other rational, prescriptive models of decision making (Kahneman and Tversky 1984; Tversky and Kahneman 
1986; Clemen and Reilly 2001). The framing concept was originated from a psychophysical domain where it was 
understood that human is more sensitive on the change of a state than the final state of the change (Kahneman 2002). 
10
 In its original form, as proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), framing was the way the possible outcomes (or 
prospects) of a hypothetical risky decision problem were presented to a decision maker by the researchers (Qualls and 
Puto 1989; Levy 1997; Levy 2003; Fiegenbaum et al. 1996). The decision maker was said to have a prospective view 
when making decisions. The original concept was further extended by other scholars (Elliott & Archibald 1989; 
Kühberger 1998) to hypothetical problems which were presented in a neutral framing. It was found that despite the 
provided neutral framing, the respondents had their own subjective framing on the neutrally-presented prospects and 
made risky decisions based on the framing. It means that decision makers defined a subjective reference point to which 
the prospect was gauged against. The theory was further expanded in some other studies to address non-hypothetical 
(i.e. real life) risky problems with a retrospective (as opposed to prospective) view. In a retrospective fashion, it was 
assumed that decision makers would make risky decisions in light of past conditions. For instance: studies in strategic 
management area by (Lee 1997; Jegers 1991; Bromiley 1991). 
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reference point (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). When the values of alternative outcomes (or 
prospects) are lower (higher) than a selected reference point, the decision makers frame or view 
the problem in a negative (positive) domain. Since decisions are made on the basis of prospects, 
the approach is called the prospective view. 
For the bid mark-up study, the original concept of utilizing a prospective view needs to be 
extended to include a retrospective one. A retrospective view of Framing Effect asserts that when 
bidders is about to make risky bid decisions, they would contemplate on determinants 
representing retrospective (or past) conditions (or performances) of their own companies. Hence 
by combining both prospective and retrospective views, the contemplation includes the „editing‟ 
mechanism on which the risky bid problem is seen by a bidder in light of framed determinants. 
The framed determinants are either past or future performance of own companies which are 
gauged against certain subjective reference points. 
 Hence it could be said that „loss‟ (or „in a negative domain) and „gain‟ (or „a positive 
domain‟) in the bid mark-up context is reflected by past or future performances of bidders‟ own 
companies which are measured against certain subjective reference points. Some studies 
suggested that „goal‟ or „personal aspiration‟ or „expectation‟ was a commonly used reference 
point by risky decision makers
11
. The definition is consistent to the assertion by Akintoye and 
Skitmore (1992) that construction firms bid pricing objectives are related to expected or aspired 
profit levels. Hence the reference point for the bid mark-ups is a particular level of company‟s 
performance that a bidder believes the company should have operated at the time a bidding 
process is carried out. 
                                                          
11 According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981) a (subjective) reference point in everyday decision making was related 
to a situation to which a decision maker had adapted. Borrowing concepts from Goal Theory, Heath et al. (1999) 
proposed „mere goal‟ as a reference point which systematically altered the value of possible outcomes as perceived by 
decision makers. The working definition of mere goal was closer to personal goal, expectation or aspiration rather than 
a goal which was imposed by organizations and hence linked to explicit rewards. Mullins et al. (1999) in the domain of 
product development utilized performance that a manager believes the firm could have achieved as a reference point. 
This is basically another form of aspiration as a reference point. 
  
This personal goal or aspiration may be a function of a more official goal which was set by the organization; or be 
related to industry averages (Tenah & Coulter 1999) or other benchmarks. However, the origin of the aspiration was not 
investigated in this study. The personal aspiration as a reference point was treated as an exogenous factor in this 
research. 
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Accordingly, a bid mark-up risky problem is framed as a „loss‟ (or „in a negative domain‟) 
by bidders if they perceive that their own companies‟ past or future performances are (or would 
be) lower than their own personal aspirations. It is viewed as a „gain‟ (or „in a positive domain‟) if 
bidders perceive that their own companies‟ past or future performances are (or would be) higher 
than expectations. 
To answer the second question on what constitutes risk seeking and risk averse in the bid 
mark-up context, this study refers to some past empirical findings. The common measure used by 
academic scholars to represent the  level of risk is the degree of variations of possible outcomes 
(see for instance in (Clemen and Reilly, 2001)). However empirical studies of managers‟ 
perceptions on risk suggested that most managers were not familiar with and accordingly did not 
employ the concept of variation as a risk measure (March and Shapira, 1987). Practicing 
managers when evaluating risk would focus primarily on the downside effects of the variation 
rather than the whole range of possible variations (MacCrimmon et al., 1988; Miller and Leiblein, 
1996). Managers seemed to associate risk with possible failures (Lee, 1997); they tended to relate 
risk with failures to perform at an aspired level (Miller and Leiblein, 1996). 
In this reported study, the practical definition of risk was applied. Risk was related to 
possible downside effects of bid decisions. In this sense, construction bidders would see a bid 
mark-up decision which lead to a failure as a riskier alternative. Conceptually, there are two 
possible competing conceptions regarding to what constitutes risky bidding, namely: (i) not 
getting the contract; (ii) getting the contract but eventually earning profit less than the aspiration. 
The two competing conceptions are presented in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Two Competing Conceptions on Risky Bidding 
 High Bid Mark-ups Low Bid Mark-ups 
1) The chance of NOT 
getting the project 
Higher chance (riskier) Lower chance(less risky) 
2) The chance of earning 
profits LESS than 
aspirations 




 In this research, the second notion which was consistent with views shared by Miller and 
Leiblein (1996),  Chua and Li (2000) and de Neufville and King (1991) was applied as indicated 
by the shaded area in Table 3.1. Bidders seem to consider profitability above winning the contract 
in bid decisions. In the bid mark-up decision, other things being equal, providing a relatively low 
bid mark-up value
12
 increases the possibility of not achieving the aspired project-level rate of 
returns due to project uncertainty. Such a decision could eventually contribute to a possible failure 
of achieving a company-level aspired profit (in terms of rate of returns). 
Accordingly, in this study, a low bid mark-up value was seen as a riskier decision making 
(being aggressive, exhibiting risk seeking behavior) while a high bid mark-up was considered as 
being less risky (or being more conservative, exhibiting risk averse behavior). Since the two 
previous questions had been answered, original propositions of framing effect could then be used 
in the bid mark-up context. The original proposition of: 
Decision makers who view a risky choice problem as a loss (in a negative domain) tend to 
exhibit risk seeking behavior while those who view the same problem as a gain (in a 
positive domain) tend to be risk averse; 
Could then be transformed into the following generic conjecture which is applicable for this bid 
mark-up study: 
Bidders who view their companies’ performance as being below aspirations tend to 
engage risk seeking behavior by providing low bid mark-ups. Bidders who view their 
companies’ performance as being above aspirations tend to engage risk averse behavior 
by providing high bid mark-ups. 
The above generic conjecture serves as a reference for development of respective individual 
propositions involving „rate of returns‟ (X1), „revenues‟ (X2), and „project backlogs‟ (X3) as 
described in Sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.4. 
                                                          
12 As mentioned earlier, by definition, the bid mark-up value in this study was measured relative to the aspiration level 
of the company profit (rate of return). Mark-up value is considered low when the value is relatively close to the 
aspiration level of rate of return, or below. Mark-up is considered high if the value is markedly higher than the aspired 
level.   
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The previous theoretical conjecture on risky decision making was further supported by some 
empirical studies from other domains. Pertinent studies in domains of strategic management and 
decision theory are elaborated in the following passages
13
. 
In a strategic management domain, Bowman (1982; 1984) carried out pioneering empirical 
works to examine the relationship between firms‟ performance and risk levels within a framework 
of Prospect Theory
14
. It was found empirically that troubled firms took a greater risk. Numerous 
subsequent studies had provided a similar pattern of findings. Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) 
carried out an empirical, cross sectional study using COMPUSTAT data on United States firms. 
The finding supported a Prospect Theory-based proposition that below-target firms indicated risk 
seeking behaviors while above-target firms showed risk aversions
15
. More empirical evidences 
from similar studies were reported in (Fiegenbaum, 1990; Jegers, 1991; Sinha, 1994). In light of 
criticisms to preceding studies which employed cross-sectional data, Lee (1997) conducted a 
longitudinal study to examine the firm-level performance-and-risk relationship
16
. The finding 
confirmed results of the previous studies. A literature review by Núñez-Nickel and Rodriguez 
(2002) on a firm-level performance-and-risk relationship found that most empirical works which 
were grounded to Prospect Theory had confirmed the same assertions that organizations which 
perform below [above] aspirations tend to engage risk seeking [averse] behavior. It should be 




                                                          
13 Studies in strategic management utilized company for the unit of analysis while those in Decision Theory chose 
individual decision makers for the unit of analysis. 
14 A competing theory to predict and to explain the relationship was the behavioral theory of firm (Cyert & March 
1992). Both behavioral theory of firm and prospect theory were consistent in predictions (what) yet different in 
explaining the relationship (why). 
15 Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1988) used Return of Equity (ROE) for the company‟s performance indicator. „Target‟ was 
defined as the median value of ROE of a particular industry (or the overall industry, whenever applicable) within a 
specific time period of analysis (5-year or 20-year, respectively). Within the period, firms with average (not median) 
values of ROE above [below] the target were considered as good [poor] performers. A firm‟s variance of ROE within 
the period was used as a proxy for the firm‟s risk behavior.      
16 Lee (1997) defined target measures as the firm‟s ROE and market share at year (t-1); i.e. previous year‟s performance 
level. Risk behavior was analyzed by means of content analysis from the firm‟s annual report at year (t).   
17
 While most of the studies did not explicitly acknowledge the utilization of the retrospective view, Lee (1997) 
provided an explicit elaboration. It was argued by Lee (1997) that Prospect Theory in a retrospective fashion was 
applied to explain satisfaction or dissatisfaction of decision makers towards prior companies‟ performance in 
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 In the domain of decision theory, empirical studies by Shapira (1986), March and Shapira 
(1987), and MacCrimmon et al. (1988) provided further evidence on the validity of the 
association between company performance and risk behaviors. The studies examined practicing 
managers‟ understandings on risk in practical settings. A large-scale survey by MacCrimmon et 
al. (1986) sampled 509 Canadian and US top managers which were followed by interviews with 
128 of the respondents. The interview study by Shapira (1986) was carried out with fifty US and 
Israeli executives. Those studies reported, among other things, a general attitude that managers 
who viewed that their organizations had performed below aspirations would and should seek 




3.2.2 Relationships between Rate of Returns and Bid Mark-Ups 
Utilizing the previous conjecture, it could be proposed that bidders who view their own 
firms‟ prior performances in terms of rate of returns as being above aspirations (i.e. in a positive 
domain) tend to avoid risk. Avoiding risk implies that bidders set high bid mark-ups relative to 
aspiration levels. Since bidders are already in a comfortable position their focus is to maintain 
current positions. There is a little incentive to take higher risk by bidding low (i.e. just marginally 
above the aspired company-level profit margins, or below) which could drag down the overall 
company‟s performance in terms of rate of returns should things get awry. Bidders in a positive 
domain will be conservative on making bid decisions. For them, other things being equal, not 
getting an additional contract is not considered risky because the firms have achieved the aspired 
level of rate of returns. 
In contrast, bidders who view their own company-level performances as being below 
aspirations tend to engage risk seeking behavior by bidding low. Most bidders in such negative 
                                                                                                                                                                             
comparison to the aspiration level. This assertion was in line with a notion by Bowman (1982) that under-achievers tend 
to seek risk “to meet the previously established aspiration level” (p. 38). When an organization is experiencing a 
condition where its performance is less than the aspired level, it feels disappointed (in a negative domain). It makes the 
firm engage risk seeking behavior in order to fill the gap. In contrast, when a firm view its well-being is better than 
aspired; it feels comfortable with the condition and tends to behave less risky to maintain the current positive position. 
 
18 An additional finding was that firms in the face of near-bankruptcy situations were avoiding risks. 
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domains understand that the only entry point to improve company performance of rate of returns 
is by securing new contracts. It is reflected by bidders‟ attitude as reported by Oo et al. (2008) that 
„if you are not in you can‟t win‟. Without securing new contracts the bidders would have no 
chance of improving the company-level performance of any indicators in the first place. Bidding 
marginally low increases the opportunity to secure contracts in the hope of earning some project 
profits from various means such as cost cutting, claim on delays or variation orders (Ling and Liu, 
2005; Oo et al., 2007). However, the decision implies a higher risk of earning profits less than the 
aspiration for the particular project which in the end could drag the overall company performance 
down even further and makes the gap between the actual and aspired performance even wider– 
hence the decision is riskier. Referring to the above analysis, the propositions can be stated as 
follows: 
Proposition (P)1a: Bidders who view their own companies’ prior performances as being 
below aspirations (in terms of company-level rate of returns) tend to engage risk 
seeking behaviors by providing low bid mark-ups;  
P1b: Bidders who view their own companies’ prior performances as being above aspirations 
(in terms of company-level rate of returns) tend to engage risk averse behaviors by 
providing high bid mark-ups. 
3.2.3 Relationships between Revenues and Bid Mark-Ups 
The proposition follows the same retrospective view as this for „rate of returns‟. As 
predicted by Prospect Theory a bidder who perceives that his/her company‟s revenue is below 
expectation (in a negative domain) could engage risk seeking behavior by bidding low. The 
perceived company-level revenue at the time the bid decision is carried out could be viewed by a 
bidder as a proxy of the business volume his/her company is likely to perform within a stipulated 
financial year. Business volume becomes crucial for the organization since it is related to the 
ability of the firm to sustain the overhead (Dulaimi and Shan, 2002). Failure to secure sufficient 
business volume may lead to decreased firm capacity or bankruptcy (Shash, 1993). Bidders tend 
to be more aggressive by bidding low (relative to the aspired rate of returns) to improve the 
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chance of winning the contract and to fill in the gap between the perceived company-level 
business volume (i.e. revenue) and the aspirations.  
On the other hand, bidders who view their companies‟ revenues as being higher than their 
own aspirations (on a positive side) tend to take less risk by bidding high. They would have had 
less incentive to take a higher risk (i.e. to bid relatively low). Even if they do not secure additional 
contracts as a result of being conservative, bidders are indifferent because, other things being 
equal, the company-level revenues have already exceeded the aspired levels. There is a low need 
for additional works. An experimental study by de Neufville and King (1991) suggested that in 
such a case of low need for works, bidders would put a premium to bid mark-ups and hence make 
high bid mark-up decisions. Fayek et al. (1998) asserted companies with low need for works were 
operating in high profit margins. 
From the analysis, the propositions can be stated as follows: 
P2a: Bidders who view their own companies’ prior performances as being below aspirations 
(in terms of company revenues) tend to engage risk seeking behaviors by providing low 
bid mark-ups;  
P2b: Bidders who view their own companies’ prior performances as being above aspirations 
(in terms of company revenues) tend to engage risk averse behaviors by providing high 
bid mark-ups. 
3.2.4 Relationships between Project Backlogs and Bid Mark-Ups 
A proposition of „project backlogs‟ assumes a prospective view of bid decisions. Framing 
effect is, again, applicable for the proposition development. It is speculated that when bidders 
perceive their own companies‟ performances being below [above] expectations in terms of 
backlogs, they would take a more [less] risky, aggressive [conservative] stance by bidding low 
[high]. 
When bidders frame their own companies‟ project backlogs as being higher than own 
aspirations, they would think of having a low need for additional works. The motivation to win 
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new contracts is relatively low; bidders tend to be risk averse. In addition, with high projected 
workloads, new contract awards would require contractors to acquire extra capacities (e.g. hire 
more manpower, lease extra equipment) with premium costs (Fayek et al., 1998). Accordingly, 
contractors with project backlogs higher than aspirations would set high bid mark-ups. 
On the other hand, bidders with project backlogs which are lower than aspirations tend to 
exhibit risk seeking behavior by placing low bid mark-ups. A low level of project backlogs 
indicates a projected low utilization level of the contractor‟s resources. For such contractors, to 
survive is more important than to generate profit (Boughton, 1987) – bidders tend to be risk 
seeking by bidding low. Some empirical findings supported the assertion that an organization with 
a low utilization would tend to bid low. Bidding low during such a situation could be driven by 
many reasons, including: to retain key employees (de Neufville and King, 1991) and to maintain 
employees‟ morale. The propositions: 
P3a: Bidders who view their companies’ project backlogs as being below aspirations tend to 
engage risk seeking behaviors by providing low bid mark-ups;  
P3b: Bidders who view their companies’ project backlogs as being above aspirations tend to 
engage risk averse behaviors by providing high bid mark-ups. 
3.2.5 Relationships between Project Strategic Importance and Bid Mark-Ups 
As noted earlier, „project strategic importance‟ is a bidder‟s subjective view on the inherent 
value of the observed project beyond the immediate, direct monetary benefits provided that the 
contractor wins the bid (Betts and Ofori, 1992; Boughton, 1987; Chinowsky and Meredith, 2000). 
Some bidders participated in bidding process to achieve long-term goals (Boughton, 1987; Fayek 
et al., 1998; Male, 1991). Bidders could view bidding process as an enabler to achieve their 
organization long-term business agendas (Dikmen and Birgonul, 2003)
19
.  
A specific project may be deemed strategically important for the contractor therefore there is 
a great motivation for the particular contractor‟s bidder to secure it at all costs. For instance, a 
                                                          
19 The agenda could be casually set by the bidder or officially determined by the organization.  
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bidder knows that the project under observation could be followed by much larger related 
projects. The bidder also knows that if the project could be won, the contractor will have 
competitive edges against competitors for subsequent bids such as: being able to set specific 
engineering standards or work methods in favor of his or her own construction firm. This would 
increase the chance of securing the follow-on, larger projects leading to possible increased 
revenues and profits and improved firm reputations. In such a context, bidders consider long-term 
benefits of carrying out the project outweigh the short-term direct monetary pay-offs and hence 
bid aggressively by setting a low bid mark-up. Conversely, if a bidder perceives that the strategic 
value of a project is being low, the bidder would have less incentive to secure it at all costs. 
Bidder will engage risk averse behavior by setting higher bid mark-ups. The propositions: 
P4a: Bidders who view the projects as having high values of strategic importance tend to 
engage risk seeking behaviors by providing low bid mark-ups; 
P4b: Bidders who view the projects as having low values of strategic importance tend to 
engage risk seeking behaviors by providing low bid mark-ups. 
3.3 Contingency Framework to Explain and to Predict Bid Mark-up Decisions 
The earlier propositions P1 to P4 could provide isolated explanations of the effects of 
individual independent variables (determinants) on bid mark-up decisions. While P1 to P4 are 
important to understand, as would be demonstrated later on, directly applying and testing the 
individual propositions would not capture the whole picture of the bid mark-up decision making 
process. It would not reflect the interrelationships between determinants against bid mark-ups. 
Practically, bidders might not analyze each determinant in isolation to make bid decisions. A 
contingency approach was then required in this study in the sense that all four determinants had to 
be taken into account as a combined value when explaining and predicting bidders‟ decisions on 
bid mark-ups. Bid mark-up decisions were contingent to the joint values of determinants.  
The central tenet of the contingent framework which was proposed in this research was that 
bidders, in light of the four accessible determinants, would eventually focus their attention on a 
single, specific determinant as a basis of making bid decisions. This was consistent with an 
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empirical finding of a large-scale study by March and Shapira (1987) which reported that risky 
decisions of practicing managers were shaped by attention and focus. Brandstatter et al. (2006) 
argued that substantial empirical evidence was found to support the assertion that human decision 
process could be predicted by heuristics (see also for instance: (Broder 2000; Broder & Schiffer 
2003)). Theoretical explanations from descriptive studies of heuristics human decision making are 
explained below.  
Consistent with the bounded rational model from the descriptive research camp, it was 
posited that decision makers may utilize simple heuristics to make a decision in light of multiple 
determinants
20
. A heuristic which fits with the previously mentioned empirical finding by March 
and Shapira (1987) and therefore is relevant to this study is the One Reason Decision Model 
(Todd, 2002). The One Reason Decision Model implies that decision makers ultimately make a 
decision on the basis of a single reason after scanning through multiple pieces of accessible 
information which potentially become determinants of the decision. Examples of empirical 
evidences verifying the assertion include studies by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) and 
Brandstätter et al. (2006). Hilbig (2008) and Birnbaum (2008) were among those who contested 
the theory and findings. The building block of the One Reason Decision Model consists of 
priority rule, stopping rule, and decision rule (Todd, 2002). The rules are explained in the context 
of the bid mark-up decisions as follows. 
Priority rule is the order of which the individual determinants of „rate of returns‟, „revenues, 
„project backlogs‟, and „project strategic importance‟ are considered by bidders during bid mark-
up decision process. It guides the mechanism of bidders‟ attention shifting during the analysis. It 
starts from a determinant which is seen as having the highest importance. If a condition to make a 
decision is not satisfied, the priority rule will guide the bidder to shift their attention to the next, 
less important determinant and so on.  
                                                          
20 This descriptive approach was on the contrary to the understanding commonly used in prescriptive approach which 
viewed decision makers would integrate all the available information (by using weighting-and-summing approach 
(Brandstatter et al., 2006) and make a decision accordingly. 
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Prescriptive theories suggested that decision makers in making risky decisions would 
consider both the magnitude or impact and probability of each decision‟s possible outcome 
(Clemen and Reilly, 2001). Empirical evidence, however, suggested that decision makers would 
focus on the impact of the possible outcomes (Brandstätter et al., 2006; Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Sunstein, 2003). Accordingly, it is posited that bidders develop a priority rule mainly on the basis 
of the possible impact of the bid decisions toward their own organizations.  
It is conjectured that bidders would see „project strategic importance‟ as a factor with the 
highest priority which is followed by „project backlogs‟ (X3). The least important ones are the two 
prior performance indicators, namely „rate of returns‟ (X1) and „revenues‟ (X2). The following 
passages provide the rationale. 
Strategic importance of a project could have a long-term impact to a contractor. Betts and 
Ofori (1992) asserted that as early as the 1980s a major structural move from a short-term to long-
term view was observable in general business. In construction industry, Hillebrandt and Cannon 
(1990) found that while most participating construction firms were not aware and hence did not 
have a formal long-term plan, the senior managers who were interviewed had highlighted the 
importance of long-term perspective in managerial decisions. An empirical study by Dikmen and 
Birgonul (2003) in Turkish construction industry found that a long-term value of „having positive 
image and reputation‟ was considered to be the most important objective of construction firms. It 
was also found that „to maximize long-term profitability‟ was regarded more highly than gaining 
short-term gains. This is in line with a more specific finding by Fayek et al. (1998) that bidders 
placed „building reputation‟ and „market penetration‟ factors above a project‟s contribution to 
short-term profit. Egemen and Mohamed (2007) suggested that factors related to „strategic 
considerations‟ had significant roles in bid mark-up decisions. Based on the elaboration, it is 
argued that „project strategic importance‟ would be seen by bidders as a determinant with the 
highest priority in bid mark-ups due to its long-term impact towards the construction firms. 
„Project backlogs‟ is related to the level of resource utilization or workload of a construction 
firm in the near-future. It would also reflect the firm‟s ability to stay afloat, to meet the overhead 
cost and to deploy and retain key personnel especially during bad years (de Neufville and King, 
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1991; Fayek et al., 1998). A study by Dikmen and Birgonul (2003) suggested that, especially 
during a recession time, increasing the workload has become the second most sought-after 
objective after the longer-term view of reputation building. 
Prior „rate of returns‟ and „revenues‟ reflect historical performances of a construction firm 
for the particular financial year. These also indicate the gap between actual and aspired 
performance levels of the organization. The indicators provide a projection on how far the 
organization from meeting aspirations at the end of the financial year. A new bid decision, 
however, would not affect the past performance. Hence it is speculated that the two determinants 
would be subdued by „project backlogs‟ which represents the firm‟s workload in the near-future. 
„Rate of returns‟ and „revenue‟ could be deemed the least important determinants in the bid mark-
up decisions. 
Stopping rule is a condition where the bidders would stop the analysis and about to make a 
mark-up decision. It occurs when particular information (i.e. a certain value of a determinant 
under attention) is found. Bidders would then pay attention to this particular information and are 
ready to make a decision. 
Decision rule is a set of rules which explains what decisions will be made by bidders for a 
given bid considerations. In the bid mark-up context, the decision rule is consistent to the relevant 
individual propositions which were previously elaborated in Section 3.2.  
By utilizing the building blocks of the One-Reason Decision Model, three possible scenarios 
of bid mark-up were conjectured as follows.  
The first scenario [S1]: bidders focus on strategic importance. In this scenario, a bidder 
perceives that the „strategic importance‟ (X4) of a project being observed is „high‟ and disregards 
the values of other determinants. Referring to P4, the decision rule is that bidders who focus on the 
high value of project strategic importance would bid low to secure projects. Bidders‟ perceptions 
on the high value of project strategic importance would subdue other less important 
considerations to make a low bid mark-up decision. Scenario 1 in Table 3.2 depicts the condition.  
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Scenario X1 X2 X3 X4 Predicted Y
Rate of Return Revenue Backlog Strategic Mark-up
Scenario 1 irrelevant irrelevant irrelevant H L
Scenario 2 irrelevant irrelevant A L H
Scenario 3 L Lat least one of the three variables is B
Table 3.2 Contingency Framework of Bid Mark-Up Decisions 
           
Note: A: above aspiration, B: below aspiration, H: high, L: low 
 
The second scenario [S2]: bidder shifts his/her attention to project backlogs. The attention 
shifting, guided by the priority rule, occurs when a bidder does not view a particular project as 
having a high strategic value. The bidder would stop the analysis at this stage if he/she thinks that 
his/her own company performance in terms of „project backlogs‟ (X3) is „above the aspiration‟ 
(regardless the values of „rate of returns‟ X1 and „revenues‟ X2). This is the stopping rule for the 
second scenario. Bidder‟s assessment of „project backlogs‟ (X3) being „above aspiration‟ would 
result in a decision which is consistent to a prediction by P3: bidders tend to take less risk by 
bidding high. Scenario 2 in Table 3.2 illustrates this condition.  
As elaborated earlier in Section 3.2.4, a perceived project backlog above the aspiration 
indicates a projected high resource utilization of the organization in the near-future. 
Consequently, there is a low need for extra work since an adequate volume of projects has been 
secured for a particular time window. Regardless the prior performance of the organization (in 
term of company-level rate of returns and revenues), a high level projected resource utilization 
implies a premium cost to carry out additional works. Moreover, in the case where the company 
performance in terms of company-level „rate of returns‟ (X1) or „revenues‟ (X2) being low, the 
upcoming, already-secured projects would provide an opportunity to improve the two 
performance indicators without a need to take more risk. In short, considerations on „project 
backlogs‟ (X3) suppresses those for two other determinants of „rate of returns‟ and „revenues‟ (X1 
and X2) and as a result bidders would bid high. 
The third scenario [S3]: bidders shift their focus to loss aversion. This is applicable in cases 
which do not meet specifications on Scenarios [1] and [2] and at least one of the three 
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performance-related variables („rate of returns‟(X1) or „revenues‟ (X2) or „project backlogs‟ (X3)) 
is perceived by bidders to be „below aspiration‟. It is depicted in Table 3.2 by Scenario 3. 
It is posited in Scenario 3 that the concept of loss aversion applies for the bidders. Loss 
aversion is another proposition of Prospect Theory hypothesizing that losses loom larger than 
gains (Hardie et al., 1993; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Here, loss is interpreted as bidders 
perceiving their own companies‟ performance (rate of returns, revenues, or project backlogs) 
being less than an aspiration. It is posited that in a view of a joint value of X1, X2, and X3 bidders 
would focus their attentions on factor(s) which represent loss (i.e. below aspiration) and behave 
according to the relevant propositions (P1, P2, or P3). Hence provided that S1 or S2 could not be 
met, when at least one of the three determinants (X1, X2, or X3) is deemed „below the aspiration‟ 




As mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, the contingency framework - on which the 
four individual propositions are embedded - provides an integration of the individual propositions 
by considering the interrelationships between or the contingent effects among determinants 
against bid mark-up decisions
22
. The three contingent scenarios of the theoretical framework need 
to be empirically tested while the individual propositions are not directly testable. 
 
                                                          
21 Some may argue that the analysis of scenario 3 [S3] is not required due to redundancy. By using an opposite 
explanation of S2, the values of Y in bid scenarios which are reflected by S3 could be correctly predicted. That is, one 
can say that given the value of X3 is „below aspiration‟ (which is a negation of the value of X3 in S2) the values of Y 
can be predicted as being „low‟ (negation of the Y value in S2) –regardless the values of X1, X2. Accordingly, to some 
extent S3 is redundant. The analysis of Scenario 3 [S3] is retained because it provides a clear and explicit, rather than 
implicit, explanation and prediction of scenarios which are not formally covered by other scenarios, especially S2. 
22  The previous analysis implies that variations of Y could be explained by only two variables of X4 and X3. It raises a 
question on whether X1 and X2 are still relevant for this study. It was decided that in this research the two determinants 
(X1 and X2) were retained for the empirical study. While the developed contingency model of this research speculates 
that the two determinants (X1 and X2) are subdued by X3 and X4, past empirical studies emphasizing individual, 
independent determinants had reported the importance of rate of return (X1) and revenue (X2), among others, on 
affecting bid mark-up values. The two conflicting claims would be investigated as part of this study. 
47 
3.4 Operational Definitions of Key Variables 
In this section, operational definitions of the key variables of the model are elaborated. 
Operational definition provides concise, measurable definitions of variables which would be 
utilized in data elicitation and the subsequent analysis (Neuman, 2000). 
A practical question relevant to the operational definitions of performance-related 
determinants is whether data of determinants would be elicited in absolute or relative terms 
against aspirations
23
. Kirchhoff (1977) argued that if aspirations were used to guide actions, 
company performance might be measured relative to these desired results. This could be related to 
the fact that company performance data is considered very sensitive and confidential (Dulaimi 
and Shan, 2002), especially when presented in the form of absolute values. Eliciting data in 
relative values may be considered less sensitive since it will not reveal the actual numbers. 
Respondents‟ views on data sensitivity were considered vital in this research because it might 
directly affect the response rate of the survey. A less sensitive data would increase the chance of 
getting a higher response rate. Hence in this study, operational definitions of „rate of returns‟ (X1), 
„revenues‟ (X2), and „project backlogs‟ (X3) were expressed and would be collected in relative 
terms against aspirations. Due to the broad concept of „project strategic importance‟ (X4), this 
particular determinant was represented by a construct with multi-dimensions, multi-items. 
In addition, information would be solicited in a form of subjective assessments of the 
respondents (instead of requesting for hard data). Respondents would be inquired to recall their 
past experience and judgment on pertinent information of recent, specific projects.  
3.4.1 Bid Mark-ups (Y) 
„Bid Mark-ups‟, as mentioned in Section 1.1, is defined as the monetary value which is 
expressed in the percentage of the sum of the estimated firm overhead, project direct and indirect 
costs, and contingency to reflect the expected project profit margin. It is measured against the 
aspired level of the company profit margin.  
                                                          
23 Propositions involving X1 to X3 require data of determinants which is measured against aspirations. Since 
determinants are to be elicited in absolute values, data needs to be adjusted with aspiration levels to get the relative 
value of determinants prior to the statistical analysis. 
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3.4.2 Rate of Returns (X1) 
„Rate of returns‟ is defined as the perceived company-level24, total profit before tax and 
interest divided by total revenues from prior projects. „Prior project‟ is defined as projects which 
had been completed or terminated within the stipulated financial year up to the point when the 
particular bid decision was made. This determinant reflects perceptions of the respondents toward 
company-level prior performance; hence it is a subjective, self-reported measure. Data would be 
elicited in a relative value against the aspired rate of returns in the form of an interval level of 
measurement (instead of using a nominal or ordinal level) in the unit of percentage points. Since 
the variable is simple, specific and concrete, it could be sufficiently represented by a single open-
ended, evaluation-type questionnaire item (Spector, 1992). The similar procedure was applied in 
past studies (Dawes, 1999; Wall et al., 2007). 
3.4.3 Revenues (X2) 
„Revenues‟ is defined as the total monetary value which is generated from all prior projects 
by the company. Similar to rate of returns, this determinant reflects personal assessment of the 
respondents; hence it is subjective and self-reported. Data would be elicited in a relative value 
against the aspiration in the form of an interval level of measurement in the unit of percentage. A 
single open-ended evaluation-type questionnaire item would be utilized. 
3.4.4 Project Backlogs (X3) 
„Project backlogs‟ is the total monetary value of projects which had been secured but was not 
considered as prior projects. Hence it includes all on-going and future secured projects. Similar to 
the two previous determinants, „project backlogs‟ is a subjective, self-reported measure. Data 
would be elicited in a relative term against the aspired backlog in the unit of percentage. Project 
backlogs would be in the form of an interval level of measurement. A single open-ended, 
                                                          
24 In the case where the construction business unit is part of a larger business entity (i.e. business holding), the 
„company‟ in this study would refer to the construction-related business unit instead of its holding. 
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evaluation-type questionnaire item for eliciting information of „project backlogs‟ would be 
developed. 
3.4.5 Project Strategic Importance (X4) 
a. Operational Definition 
Past studies indicated that bidders viewed „project strategic importance‟ differently at 
different time or context. For instance, Male (1991) found that bidders related strategic or long-
term values of a project to the potential role to deter new competitors.  Egemen and Mohamed 
(2007) and Fayek et al. (1998) revealed that responding bidders viewed project strategic 
importance from its potential value to improve firm‟s reputation. Egemen and Mohamed (2007) 
also found that bidders might see project strategic importance from the opportunity to have repeat 
businesses from the same client.  
To accommodate the bidders‟ differing views of the construct, „project strategic importance‟ 
in this study was seen as an overarching construct which covers multiple facets or dimensions 
which do not need to highly correlate to each other (Spector, 1992). Each dimension would be 
represented by multiple questionnaire items. It follows an assertion by Litwin (1995) that the 
utilization of multiple-items to represent an abstract concept would result in a richer and more 
reliable measurement. 
By referring to the findings of past pertinent studies (Boughton, 1987; Egemen and 
Mohamed, 2007; Fayek et al., 1998; Hasegawa, 1988; Male, 1991; Mochtar and Arditi, 2001), a 
list of items related to project strategic importance was developed. Table 3.2 depicts the 
questionnaire items which had been classified into four dimensions. It should be noted that the 
most appropriate method of items classification is factor analysis which was performed during 
pilot study. This method however was not viable for this study due to the limited sample size. 
Hence the classification was carried out by qualitatively observing concept similarities and 
differences across the items. Items with a high degree of concept similarity were grouped together 
under the same dimension. The classification was then discussed with three colleagues for 
improvement.  
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Each dimension reflects bidders‟ different perspectives of the project strategic importance. 
The „maintaining‟ dimension is related to a bidder‟s view on the potential value of a particular 
project to help his or her company to maintain a stable market share by managing competitions. 
The ‘expanding’ dimension is the opportunity for the project to support a contractor to expand 
existing business lines or to explore new markets. The other two dimensions fall in between the 
two. It is a strategic consideration of a project which sees indirect business opportunity beyond 
what the observed project would offer, yet the perspective is bounded within the existing 
construction market. ‘Repeating’ is a strategic value which, as seen by bidders, could improve a 
chance to gain benefits from the same client due to possible repeat projects. ‘Strengthening’ is 
another strategic-related perspective by a bidder which concerns on the opportunity to strengthen 
and to further penetrate the existing construction market. 
The items of project strategic importance as depicted in Table 3.3. were included in the 
instrument in the form of agreement-type questionnaire items (Spector, 1992). A five-point Likert 
scale would be used to inquire respondents‟ judgment on respective items. 
Table 3.3 Item List for Project Strategic Importance 
No Item Code Item Dimension Reference(s) 
1 STRA01 
Opportunity to break into a new market 
with productive future 
A - Expanding 
(Egemen and Mohamed, 
2007; Fayek et al., 1998; 
Boughton, 1987) 
2 STRA02 
Opportunity to secure a foothold in a 
new sector 
A - Expanding 
(Mochtar and Arditi, 
2001) 
3 STRA03 
Opportunity to expand existing business 
lines 
A - Expanding (Hasegawa, 1988) 
4 STRA04 
Opportunity to get easier access on future 
works the client carries out regularly  
B - Repeating 
(Egemen and Mohamed, 
2007; Mochtar and 
Arditi, 2001) 
5 STRA05 
Opportunity to get repeat business from 
the client 
B - Repeating 
(Egemen and Mohamed, 
2007; Mochtar and 
Arditi, 2001) 
6 STRA06 
Opportunity for lucrative, follow-on 
projects from the client  
B - Repeating 
(Boughton, 1987; Fayek 
et al., 1998) 
7 STRA07 
Opportunity to upgrade the contractor 
workhead classification / tendering limit 
C - Strengthening 
(Egemen and Mohamed, 
2007) 
8 STRA08 
Opportunity to improve the contractor 
track record in this construction market 
C - Strengthening 




Opportunity to strengthen contractor 
reputation 
C - Strengthening 
(Egemen and Mohamed, 
2007) 
10 STRA10 
Opportunity to deter competitor(s) on 
taking over contractor market share 
D - Maintaining (Male, 1991) 
11 STRA11 
Opportunity to defend existing market 
from competitor(s) trying to break into  
D - Maintaining (Fayek et al., 1998) 
12 STRA12 
Opportunity to prevent main rival(s) 
from entering the sector 
D - Maintaining  
 
b. Rule of Correspondence25 
An index representing the „project strategic importance‟ construct would be derived from a 
calculation which is consistent to the One Reason Decision Model (Todd, 2002) as described in 
Section 3.3
26
. The One Reason Decision Model asserts that decision maker would eventually 
focus on a particular consideration in making a certain decision. In the context of the current 
discussion, bidders would eventually focus their considerations on a particular dimension with the 
highest perceived value. In other words, given the bidders‟ possible different perspectives, as long 
as bidders think that a project is highly important for any of the four dimensions, they would 
consider the project as having a high strategic importance. Since each dimension is represented by 
multiple-items, bidders‟ evaluations on each dimension are represented by the average value of 
items under the particular dimension. It is presented in Equation 3-1.  
Strategic Importance Index = Max [Average of Dim]i   Equation 3-1 
Where: 
Strategic Importance Index: a single score which represents the value of „project strategic 
importance‟ construct as a whole; 
Average of Dim      : the average of item scores for a particular dimension; 
i         = 1, 2, 3, 4. 
                                                          
25 Rule of correspondence is defined by Neuman (2000, p. 161) as “logical statements of how an indicator corresponds 
to an abstract construct.” 
 
26 Refer to Hair et al. (2006, p. 136-138) for discussions on methods to derive summated scales or composite indices of 
constructs. 
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As dictated by the contingency framework, the index which was measured in an interval 
measurement scale would need to be transformed into a categorical one. When a two-category 
scale of „high‟ and „low‟ is used, the mean of the overall observations would serve as a cut-off for 
the classification:  all values above the mean are classified as „high‟, the others are classified as 
„low‟. 
3.4.6 Contractor Size (Control Variable) 
There exist various possible operational measures of „contractor size‟. Variables which are 
related to the contractor business volume such as annual turnover may accurately reflect the size 
of the organizations. However data elicitation of the variable could be challenging due to the very 
sensitive nature of the data. Dulaimi and Shan (2002) found that Singapore contractors were 
reluctant to reveal such information. 
Dulaimi and Shan (2002) utilized the Singapore Building Construction Authority (BCA)‟s 
financial grade to represent „contractor size‟. Contractor‟s financial grade is a contractor 
classification maintained by BCA which reflects a contractor‟s track record and performance, 
financial capacity, and personnel resources. While the financial grade is considered as 
comprehensive and less sensitive, it provides information in a categorical measurement scale. 
Accordingly it did not fit with this study‟s requirement of an interval measurement scale27. 
The number of employees is a common operational measure to represent the size of 
construction companies in studies of bid mark-ups (Kale and Arditi, 2002; Ling and Liu, 2005).  
Shash and Abdul-Hadi (1993) argued that since building construction companies were labor-
intensive, the number of permanent employees was considered as a more accurate operational 
measure than other measures such as value of equipment owned by the contractors. Moreover, the 
information is considered less sensitive and it could be elicited in an interval measurement scale.   
Hence, in this study, the number of employees was chosen as the operational measure of 
„contractor size‟. More precisely, „contractor size‟ was defined as the average number of local 
permanent employees of a contractor for the last three years. 
                                                          
27 Information of contractor‟s „financial grade‟ was elicited in the survey as part of company descriptive statistics. 
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4 Instrument Development and Evaluation 
In this chapter, the procedure of developing the survey instrument is elaborated. Evaluations 
of the efficacy of the instrument are also described. They include qualitative assessment of face 
and content validities, quantitative assessment of convergent and discriminant validities, 
reliability and an evaluation of the possible existence of common method biases. 
4.1 Instrument Development Procedure 
By referring to the theoretical framework described earlier in Chapter 3, the requirement for 
the survey instrument could be identified. The survey must be able to correctly inquire 
information related to four determinants (i.e. rate of returns, revenues, project backlogs, and 
project strategic importance), one covariate (contractor size), and one dependent variable (bid 
mark-up values). In the same chapter, operational definitions of each key variable had been 
defined. One questionnaire item was assigned for each key determinant except for the „strategic 
importance‟ construct which originally consisted of 12 items. To reduce common method biases, 
the dependent variable of bid mark-up value would be elicited in a different measurement score 
by using its absolute term. Since the theoretical framework would require a relative value of bid 
mark-ups against aspirations, another item was included to obtain the perceived aspiration level. 
Items translated from the operational definitions of the key variables serve as the backbone of the 
instrument draft. 
In addition to the above key variables, descriptive information of companies and respondents 
profiles would also be collected. This study considered past studies in bid mark-ups (for instance: 
(Ling and Liu, 2005)) to generate a list of relevant items related to descriptive information.  
To ensure that the instrument would cover all necessary items while maintaining a 
reasonably short item list, a table was developed to record possible relevant questions or items. 
Table 4.1 shows the final items list, the corresponding item code, type of measurement scale, and 
the possible responses. A draft of questionnaire was then developed. Items were grouped into 
three main sections, namely: „company profile‟, „respondent profile‟, and „project and bid 
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profile‟. Items were ordered in a logical manner to improve clarity. Survey instructions and 
definitions of certain terms were also included in the draft. 
Table 4.1 List of Questionnaire Items 
Question / Item Type of Measurement Response Note
A1 Financial Grade for CW01 (General 
Building Category)
Ordinal A1/ A2/ B1/ B2/ C1/C2/C3/ not 
applicable
A2 Financial Grade for CW02 (Civil 
Engineering Category)
Ordinal A1/ A2/ B1/ B2/ C1/C2/C3/ not 
applicable
A3  Average number of permanent 
employees in the last three years
Interval, open-ended question [ _________ ] Contractor Size, fol lowing Ling & Liu (2005)
A4 Most preferable used method of 
determining bid mark-ups
Ordinal and open-ended 
question
intuitive judgment / statistical 
analysis / other ____________ 
A5 Comfortable level with the current bid 
mark-ups method
Likert 5-scale very uncomfortable to very 
comfortable
A6 Average success rate of the company on 
competitive bid attempts in the last 
three years
Interval, open-ended question, 
in percentage
[ ________ ] %
B1 Current Designation Ordinal and open-ended 
question
director, senior management / 
estimating & contract manager, 
project manager / other ___ 
B2 Length of working in construction Interval, open-ended question [ _________ ] years General  experience in the industry
B3 Length of holding current designation Interval, open-ended question [ _________ ] years Experience in the curent pos i tion
B4 The number of bid mark-up decisions 
involved 
Ordinal no involvement / 1 to 4 / 5 to 10 / 
more than 10 bids
Experience on bid mark-ups
C1 Project Workhead Ordinal CW01/CW02 Project category. CW 01 for genera l  bui lding 
and CW 02 for Civi l  Engineering
C2 Recentness of the bid Ordinal Less than 2 weeks ago / 2 to 4 weeks 
ago / older than 4 weeks
C3 Bid Mark-ups (profit margins) interval, open-ended question 
in percentage
[ _______ ] % of total estimated cost The absolute va lue of bid mark-ups . This  
s tudy defines  the dependent variable 'bid 
mark-ups ' (Y) as   the relative va lues  of bid 
mark-ups  against aspirations  (C6).                                                 
Hence  Y = C3 - C6.
C4 Revenues against aspirations interval, open-ended question 
in percentage
[ _______ ] % above / below aspiration For X2
C5 Project Backlogs against aspirations interval, open-ended question 
in percentage
[ _______ ] % above / below aspiration For X3. To improve clari ty, the term 
"ongoing-and-forthcoming workload" was  
used in the questionnaire.
C6 Rate of Returns against aspirations interval, open ended question in 
percentage points
[ _______ ] %~points above / below 
aspiration
For X1
C7 The expected company-level of gross 
profit margins
interval, open ended question in 
percentage
[ _______ ] %
STRA01 to 
STRA12*
Twelve items for 'project strategic 
importance' (X4)




C. Project & Bid Profile
Contractor Size, fol lowing Dula imi  & Shan 
(2002). This  survey invi ted only contractors  
with grades  of A1 to C1. However in the 
questionaire, C2 and C3 category responses  
were  provided to accommodate poss ible 
downgrades  of l i s ted contractors .
 




Whenever applicable, the design of the instrument would consider a variety of pro-active 
strategies to minimize common method biases as suggested by Podsakoff  et al. (2003). In 
particular, the item which elicits information of the dependent variable (i.e. bid mark-ups) was  
placed at the earlier part of the questionnaire on bid profiles to reduce the likely development of 
implicit theories
28
. Secondly, different measurement scales were utilized to elicit information for 
the dependent variable of bid mark-ups and the independent variables. As described earlier, items 
related to „bid mark-ups‟ would elicit information in the absolute values while those for „rate of 
returns‟, „revenues‟, and „project backlogs‟ would elicit information in the relative values against 
aspirations respectively. Thirdly, following suggestions by Podsakoff  et al. (2003), instructions 
were provided to reduce respondents‟ concerns on evaluation apprehension leading to common 
method biases. In particular, it was highlighted in the survey instruction that respondents might 
participate in the survey anonymously and there was no right or wrong answers to the 
questionnaire.  
The final process of the draft development was giving a finishing touch to improve the 
overall appearance of the instrument. At this point, the original draft was ready for the pilot study 
and subsequent evaluations. 
4.2 Qualitative Evaluation of Instrument Validity 
The purpose of this pilot study was to qualitatively evaluate the effectiveness of the survey 
instrument as a communication means between researchers and respondents. In the following 
sections, detailed objectives, method and key results of the pilot study are presented. The applied 
procedures in this study follow those which were suggested by (Creswell, 2008; Litwin, 1995; 
Neuman, 2000; Sapsford, 1999). 
                                                          
28 Implicit theory is an illusory correlation of variables which can be developed by a respondent when answering a 
survey. This correlation does not necessarily reflect the intended correlation being tested by researchers. A respondent 
with a strong implicit theory may provide biased answers toward confirming his/her own illusory correlation. By not 
placing the dependent variable in the last part of the instrument, it would be more difficult for respondents to guess the 
actual dependent variable and hence to develop their own theory.  
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4.2.1 Objective 
The followings are the specific purposes of the qualitative pilot study: 
a) to evaluate appearance and to identify problems of the survey instrument, namely: 
typographical and grammatical errors.  
b) to predict difficulties that may arise during the main survey and to find solutions to 
minimize them;  
c) to estimate the time needed to complete the questionnaire; 
d) to assess sensitivity of data to be inquired from the respondents‟ perspective and to elicit 
feedbacks to improve the response rate;  
e) to assess face validity and content validity29.  
Based on the stated objective, list of question items were developed as depicted in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Items for the Pilot Study 
Questions Related objectives Pilot Study Stage
1 Are there any typographical errors?  Misspelled words? (a) 1
2 Is the type size big enough to be easily read? (a) 1
3 Are the terminologies appropriate for the respondents? (a) 2
3 Is the instruction clear enough to follow? (b) 1,2
4 Is the question clear enough to follow? (b) 1,2
5 Is the style of the items too monotonous? (b) 1
6 Does the survey format flow well? (b) 1,2
7 Is the survey too long? Do the item numbers make sense? (c) 1,2
8 How long it takes to complete the whole survey? (c) 2
9 Are certain items too sensitive to be asked? (d) 2
10 Do you think that the respondents would decline to respond to  sensitive items, if 
any? Why? How to deal?
(d) 2
11 Overall, are the question items appropriate and relevant for measuring the 
concepts they want to measure, respectively? 
(e) 1,2
12 Overall, does this instrument seem like a reasonable way to gain the information 
the researchers are attempting to obtain?
(e) 2
14 Other comments __________________ (e) 1,2
 
                                                          
29 Face validity refers to a cursory view of question items by common people while content validity is a subjective 
assessment by experienced or knowledgeable judges on how appropriate the items for the given context (Litwin, 1995). 
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4.2.2 Methods of Inquiry 
The qualitative pilot study was conducted in two stages. As indicated in Table 4.2, the first 
stage mainly covered evaluations on the presentation of the instrument from a layman 
perspective. The questionanaire was assessed in a cursory sense. The second stage emphasized on 
the relevance of the detailed question items from an experienced respondent‟s perspective. In 
particular, the second stage investigated whether respective items would likely to correctly 
measure variables that were set to be measured. Two slightly different versions of an open-ended 
type of evaluation forms were developed to guide the two stages of the pilot study. Appendix 1 
shows a sample of the evaluation form. 
Whenever possible, the pilot study was conducted by means of face-to-face interviews. This 
would provide sufficient opportunity for the researcher to acquire richer information by asking the 
respondents for elaboration beyond the questions listed in the evaluation form. It would also 
provide opportunities to exchange ideas on the underlying theoretical concepts behind the 
instrument.  
In some cases, it was not feasible to carry out face-to-face interviews (e.g. due to a tight 
schedule of the pilot respondent). For such cases, the instrument and the evaluation form were 
sent out by email to the respondents for their self-administered evaluations. Respondents and the 
researchers communicated by email exchanges for deeper elaboration. 
A continuous review method was adapted in evaluating the instrument. It means that every 
time feedbacks were received from and discussed with respondents, the instrument was revised 
accordingly. Hence, it was expected that the quality of the instrument would advance over time to 
a point where further significant improvement could no longer be achieved. 
Out of the sixteen prospective respondents which were contacted at different points of time, 
four provided no responses to the initial invitation, three declined to participate, one had wrongly 
answered the evaluated instrument instead of the evaluation form. Hence eight respondents had 
participated in this qualitative pilot study – a 50% of response rate. Profiles of participants varied 
from graduate students who had some exposures in project management concepts and possessed 
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no real experience in construction industry (for the first stage of the pilot study) to a vice 
president of an engineering and construction company with extensive experience in the industry 
(for the second stage). Table 4.3 shows profiles of the pilot respondents. 








1 Post-graduate students 0 year 2 (25%) 
First stage of the 
pilot study 
2 
Mid management / 
senior engineer 
5 years 4 (50%) 
Second stage of the 
pilot study 
3 Senior Management 15.5 years 2 (25%) 
Second stage of the 
pilot study 
 Total  8 (100%)  
 
4.2.3 Results 
Table 4.4 provides key results of the pilot study. As earlier mentioned, it should be noted that 
the instrument under evaluation advanced in parallel with the progression of the pilot study. This 
is to say that a subsequent pilot respondent would have received a new version of the instrument 
draft which had been updated on the basis of feedbacks from a preceding respondent. 
Table 4.4 Results Summary of the Qualitative Pilot Study 

















a) Some typographical and grammatical errors were identified and fixed in 
both the cover letter and instrument; 
b) The presentation and lay-outs of some items was re-arranged to improve 
clarity; 
c) The order of the item presentation in the instrument was re-arranged In 
particular, item representing the dependent variable („bid mark-up‟) was 
relocated to the early part of the questionnaire. It would be useful to 
improve clarity and to reduce common method bias  (Podsakoff et al., 2003; 
Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). 
 





engineer with 5 
years of 




a) Instructions and terminologies used were generally found to be sufficiently 
comprehensible and intuitive; except for certain things as indicated in b) 
and c); 
b) The definition of „project backlogs‟ was rather unclear. It was fixed; 
c) The distinction between the question on actual prior performance and 
expected performance was rather unclear. It was re-worded to avoid 
confusions. The middle response choice of „it performed as I had expected‟ 
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was removed to reduce „social desirability bias‟;  
d) The logical flow of the survey format was found to be good; 
e) Three items related to the „maintaining‟ dimension on project strategic 
importance were found to be rather sensitive. However it must be retained 
as suggested in the theoretical work. Nevertheless, the three items which 
had been originaly located at the first part of the „project strategic 
importance‟ section was moved to the last part of the same section 
(following the idea to put the most difficult questions in the last section);  
f) It was found that in overall, the items were appropriate and relevant for 
measuring the concepts to be measured; 
g) The respondent argued that information technology has been widely used in 
Singapore construction industry. Hence, he further asserted, it might be 
useful to provide an e-survey system to complement the conventional 
mailed survey. In responding to that assertion an e-survey system was 
developed; 
h) As a side note, due to the low current workload of contractors, the 
respondent predicted that the response rate of this survey was promising. 
  





engineer with 3 
years of experience 
in a construction 
company 
a) „Project backlogs‟ terminology was found to be unfamiliar to the 
respondent. However, he believed senior managers or those who were 
„working in the office‟ would know it. The researcher conducted a further 
check to the assertion with the subsequent respondent. Result is shown on 
section 5.a of this table; 
b) It was found that the instructions were clear enough. No further 
suggestions; 
c) It was found that the questions were clear enough. A random check to one 
of the most complicated questions provided evidence that the respondent 
intrepeted the question in a way it was intended by the reseacher; 
d) The question order was believed to be fine; 
e) The respondent had an impression that the survey seemed to be shorter than 
typical surveys he had previously participated. He predicted that on average 
respondents of this study would complete the whole survey for 15 minutes 
or less; 
f) Anonimity and confidentiality should be emphasized. Some potential 
respondents may decline to participate due to their personal circumstances 
(e.g. paranoia). Those who are working in companies which performed well 
may be more willing to participate; 
g) The respondent felt that overall the items were relevant for measuring the 
concepts; 
h) Some notes for the strategic importance variable: the following items might 
be incorporated: „opportunity to gather new experience‟ & „opportunity to 
gather new skills‟ [i.e. extending the company‟s core competence]; 
Follow-up: the item of „to strengthen my company‟s reputation‟ was 
replaced by a more concrete statement: „to acquire new experience or new 
skills in construction methods‟; 
i) It was believed by the respondent that a mailed-survey is a better method of 
inquiry than face-to-face interview for the main survey due to privacy 
concerns; 
j) Some tips from the respondent to improve the response rate: 
 Gather contact information from Professors who have  strong networks 
in the industry; 
 Look for „peak events‟ (i.e. industry-based conferences where industry 
players do their marketing); 
 Follow-up calls for reminder after submiting the invitation letter and 
the instrument; 
 Utilize email and  e-survey. 
 
5 2 14 July 2009 
[email 
received] 




more than 10 
years of 
experience. 
a) „Project backlogs‟ terminology was found to be unfamiliar to the 
respondent. Follow up: providing a clearer terminology of „on-going-and 
forthcoming workloads‟; 
b) All instructions were clear enough to follow; 
c) The survey format was found to flow logically; 
d) The survey seemed to be short given that the objective of the instrument 
was to test a complex process of decision making. It was predicted that 
around 30 minutes would be required to complete the survey; 
 
60 
In response to the above concern, the researcher asserted that the instrument 
was developed on the basis of a rigorous theoretical framework. Most of 
question items in the instrument were translated from operational variables 
which in turn were supported by theoretical concepts. 
It was believed by the pilot respondent that no items were too sensitive to 
be asked. 
e) With respect to „project strategic importance‟ items, it was found that 
the items seemed to have similar meanings. In response to the above 
comment, the researcher argued that the similarities were by-design. 
Groups of similar items were developed to measure respective dimensions 
of „project strategic importance‟. Hence items under the same dimension 
should be, by definition, similar or overlapping. 
 
f) The respondent found that the statement „to secure a foothold in a new 
sector‟ was a bit confusing and inconsistent. The researcher revised it : „to 
build a foothold in a new sector‟ 
 










a) The respondent suggested to add: „construction manager‟ or „facility head‟ 
for responses in the question of respondents‟ designations. 
b) It was found that both the instructions and question items were clear 
enough; 
c) The survey format was found to flow quite well; 
d) It would take at least 30 minutes to complete the survey; 
e) The respondent believes that there were no items which were too sensitive 
to be asked; 
f) The survey was believed by the respondent to be a reasonable way to 
inquire information for this study; 
g) The respondent also highlighted the importance of a proper introduction 
(i.e. cover letter); 
h) The respondent argued that internet-based survey would be useful. 
 
7 2 22 July 2009 
[email 
received] 
A Vice President 
(EPC operations 
unit) at an 
engineering and 
construction 
company with  
19 years of 
experience in the 
industry 
a) All terminologies seemed to be familiar to the respondent; 
b) Instructions and questions were clear; 
c) Survey format was found to flow quite well; 
d) The number of the items was found to be about the right size. It would take 
no more than 40 minutes to complete the whole survey; 
e) No items were too sensitive to be asked; 
f) It was found that the method of inquiry was apropriate and relevant; 
g) The respondent argued that internet-based survey would be very helpful to 
attract more people to participate and it would also be more convenient. 
 




A site agent in a 
construction 
company with 
4.5 years of 
experience 
a) All terminologies seemed to be familiar to the respondent; 
b) The research scope of competitive bidding need to be emphasized since 
there are other ways of acquiring projects in construction industry (e.g. by 
negotiation); 
In response to the comment, some revisions were done for the instructions 
and questions; 
c) Instructions were found to be clear. A random check of the instruction 
found that the respondent had understood the questionnaire in the way the 
researcher had intended; 
 
d) The original questions related to „project recentness‟ could mislead the 
respondents to a (wrong) impression that the researcher was looking at a 
relationship between the (bid mark-up of the) observed bid (as a predictor) 
and the company‟s prior performance (as a criterion) with a consideration 
of the time lag between the two events. It is called an „illusory correlation‟. 
This condition could lead to biased answers by respondents. Hence the 
question was reworded to provide a hint on the actual purpose of the 
questions (i.e to discover the recentness of the project bid). 
Original: „When was the bid mark-up for this project decided?’ 
Revised: „How recent the project bid was?’ 
e) Survey format was found to flow well; 
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f) The survey was found to be short. The respondent estimated that it would 
take 5-10 minutes for senior management to complete the survey; 
g) No items were deemed too sensitive to be asked; 
h) In terms of the mailed survey method, the respondent provided some 
suggestions / assertions: 
 For big companies, it is possible to have more than one available 
respondents; 
 Contact Singapore Contractors Association Limited (SCAL, 
www.scal.com.sg) for possibility to acquire information of its 
members (i.e. senior management, directors from construction 
companies); 
i) The pilot respondent argued on the basis of his observation that senior 
managers would prefer a paper-based survey. According to his personal 
belief, chairmans, directors who were mostly in their 50s or above were 
more comfortable in working with papers. Their secretaries might operate 
computers. 
   
4.2.4 Discussions 
By following the progression of the pilot study as depicted in Table 4.4, it coould be seen 
that at a point at the later stage, the feedbacks were saturated. This was when the number of novel, 
significant feedbacks from the respondents had dropped. At the time when the seventh respondent 
provided the assessment, the researcher noticed that feedbacks given were all positive, as 
indicated by respondent‟s all favorable or approving answers on various aspects of the observed 
instrument. At the time, an appointment with the eighth respondent had been arranged. Hence it 
was decided that the pilot study was concluded after conducting the eighth interview. 
Based on the feedbacks from the pilot respondents, it can be said with high degree of 
confidence that the quality of the reviewed instrument had improved significantly since the first 
draft. The latest version of the draft appeared to be both effective and relevant to be used as a tool 
of inquiry in the bid mark-up study. Accordingly, the latest version of the instrument draft was 
ready for quantitave evaluations. 
4.3 Quantitative Evaluation of Instrument Reliability and Validity 
For the quantitative evaluation, a small-scale mailed survey was carried out. To distinguish 
the survey with the subsequent larger-scale main survey, this survey is termed „the quantitative 
pilot study‟. This study was conducted from August to September 2009. The objective, profiles of 
the respondents and the key findings of the study are elaborated in the following sections. 
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4.3.1 Objective 
The quantitative pilot study served as a continuation of the qualitative one. In particular, this 
study had three main objectives, as follows:  
a) to quantitatively test the reliability of the instrument; 
b) to quantitatively test the validity of the instrument; 
c) to quantitatively assess the possible existence of common method biases. 
4.3.2 Methods of Inquiry 
Data from respondents was collected by means of a self-administered survey. An instrument 
which had been developed and been qualitatively tested on the pilot study was used. Respondents 
were offered two possible approaches to participate: by surface mail or online survey. 
i. Surface Mail 
Cover letters along with the survey instruments and pre-paid return envelopes were 
distributed to targeted respondents. In the cover letter, respondents were invited to participate in 
this study by either completing the hard copy or the online version of the survey.  
ii. Online Survey 
The online version of the questionnaire was an identical copy of the mailed questionnaire. It 
was published at the same time as the surface mail distributions. Before the publication, the online 
survey had undergone a test to ensure that all functions had worked properly. 
Within a week of the surface mail distribution and online survey publication, reminder 
postcards were distributed to the previously invited respondents. 
4.3.3 Respondents 
A list of respondents was drawn by a convenient sampling from the contacts database which 
was under development at the time this small-scale survey was initiated. The targeted respondents 
for this study were expected to be good representations of the ultimate respondents of senior 
managers in construction industry who have direct involvement in bid mark-ups.  
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Out of 100 respondents who were invited to participate in this study, fifteen (15) respondents 
provided their responses. Two questionnaires were undelivered and returned. It reflects a 15% 
response rate. The rate was within the expectation as stated in the original research proposal 
(Hartono, 2009). Thirteen (13) respondents provided 25 usable datasets for pilot analysis. 
Figures 4.1 to 4.3 and Table 4.5 depict the company and respondent profiles who provided 
usable data sets (n = 13). Figure 4.1 indicates proportions of the respondent profiles based on their 
companies‟ financial classification as general builders. Figure 4.2 shows that respondents were 
either holding very senior-level positions in their respective companies (46%) or having mid-level 
managerial positions which were directly pertinent to bid mark-up decisions (54%). Table 4.5 
indicates that all respondents possessed significant experience in the construction domain with the 
median of 26 years. Figure 4.3 suggests that most respondents (77%) had extensive exposure on 
bid mark-up decisions by having directly involved in more than ten bid mark-up decisions. Hence, 
it can be said that the respondents in this study are considered highly relevant because their 





















A1, unlimited tendering limit
A2, max: SGD 85 M
B1, max: SGD 50 M
B2, max: SGD 15 M
C1, max: SGD 5 M
Others
 
















Figure 4.2 Current Designations of the Respondents (n = 13) 
 
Table 4.5 Experience of Respondents (n = 13) 
Years of Experience in Construction Industry 
Minimum 10 Years 
Median 26 Years 
Maximum 35 Years 
 
less than 5 
bids
23%






Figure 4.3 Number of Involvement in Bid Mark-up Decisions (n = 13) 
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4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
After data cleansing, descriptive statistics of key variables were generated. Table 4.6.a and 
4.6.b respectively show the response frequency of the questions related to the project category 
(workhead) and bid recentness. It can be seen that more than 75% of the recorded bids were 
carried out under the category of general building (Response 1, C1). More than half of the 
reported bids were done more than four weeks before the survey (Response 2, C2). 
Table 4.6 Descriptive Statistics of Variables* 
Response Frequency Percent Response Frequency Percent
1 General Building 19 76 1 Less than 2 weeks 4 16
2 Civil Engineering 3 12 2 Two to four weeks 7 28
3 Others 3 12 3 Older than 4 weeks 14 56
Total 25 100 Total 25 100
a. Project Type / Workhead (C1) b. Recentness (C2)
 
n Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation
Absolute Mark-ups (C3) [%] 25 1 20 8.82 8.00 5.56
Revenues (C4) [%]* 25 -50 15 -8.72 -8.00 18.27
Backlogs (C5) [%]* 25 -50 15 -7.8 -10.00 16.84
Rate of Returns (C6) [%~point]* 25 -10 15 1.04 0.00 7.71
Expected Profits (C7) [%] 21** 2 50 12.74 10.00 10.36
STRA01 - to break into a new  market w ith 
productive future
25 1 5 3.36 3.00 1.29
STRA02 - to secure a foothold in a new  
sector
25 1 5 3.04 3.00 1.14
STRA03 - to expand existing business lines 25 1 5 3.36 4.00 1.15
STRA04 - to get easier access on future 
w orks the client carries out regularly 
25 1 5 3.68 4.00 1.07
STRA05 - to get repeat business from the 
client
25 1 5 3.8 4.00 1.00
STRA06 - for lucrative, follow -on projects 
from the client 
25 1 5 3.44 3.00 0.96
STRA07 - to upgrade the contractor's 
w orkhead classif ication / tendering limit
25 1 5 2.96 3.00 1.21
STRA08 - to improve the contractor's track 
record in this construction market
25 1 5 3.28 3.00 1.21
STRA09 - to strengthen contractor's 
reputation
25 1 4 2.8 3.00 0.91
STRA10 - to deter competitors on taking over 
market share 
25 1 5 2.44 2.00 0.82
STRA11 - to defend existing market from 
competitor(s) trying to break into 
25 1 5 2.4 2.00 0.82
STRA12 - to prevent main rival(s) from 
entering the sector 25 1 5 2.24 2.00 0.83
c. Other Key Variables
 
Note: * By definition, variables were relatively measured against aspirations  
         ** Missing data was identified 
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Standard deviations on Table 4.6.c indicate the existence of variability of the responses. 
Responses on items related to company relative performance (C4, C5, and C6) show that there 
were divided responses of positive (above aspiration performance) and negative (below aspiration 
performance). Accordingly, a concern that only good performers would be willingly participating 
in this study was not substantiated. Table 4.6.c also indicates that out of the 25 usable data sets, 
four had missing data for item of C7 (expected profit).  
4.3.5 Assessing Instrument Reliability 
Instrument reliability is related to the measurement consistency of the instrument (Litwin, 
1995). In this bid mark-up study, assessment of reliability was carried out for the „project strategic 
importance‟ construct. As described in Section 3.4.5.a, this construct consists of four dimensions 
namely: A (Expanding), B (Repeating), C (Strengthening), and D (Maintaining). Each dimension 
originally had three items. A method by Cronbach (1951) was utilized to assess the internal 
consistency of the items under the same dimension (or the inter-item reliability). The procedure 
would assess how well the different items measure the same issue (Litwin, 1995). The procedure 
was carried out for all four dimensions independently (Spector 1992). 
In general, results of the evaluation were encouraging. Table 4.7 shows values of the 
Cronbach coefficient alpha () for respective dimensions. Respective values of coefficient alpha 
for items under dimensions B, C, and D were sufficiently high
30
. It indicates that relevant items 
under the mentioned dimensions were internally consistent. Accordingly, all original items belong 
to dimensions B, C, and D would be retained for the main survey.  
A rather low value (=0.554) was detected for dimension A (Expanding). Further analysis 
suggested that an item of dimension A (i.e. STRA01: „to break into a new market with productive 
future‟) had a low corrected item-total correlation of 0.199 (not shown here). Hence this particular 
item did not fit (Field, 2009) with the overall dimension of „Expanding‟. The exclusion of 
STRA01 resulted in a higher, more acceptable internal consistency (=0.720).  
                                                          
30 A value of  which is greater than 0.7 is generally considered good or acceptable (Spector 1992; Litwin 1995).  
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Hence it could be said that the instrument and especially items related to the „project 
strategic importance‟ construct was considered internally consistent. The item of „STRA01‟ 
would be excluded from the subsequent analysis and from the instrument for the main survey. 







A (Expanding) 3 (2)* 0.554 (0.720)* One item to be removed (STRA01)
B (Repeating) 3 0.912 All original items to be retained
C (Strengthening) 3 0.786 All original items to be retained
D (Maintaining) 3 0.97 All original items to be retained  
           Note: * Value in the parentheses indicates the new score after excluding the item of STRA01. 
 
4.3.6 Assessing Instrument Convergent and Discriminant Validities 
Validity is related to how well an instrument measures what it sets out to measure (Litwin, 
1995). Face and content validities had been assessed qualitatively in the earlier study with a 
promising result. In this analysis, construct validity (i.e. convergent and discriminant validities) 
was quantitatively assessed. 
Various quantitative methods of construct validity assessment exist. However, most of the 
procedures could not be applied in this study due to some limitations. For instance, a multi-trait 
multi-methods (MTMM) procedure to assess validity is not feasible because this procedure is 
only designed to assess a construct which is measured by at least two different data collection 
methods (Trochim, 2006). A confirmatory factor analysis which utilizes structural equation 
modeling (Hair et al., 2006, chap. 11) would not be practicable for validity assessment of few data 
sets (Field, 2009). 
In this study, a simplified MTMM procedure was utilized to assess convergent and 
discriminant validities. It was carried out by leaving out the multi-methods part (Trochim, 2006). 
A matrix of correlation coefficients of items was developed and evaluated. Values of item 
correlations within the same dimension (i.e. intra-correlations) reflect convergent validity. In 
contrast, values of correlations of items between dimensions (i.e. inter-correlations) indicate 
discriminant validity. Both parametric and non-parametric methods of calculating correlation of 
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coefficients were used. Both values of intra- and inter-correlations were then visually inspected. 
An instrument is valid (both convergent and discriminant) if the values of intra-correlations are 
generally higher than those of inter-correlations. 
The procedure was applied for the „project strategic importance‟ construct. Table 4.8 depicts 
a matrix of correlation coefficients which were calculated by using a parametric procedure 
(Pearson‟s correlation). Visual inspections to the matrix indicated that: 
a) Correlations of items within dimensions (intra-correlations) were all statistically 
significant and large;  
b) Correlations of items between dimensions (inter-correlations) were found to be low 
and generally not significant with some exceptions. Inter-correlations between items 
of A and C dimensions were found to be relatively high and significant. This is 
consistent to the theoretical understanding that Dimension A („Expanding‟) and 
Dimension C („Strengthening‟) were not conceptually remote as discussed 
theoretically in Section 3.4.5; 
Most importantly:  
c) Correlations of items within dimensions (intra-correlations) were generally higher 
than those between dimensions (inter-correlations). It suggests both convergent and 
discriminant validities. 
Similar patterns of correlation values appear in a matrix derived from a non-parametric 
procedure (i.e. Spearman‟s correlation, not shown here). It indicates that, in this case, the Likert 
Scale which was utilized for acquiring data for „project strategic importance‟ construct was not 
sensitive toward assumptions of parametric analysis. 
Based on the analysis, it could be said that higher correlations were found at items which 
were theoretically belong to the same dimensions than those which belong to different 




                                                          
31 The result should be used with caution because the procedure was not rigorous. Nevertheless, the results provide 
some degree of confidence to the validity of the instrument‟s items.  
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Table 4.8 Matrix of Correlation Coefficients of Items (Pearson’s, n = 25) 






























** 0.22 0.16 0.11 .397
* 0.37 0.23 1
0.07 .46
* 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.36 0.30 0.17 .97
** 1
STRA12 0.12 0.39 0.18 0.11 0.18 .47




















*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Shaded areas indicate correlations of items within dimensions (intra-correlations). 
 
4.3.7 Evaluating Common Method Biases 
Common method bias is a systematic measurement error which is caused by a uniform 
method of inquiry for dependent and independent variables. In the bid mark-up study, this type of 
bias might occur since all information was acquired by a single means of a self-administered 
survey. 
To assess the possible existence of common method biases, Harman‟s one-factor test was 
carried out. The procedure basically employed an un-rotated exploratory factor analysis involving 
all key measured variables (Podsakoff et al., 2003). The basic assumption of the test is that 
substantial amount of common method variance is present if either (Podsakoff et al., 2003; 
Podsakoff and Organ, 1986): 
a) Single factor emerges from the factor analysis, or 
b) One „general‟ factor accounts for the majority of the covariance (i.e. the first factor‟s 
loading is greater than 0.5). 
Results of statistical analysis relevant to the test were as follows: 
a) Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.557. Field (2009, p. 
647) argued that KMO value of 0.5 was barely acceptable; 
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b) Bartlett‟s test of sphericity showed a significant result (0.000). It indicated that in general, 
correlations between variables were significantly different from zero (Field, 2009, p. 
648); and most importantly: 
c) Using Kaiser‟s criteria (Eigen Value > 1) for extracting factors, the un-rotated factor 
analysis yielded five factors, accounting for 83.3 % of total variations. Furthermore the 
first main factor‟s loading was 33.04%.  
The above results indicated that common method variance would not be a serious threat to 
validity because more than one factor had emerged from the analysis and there was no general 
factor accounting for the majority of the variations. Nevertheless, a careful interpretation of the 
test result must be exercised due to the limited number of data points as pointed out by the KMO 
measure.  
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
Based on the previous analysis and discussions, it can be concluded that the instrument draft 
was considered internally reliable especially for the items of the „project strategic importance‟ 
construct. A minor revision was done to exclude the item of STRA01: „to break into a new market 
with productive future‟ from the instrument. Other key variables could not be tested for their 
internal consistency (reliability) since each of the variables consists only a single item. 
Furthermore, the pilot study provided some confidence to the overall face and content 
validities of the instrument. This assertion is further partially supported by results of a quantitative 
validity evaluation of items under the „project strategic importance‟ construct. Quantitative 
validity evaluations of other key variables which were related to company performance indicators 
could not be viably carried out. Hence this study would rely on the findings of other studies which 
provided theoretical and empirical supports to the assertion that the use of subjective judgment for 
eliciting information related to company performance was valid (Dawes, 1999; Dess and 
Robinson Jr, 1984; Kirchhoff, 1977; Wall et al., 2007). Lastly, a serious threat of validity due to 
common method biases was unlikely according to the result of the Harman‟s one-factor test. In 
sum, it could be said that the instrument was ready to be used for the main survey. 
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5 Main Empirical Study Administration and Descriptive Data  
In this chapter, research administration of the main empirical survey is presented. It includes 
procedures of data inquiry, data cleansing, and evaluation of validities. In the last part of this 
chapter, descriptive statistical data is also described. 
Before conducting an empirical study involving human subjects, it was required to apply for 
an ethical review. This research had been approved by the National University of Singapore – 
Institutional Review Board (NUS – IRB) on May 14, 2009 as presented in Appendix 2.  
5.1 Data Inquiry 
5.1.1 Targeted Respondents 
Targeted respondents of the main empirical study were senior practitioners from registered 
construction contractors in Singapore. Respondents who had been invited in the quantitative pilot 
study were not invited for this study. The contractors‟ registry of Singapore Building Construction 
Authority, BCA (2009b) was used to develop the list of companies. In particular, general 
contractors (workhead: CW01
32
) with financial grades of A1 (unlimited tendering limits) to C1 
(maximum tendering limit of SGD 5 Millions) (BCA, 2009a) were listed. Smaller contractors 
were not invited because the majority of them worked as subcontractors with very small contract 
values. The number of companies identified from the registry was 485 as at February 1
st
 2009. 
Senior practitioners were selected as targeted respondents because past empirical studies e.g. 
(Ahmad and Minkarah, 1988; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; Mochtar and Arditi, 2001) provided 
evidence that bid mark-up decision process was mostly conducted by them. Designations 
included: CEO, Managing Director, Deputy Managing Director, Contracts Manager, Senior 
Project Manager, Senior Quantity Surveyor, and Construction Manager. Specific personal 
information regarding to the targeted respondents (e.g. name) of the listed companies was 
                                                          
32 In Singapore construction industry, CW which stands for Construction Workhead is a project-type classification for 
public construction contractors. CW01 is a class for general builders while CW02 is for civil engineering contractors.  
Each workhead is further sub-classified into financial grades: A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2, and C3 with the following 
respective tendering limits (for July 2009 to December 2009): unlimited, SGD 85M, SGD 50M, SGD 15M, SGD 5M, 
SGD 1.5M, SGD 0.75M (BCA 2009a). 
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acquired from various resources, including the Directory of Singapore Contractors Association 
Limited (SCAL, 2008), ORBIS and OSIRIS databases, LinkedIn professional social network, and 
company websites. In some cases, more than one potential respondent could be identified for a 
particular company. Since there was no way of identifying which one(s) of them in the company 
who had exposures in bid mark-ups, all of them were invited to participate in this study. In the 
case where personal information of contact persons could not be identified, invitations were 
submitted to the generic designation of managing directors of the companies without addressing 
specific names. 
5.1.2 Methods of Inquiry 
The method of inquiry for the main empirical study was self-administered, cross sectional, 
questionnaire survey. One week prior to the main survey, where possible, pre-survey 
announcement emails were distributed to targeted respondents. Survey kits which each consisted 
of a personalized cover letter (see Appendix 3), a copy of the survey instrument (see Appendix 4) 
and a business-reply-service return envelope were sent out by surface mails to invited 
respondents. The cover letter was developed under a strict guideline from NUS – Institutional 
Review Board. Respondents were given alternatives to respond to the inquiry by using either 
surface mails or online questionnaires (e-surveys). It was also emphasized that the participation 
was voluntary.  
Guided by the instrument, respondents were requested to provide a dataset from specific, 
recent, competitive project bidding. This procedure was followed to address a methodological 
concern of past studies which often relied on eliciting general perceptions of respondents toward 
determinants affecting bid mark-ups. Eliciting general perceptions implies that the researchers 
required the respondents to provide a composite judgment (Podsakoff and Organ, 1986) on the 
importance of a particular determinant affecting bid mark-up decisions. For instance, respondents 
might be requested to provide their general assessment on whether “project size” was considered 
as an important factor (determinant) affecting their own bid mark-up decisions. The downside of 
such an approach is that respondents would be required to do some mental calculation to 
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summarize years of experience in conducting bid mark-up decisions and to come up with a single 
score of importance for the particular determinant. This process is prone to human error. 
Moreover, this approach may overlook the fact that the importance of any determinant would 
depend on the specific contextual condition of the bid process. 
This study on the contrary had adopted a procedure which was developed by Boughton 
(1987). The survey inquired specific past bidding experience that each participant has actually 
gone through (Hegazy and Moselhi, 1995). 
One week after the invitation, reminder postcards were sent out to the same addresses 
(addresses with undelivered mails were excluded). The whole empirical survey procedure was 
carried out from September to November 2009. 
To improve the response rate, it was emphasized in the cover letter that respondents might 
participate in the study as anonymous respondents and the data would be treated as being strictly 
confidential. In addition, the cover letter highlights the usefulness of the study from both 
academic and business perspectives. For the same purpose, participating respondents would be 
provided the executive summary of the research results upon request. Distributing pre-survey 
announcement emails and post-survey reminder postcards, enclosing return envelopes with postal 
stamps (business reply service), and using personalized cover letters, as mentioned earlier, were 
also among the efforts to improve the response rate. 
 
5.1.3 Response Rate and Sampling Size 
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 6, there was only a minor revision of the survey instrument 
for the main survey. Hence a usable response from each respondent of the quantitative pilot study 
was included in the main survey. Table 5.1 shows some relevant statistical figures from the 
combined surveys. 
An interesting fact depicted in Table 5.1 is the respondents‟ method on answering the 
inquiry. An overwhelming majority (92%) of respondents utilized the surface mails to respond to 
the inquiry. It is consistent to the assertions by some respondents during the pilot study that most 
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senior practitioners in construction industry would prefer a paper-and-pencil type of 
questionnaire. Online survey was much less effective. In addition, while the data is not presented 
here, it was found that postcard reminders were essential to improve the survey response rate. 
Table 5.1 Information relevant to the Survey Administration 
(a) 
Number of identified construction 
contractors 
485 
Based on BCA‟s registry as at February 1st 2009 for 
categories of A1 to C1. 
(b) Number of identified  respondents  655 
In some cases, more than one potential respondent was 
identified from a particular company. 
(c) Number of survey kits distributed 655  
(d) Number of undelivered survey kits 5 Returned to the researchers. 
(e) 
Number of respondents who responded 
to the survey* 
57   
 
 Responses by surface mails 
53 (92%) Out of the total number of responses. 
 
 Responses by online survey 
2 (4%) Out of the total number of responses 
 
 Responses by fax 
1 (2%) Out of the total number of responses 
 
 Responses by email 
1 (2%) Out of the total number of responses 
(f) 
Number of usable datasets (= sample 
size, n) * 
50 
After data treatment and cleansing. One bid data set 
from each respondent.  
(g) Response Rate* 8.7% Based on the number of invited respondents 
(h) Response Rate* 10.3% Based on the number of invited companies 
*Note: Based on usable survey returns acquired from both quantitative pilot study and main survey33.  
 
From Table 5.1 it can be seen that despite various efforts to improve the response rate (as 
stated earlier), it yielded a rather low rate. Assuming that only one respondent had come from 
each responding contractor, the response rate on the basis of the number of invited companies was 
                                                          
33 The usable replies of 25 from the pilot study came from only 13 respondents (n=13). Since a low response rate was 
expected during the pilot study, two independent bid datasets were inquired from each pilot respondent. It turned out 
that 12 respondents had respectively provided two (2) usable datasets while one respondent had only provided one (1) 
usable datasets. The 25 datasets were used for the pilot study analysis. Since the unit of analysis is individual decision 
makers, only one (1) dataset from each respondent should be utilized in the main analysis. Hence for the analysis of the 
main study, one (1) out of two datasets from each respondent of the main study (n=37) was selected randomly and one 
(1) out of two datasets from each pilot respondent (n=13) were randomly chosen. Hence the total usable datasets is fifty 
(50). 
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10.3% while the typical rate was around 10% to 50% for general mailed surveys (Neuman, 2000, 
p. 268).  
A low response rate is common for studies in the construction industry (Dulaimi and Shan, 
2002; Tan, 1995). An even lower rate was expected in this bid mark-up study due to its nature of 
acquiring sensitive and specific information of bid mark-ups
34
. 
Discussions on the minimum sample size would heavily depend on the statistical analysis to 
be applied. The main statistical analysis in this study is cluster analysis. According to Hair et al. 
(2006, p. 11), cluster analysis is considered as a non-inferential statistical method. The minimum 
sample size is then dictated by the purpose of the analysis. A large sample size is required if the 
purpose of the cluster analysis is to extract a wide range of groups of bid cases including those 
with few members. To sufficiently represent groups with few members, a large overall sample 
size is required. 
This bid mark-up study emphasized on identifying few, major clusters of bid cases. Thus it 
would be acceptable to have a rather small overall sample size as long as the major groups are 
sufficiently represented. Due to lack of details on the developed theoretical framework, a few 
empirically-derived clusters of bid cases would provide the most meaningful means of verifying 
the framework
35
. Assuming that five major bid clusters would be extracted, a total sample size of 
50 is equivalent to 10 bid cases for each bid cluster provided that the cases are distributed evenly. 
The number seems to be acceptable to represent a cluster. 
                                                          
34 In addition, in contrast to past studies which usually invited only one respondent from each construction company, 
this study invited all identified senior management of the enlisted contractors to improve sample size. For instance, 
when the researchers indentified in the ORBIS database that there were four directors of contractor X, all of the four 
directors would be invited to the study by using separate, personalized invitations. In reality, not all of these directors 
were necessarily involved in any bid process. Those who had been invited in this study yet never had exposure in bid 
process would not participate in this study; in turn it would decrease the response rate when it is calculated on the basis 
of the invited respondents. 
35 Since the developed theoretical framework has a low level of specificity (i.e. expressed on three contingent scenarios 
with two categorical measurement level of „high‟ and „low‟ for the variables) it would only capable of differentiating 
emerging clusters with highly distinctive characteristics. Having too many clusters would result in less distinctive 
characteristics across bid clusters leading to difficulty on verifying them against the framework. 
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5.2 Data Treatment and Cleansing 
Upon the survey returns, data was recorded in a simple database, coded, and double checked 
for possible procedural errors in transferring data from questionnaires to the database. Each bid 
case was then given a unique identification number to assist the subsequent analysis. In the 
following sections, procedures to treat and to cleanse data are elaborated. 
5.2.1 Data Transformation 
For the purpose of the main analysis, raw data of two key variables needed to be transformed 
into a new variable to reflect the definition in the theoretical framework. The developed 
framework suggested that the dependent variable (Y, bid mark-ups) need to be analyzed in a 
relative term against the expected profit margin. On the other hand the relevant raw data was 
collected in two separate absolute variables of bid mark-ups and expected profit margins to reduce 
common method biases. Accordingly, raw data needs to be transformed by using Equation 5-1. 
Y = Yabsolute – Expected Profit Margin         Equation 5-1 
Where 
Y : The bid mark-up value as defined in the theoretical framework; 
Yabsolute : The raw data of absolute bid mark-up for a particular bid; 
Expected Profit Margin: the expected company-level operating profit margin at the time a 
particular bid decision was made. 
5.2.2 Checking Eligibility of Respondents 
As mentioned elsewhere, this study specifically targeted senior practitioners from 
construction contractors who have personal experience in conducting bid mark-up decisions. Out 
of 57 respondents who returned the survey kits, four (4) respondents were excluded due to 
eligibility reasons. These respondents either provided no answers for both questions related to the 
„years of experience‟ and „number of bid decisions involved‟ or explicitly stated that they were 
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not involved in any bid mark-up decision. The respondents were deemed ineligible and their 
responses were excluded from the subsequent analysis. 
5.2.3 Dealing with Missing Data 
In the case where eligible respondents did not provide data for major blocks of the 
questionnaire, the datasets were dropped from the subsequent analysis. Three (3) datasets were 
excluded from the study due to this reason. In the case where a respondent provided data values in 
intervals or ranges, the averages of the two extreme values were used as estimates. 
In the case where a respondent did not answer one or two questionnaire items of key 
variables
36
, the missing values were estimated by the corresponding average value of other 
respondents from companies of similar sizes. This approach was applied because of its simplicity 
and due to the concern that every valid data was deemed valuable. Hair et al. (2006, p. 649) 
argued that this approach is best used when there is a relatively low intensity of missing data 
points as in the bid mark-up study. Four (4) datasets had one or two missing value(s) of key 
variables and each of them needed to be estimated. Dataset 4a did not provide information of 
„expected profit margins‟. Dataset 12a did not report the „contractor size‟. Dataset 30a missed two 
data, namely: „rate of returns‟ and „expected profit margins‟ while Dataset 50a did not report the 
„project backlogs‟. 
In the case where less important data was not reported by respondents, the data set was kept 
as it is. Such data would be reported as missing data in the analysis. For instance, four 
respondents did not report their companies‟ average bid success rates. Therefore the four datasets 
were excluded from analysis involving bid success rates. 
5.3 Post Hoc Evaluation on Validity  
In this section, post hoc assessments on reliability and validity are presented. The post-hoc 
analysis was basically a replication of the quantitative pilot study with a larger sample size to 
                                                          
36
 Key variable here is defined as a variable which involves in development of the theoretical framework, namely: „bid 
mark-ups‟ (the dependent variable), „rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, project backlogs‟, or „project strategic importance‟ 
(the independent variables), and „contractor size‟ (the covariate). 
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further verify the pilot results. Assessments of reliability, discriminant and convergent validities, 
the possible existence of common method biases, and multicollinearity are reported.  
5.3.1 Assessing Discriminant and Convergent Validities (Post Hoc) 
Results of the computation of correlation coefficients among items under „project 
strategic importance‟ (X4) are presented in Table 5.2. Visual observations of the results reveal a 
similarity of patterns to those of the pilot quantitative study, as follows: 
a) Correlations of items within dimensions (intra-correlations) were found to be 
large and statistically significant; 
b) Correlations of items across dimensions (inter-correlations) were found to be 
relatively low with mixed results on their significance. The significant 
correlations between items under Dimension A („Expanding‟) and Dimension C 




c) Values of intra-correlations were generally higher than those of inter-correlations. 
The result of this post hoc analysis further confirmed the pilot study that items under „project 
strategic importance‟ were valid. 
As a side note, the possible utilization of Principal Components Analysis (PCA) for post-hoc 
analysis of construct validity had been considered during the analysis. Having checked with 
statistical literatures, it was found that the sample size of N=50 is not sufficient for PCA. For 
instance, Hair et al. (2006) suggested a minimum sample size of 100 while Gorsuch (1983) 
                                                          
37 As stated earlier, the four dimensions of the project strategic importance represent the possible differing views of 
construction contractors on the subject matter. Putting the four dimensions related to the construct of “project strategic 
importance” into a continuum; the position would be „Maintaining‟ in one extreme and „Expanding‟ in the other 
extreme.  The other two dimensions are located in between, as follow: Maintaining – Repeating – Strengthening – 
Expanding. It reflects the differing perspective of taking a defensive stance to protect the existing market share to 
looking for opportunities in new markets. From the continuum it can be seen that the „Strengthening‟ (Dimension C) is 
theoretically close (and to some extent overlapping) to „Expanding‟ (Dimension C). The condition is reflected by the 
relatively high correlations between items across two dimensions. 
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recommended 100 samples as the minimum threshold. Since PCA with N=50 would not provide 
much meaningful insights, the analysis was not carried out.  
Table 5.2 Post Hoc Analysis of Matrix of Correlation Coefficients of Items (Pearson’s, n = 50) 




-0.18 0.33* 0.64** 1
0.06 0.43** 0.71** 0.78** 1
0.39** 0.26 0.49** 0.31* 0.45** 1
0.46** 0.39** 0.30* 0.19 0.26 0.65** 1
0.49** 0.41** 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.60** 0.67** 1
-0.08 0.17 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.26 0.24 0.43** 1
-0.07 0.20 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.36* 0.26 0.43** 0.91** 1















Dim A Dim B Dim C Dim D
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Shaded areas indicate correlations of items within dimensions (intra-correlations). 
 
5.3.2 Assessing Possible Existence of Common Method Biases (Post Hoc) 
As described in Section 4.3.7 during the pilot study a Harman‟s one-factor test had been 
carried out to investigate the possible existence of common method biases. Results of the previous 
test should be interpreted with cautions due to the limited sample size (n = 25) as indicated by the 
KMO measure. 
The same procedure was repeated here with a larger number of data samples (n = 50 
datasets). Using identical procedures, all collected raw data of key variables (i.e., independent 
variables, dependent variable, and covariate) was loaded into factor analysis to extract un-rotated 
solutions.  
Results of the factor analysis are as follows: 
i. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was 0.605. This is a slight 
improvement from the previous test which yielded a KMO measure of 0.557. Field (2009, 
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p. 647) argued that a KMO value between 0.5 and 0.7 is considered „mediocre‟ in terms 
of sample size; 
ii. Bartlett‟s test of sphericity shows a significant result (0.000). It indicates that in general, 
correlations between variables are significantly different from zero (Field, 2009, p. 648); 
Most importantly: 
ii. Using Kaiser‟s criteria (Eigen Value > 1) for extracting factors, the un-rotated factor 
analysis yielded six (6) factors, accounting for 78.9 % of total variations. Furthermore the 
first main factor‟s loading was 28.4%. Hence more than one factor had emerged from the 
analysis and no single factor could be accounted for majority of the covariance. 
The test results provided a further confirmation to the previous test of the quantitative pilot 
study which asserted that common method variance would not be a significant threat to validity in 
this bid mark-up study.  The satisfactory result could be attributed to the pro-active measures 
which had been taken during the instrument development stage as described in the second last 
part of Section 4.1, as follows. The item which elicited information of the dependent variable (i.e. 
bid mark-ups) was placed at the earlier part of the questionnaire on bid profiles to reduce the 
likely development of implicit theories. Secondly, different measurement scales were utilized to 
elicit information of the dependent variable (i.e. bid mark-ups) and the independent variables. 
„Bid mark-ups‟ was elicited in its absolute term while „rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, and „project 
backlogs‟ were elicited in the relative values against aspirations. Thirdly, clear instructions were 
provided to reduce respondents‟ concerns on evaluation apprehension and social desirability bias 
leading to possible common method biases. In particular, it was highlighted in the survey 
instruction that respondents might participate in the survey anonymously and there was no right or 
wrong answers to the questionnaire. 
5.3.3 Assessing Possible Existence of Multicollinearity among Independent 
Variables 
Multicollinearity is a condition where strong correlations between independent variables 
exist. When multivariate statistics such as cluster analysis is utilized, strong multicollinearity 
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should be avoided. Multicollinearity would distort the resulted model and make it difficult to 
assess the individual importance and to interpret respective independent variables (Field 2009; 
Hair et al. 2006). 
Field (2009) suggested a simple method to identify possible existence of collinearity by 
visually observing correlation matrix of independent variables. Field (2009, p. 224) suggested that 
a correlation value of 0.8 or more would indicate a strong collinearity while Hair et al. (2006, p. 
227) suggested a value of 0.9 as a threshold level. Table 5.33 indicates the correlation matrix 
between independent variables of interest using parametric analysis (Pearson). It can be seen from 
the matrix that even though some correlations are significant at 0.01, all correlations are much 
below the threshold level of either 0.8 or 0.9. Hence it could be said that threats of collinearity are 
minimum. 
Despite its simplicity, the previous test of collinearity did not account for combined 
collinearity effects of multiple independent variables (i.e. multicollinearity). Hence variance 
inflation factor (VIF) was used to measure multiple effects of collinearity (i.e. multicollinearity)
38
. 
Table 5.33 shows that the tolerance level of respective independent variables was equal or above 
0.75. VIFs were 1.33 or less for independent variables. Menard (2002) stated that a tolerance level 
of 0.20 or below (and hence VIF 5 or above) was concern. Field (2009) and Hair et al. (2006) 
asserted that VIF of 10 was often considered as a cut-off. Since the reported VIFs are much lower 
than 5 or 10, it could be said that threats of multicollinearity among independent variables were 
unlikely. 
Table 5.3 Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients, Tolerances, and VIFs 
 









Relative Rate of Return (X1) 0.80 1.25
Relative Revenue (X2) 0.363** 0.75 1.33
Relative Backlog (X3) .263 0.368** 0.77 1.30
Strategic Importance (X4) .250 .111 .229 0.88 1.13
Contractor Size (cov) .090 -.103 .175 -.101 0.90 1.11
** Denotes correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
                                                          
38 VIF is an inverse of the tolerance value. Tolerance is defined as variations of a particular independent variable which 
is not explained by the other independent variables. The lower the tolerance (and hence the higher the VIF) the more 
likely multicollinearity exists between a particular independent variable and the remaining independent variables. The 
VIF term comes from the fact that multicollinearity would increase the variances of coefficients in regression models.  
82 
5.3.4 Assessing Correlations between Covariate and Independent Variables 
As stated in the theoretical model development, „contractor size‟ was selected as a control 
variable or covariate in this bid mark-up study. High correlations between „contractor size‟ as a 
covariate and independent variables would affect the interpretation of any statistical analysis 
involving the covariate. In particular, it would compromise the result of ANCOVA in the 
subsequent main analysis. The presence of covariate in analysis would be meaningful if, to some 
extent, it is not related (or independent to) the independent variables. 
 The last row of Table 5.3 shows that the correlation coefficients between the covariate and 
respective independent variables were markedly low. In addition, the VIF for „contractor size‟ 
(1.11) was much lower than the cut-off (5 or 10). Hence it could be said that the covariate was 
independent to the respective and combined effects of independent variables.  
5.4 Descriptive Data 
In this section, descriptive statistics related to participating companies and respondents as 
well as project bids are elaborated. 
5.4.1 Participating Companies and Respondents 
Figure 5.1 shows a profile of participating contractors in terms of the financial grades in the 
general builder category. It can be seen that respondents were reasonably distributed across 
different financial classifications with C1 contractors (maximum tendering limit of SGD 5M, the 




















A1, unlimited tendering limit
A2, max: SGD 85 M
B1, max: SGD 50 M
B2, max: SGD 15 M
C1, max: SGD 5 M
Others
 
Figure 5.1 Company Financial Classifications [CW01, General Building] (n = 50) 
Figure 5.2 provides a proportion comparison between sample and population of participating 
companies‟ financial grades. It can be seen that contractors with higher financial grades were 
overrepresented while those with lower grades were underrepresented. This under- and 
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Figure 5.2 Proportion Comparison between Sample and Population of Company Financial Grades (n = 50) 
 
Figure 5.3 shows the most preferred bid mark-up methods as reported by respondents. The 
result provided further confirmation to the evidence acquired by previous studies (Ahmad and 
Minkarah, 1988; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; Mochtar and Arditi, 2001; Ofori, 1993) that many 
bidders relied on intuitive judgment or gut feeling for bid mark-ups. In this study, almost half of 
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the respondents reported that intuitive judgment was the most preferred method while statistical 














Figure 5.3 Most Preferred Bid Mark-up Methods (n = 50) 
When asked about their feelings toward the current applied method of bid mark-up decisions, 
the overwhelming majority of respondents (96%) claimed either being neutral, comfortable, or 
very comfortable as seen in Figure 5.4. Hence it could be expected that the proportion depicted in 














Figure 5.4 Comfortable Level of Currently Applied Bid Methods (n = 50) 
Table 5.4 reports the average competitive bid success rates of participating contractors in the 
last three years. The figure varies widely from 2% to 90%. Given the median rate of 16% which 
was closer to the minimum than to the maximum value, it can be inferred that the distribution was 
heavily skewed to the right-hand-side tail. This is confirmed by the fact that the mean is much 
larger than the median values.  
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Bid Success Rate , n = 46
 
 
A further examination of the datasets suggested that only ten (10) out of 46 respondents 
claimed success rates of 55% or above. Five (5) of such respondents came from contractors with 
the financial grade of C1 – a group of smallest companies in this study with maximum tendering 
limit of SGD 5 Millions. Two came from A2 (maximum tendering limit of SGD 85 M) and B1 
(SGD 50 M) contractors respectively. One came from B2 (SGD 15 M). The remaining 36 
respondents had reported much lower success rates of 30% or below. This is to say that only few 
respondents were having extremely high success rates while the majority was experiencing much 
lower success rates. 
Ling and Liu (2005) after having discussions with three accountants working in contracting 
firms defined „successful contractors‟ as those with bid success rates of 20% or above. Based on 
the definition, twenty contractors could be classified as „successful contractors‟ accounting for 
43% out of the total sample. Hence both successful and less successful contractors seemed to be 
adequately represented in this study. 
Table 5.5 indicates means, medians, and standard deviations of bid success rates across six 
different groups of contractors as classified by their financial grades in the general building 
category. ANOVA analysis was carried out to examine whether there is a significant difference of 
the means of bid success rates across groups. The p-value of the overall ANOVA model is 0.432. 
It could be inferred that while contractors with very high bid success rates seemed to be 
concentrated in the C1 category, there was little statistical evidence to suggest that a particular 
group was more successful than the others in terms of bid success rates. 
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Table 5.5 Bid Success Rates across Different Contractor Groups39 
Bid Success Rate (%)
Financial Grade (CW01) n Mean Median Std. Deviation
1 - A1, unlimited tendering limit 11 15.18 10.00 9.45
2 - A2, max: SG 85 M 4 39.38 35.00 36.31
3 - B1, max: SGD 50 M 8 24.88 14.50 27.80
4 - B2, max: SGD 15 M 6 21.42 13.00 24.23
5 - C1, max: SGD 5 M 14 37.29 23.75 32.14
8 - others 3 20.00 20.00 10.00
Total 46 26.83 16.00 26.17
Note: ANOVA result: not significant (p=0.330)
 
Another analysis was carried out to examine whether different bid methods (intuitive 
judgment, statistical analysis, or others) would have lead to different bid success rates. The mean 
and median values as presented in Table 5.6 seemed to indicate that „statistical bid methods‟ was 
superior. However the ANOVA result showed that there was no significant evidence (p-value = 
0.552) to confirm the assertion. In other words, it could be said that no method on bid mark-up 
decisions was markedly superior to the others in terms of yielding a higher bid success rate. 
Table 5.6 Bid Success Rates across Different Bid Methods40 
Bid Success Rate (%)
Bid Method n Mean Median Std. Deviation
1 - Intuitive 23 27.72 16.00 27.62
2 - Statistical 17 30.24 20.00 27.70
3 - Others 5 15.50 10.00 10.37
Total 45 27.31 16.00 26.26
Note: ANOVA result: not significant (p=0.552)
 
Figure 5.5 indicates profiles of respondents in terms of current designations. Majority of 
respondents were holding very senior positions such as managing directors or CEOs while the 
remaining were managers or senior practitioners who were directly overseeing or undertaking bid 
process such as contract managers. Figure 5.6 indicates that 80% of total respondents had direct 
                                                          
39 A non-parametric analysis of Kruskal-Wallis showed a consistent result, i.e. H(6) = 5.51  p = 0.480 (Not significant). 
See Appendix 5 for details. 
40
 A non-parametric analysis of Kruskal-Wallis showed a consistent result, i.e. H(2) = 1.10  P = 0.577 (Not significant). 
See Appendix 5 for details. 
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involvement in bid mark-up decisions in more than ten (10) occasions
41
. Table 5.7 shows that 
experience of respondents in construction industry varies with a median value of 21 years. It can 
be seen that most respondents in this study were of very experienced bidders in construction 
industry and holding senior positions in their respective companies – profiles which perfectly fit 




















Figure 5.5 Current Designations of the Respondents (n = 50) 
 
1 to 4 bids, 
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1 to 4 bids
more than 10 bids
no response
 




                                                          
41 One respondent declined to response to this particular question on bid involvement but he or she was considered as 
an eligible respondent due to the self-reported extensive experience in construction industry (15 years) and a very senior 
position in the company. 
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Table 5.7 Experience of Respondents (n = 50) 





Based on the descriptive information elaborated earlier, it can be said that different groups of 
targeted construction companies seem to be represented despite an indentified bias towards larger 
size organizations. Moreover profiles of respondents indicate a high degree of relevancy to the 
objective of the study. Thus it would help to improve the overall validity of this bid mark-up 
study. 
5.4.2 Key Variables 
Table 5.8 shows descriptive statistics of key variables of project bid mark-ups. As can be 
seen most of bid datasets (74%) were taken from general building projects. More than half of the 
respondents (58%) mentioned that datasets were taken from project bids which were older than 
four weeks at the time they were reported. The older the data the less accurate it might have been. 
A visual observation of Table 5.8.c shows that values of respective key variables are reasonably 
dispersed. It is indicated by values of standard deviation which are greater than zero. 
Data of absolute bid mark-up values (C3) shows a wide value variation, ranging from 0% to 
+30%. No mark-downs or negative bid mark-ups were observed from the sample data. This is in 
contrast to findings of past studies (Fayek et al., 1998; Oo et al., 2007) which observed bid mark-
downs especially during a recession time. While the mean of absolute bid mark-ups (C3) was 
reported at 8.92% of the total estimated cost, the contractors on average had expected 10.68% of 
company-level operating profit margins (C7). The numbers were slightly higher than those 
reported by Australian contractors. Fayek (1998) revealed that the common margin size which 
was set by Australian contractors was between 6% and 7.9%
42
. 
                                                          
42 The study by Fayek (1998) adopted a slightly different definition of bid mark-ups on which it covers the contingency 
cost on top of the expected profit margin. Hence it could be expected that the actual values of bid mark-ups as defined 
by the current study (which includes only profit margin) would be slightly lower than the reported range. 
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Table 5.8 Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (n = 50) 
Response Frequency Percent Response Frequency Percent
1 General Building 37 74 1 Less than 2 weeks 12 24
2 Civil Engineering 7 14 2 Two to four weeks 9 18
3 Others 6 12 3 Older than 4 weeks 29 58
Total 50 100 Total 50 100
a. Project Type / Workhead (C1) b. Recentness (C2)
 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Deviation
Absolute Mark-ups (C3) [%] 50 .0 30.0 8.92 8.00 6.12
Revenues (C4) [%]* 50 -60.0 50.0 -4.58 -0.50 21.45
Backlogs (C5) [%]* 50 -80.0 29.0 -14.10 -10.00 22.39
Rate of Returns (C6) [%~point]* 50 -30.0 10.0 -2.39 -1.65 8.85
Expected Profits (C7) [%] 50 2.0 50.0 10.68 10.00 7.74
STRA02 - to secure a foothold in a new  sector 50 1 5 3.18 3.00 1.10
STRA03 - to expand existing business lines 50 1 5 3.46 4.00 1.01
STRA04 - to get easier access on future 
w orks the client carries out regularly 
50 1 5 3.46 4.00 0.99
STRA05 - to get repeat business from the client 50 1 5 3.50 4.00 1.07
STRA06 - for lucrative, follow -on projects from 
the client 
50 1 5 3.22 3.00 1.02
STRA07 - to upgrade the contractor's 
w orkhead classif ication / tendering limit
50 1 5 3.16 3.00 1.35
STRA08 - to improve the contractor's track 
record in this construction market
50 1 5 3.58 4.00 1.28
STRA09 - to strengthen contractor's reputation
50 1 5 3.04 3.00 1.09
STRA10 - to deter competitors on taking over 
market share 
50 1 5 2.46 2.00 1.13
STRA11 - to defend existing market from 
competitor(s) trying to break into 
50 1 5 2.50 2.00 1.15
STRA12 - to prevent main rival(s) from entering 
the sector
50 1 5 2.36 2.00 1.10
c. Other Key Variables
 
Note: *   By definition, the respective variables were relatively measured against aspirations. A negative score suggests a 
company’s performance below the aspiration. For instance revenue of -60% means that the company, prior to the 
study, had performed 60% below its own aspiration in terms of its revenue.  
 
Responses on items related to company relative performances (i.e. Revenues, C4; Project 
Backlogs, C5; and Rate of Returns, C6) show that there were divided responses of positive (above 
aspiration performance) and negative (below aspiration performance). Accordingly, a concern 




                                                          
43 Babbie (2010) argued that researchers needed to demonstrate that biases which hinder an accurate interpretation of 
the empirical results should be minimized. For this bid mark-up study, a potential major source of biases is the non-
response bias (see Dattalo (2008) for discussions on non-response bias). Specifically in the context of this study, there 
was a concern, as stated by a pilot respondent, that respondents representing high performing contractors would be 
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Means and medians of the previously mentioned three performance measures indicated 
negative values – evidence that on average participating contractors had performed below their 
own respective aspirations. The below-expectation performances of contractors could be related 
to the fact that construction firms were experiencing poor economic conditions at the time the 
study was carried out. 
Responses on items related to „project strategic importance‟ (i.e. STRA02 to STRA12) 
varied with a minimum value of one (1) and maximum value of (5). Standard deviations indicated 
that the responses were reasonably distributed.  
Nineteen (19) out of the fifty (50) respondents had stated that the respective projects under 
observation were considered as having high strategic values
44
. It represents a relatively high 
proportion (38%) of the reported bid cases. Out of the nineteen (19) projects, five (5), five (5), 
eight (8), and one (1) project(s) were respectively related to „Expanding‟, „Repeating‟, 
„Strengthening‟, and „Maintaining‟ perspectives. The markedly low proportion of respondents 
who had reported the „Maintaining‟ perspective could lead to various interpretations. One way to 
interpret the figure is that few projects could have been seen by bidders as an effective means of 
defending their markets from competitors. This is consistent to assertions by Dulaimi et al. (2001) 
that there was a low barrier to enter the market of Singapore construction industry. Construction 
firms could come and go easily and hence existing construction firms would have seen little point 
to preventing competitors entering the market. 
From the company classification perspective, respondents who reported high values of 
project strategic importance had come from different company groups. Four (4), one (1), five (5), 
three (3), and six (6) respondents had come from A1 (unlimited tendering limit), A2 (max: SGD 
85 M), B1 (max: SGD 50 M), B2 (max: SGD 15 M), and C1 (max: SGD 5) respectively.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
more willing to participate than those coming from low performing organizations. In such conditions, results would 
better represent high performers than the entire population. The analysis provided evidence that the concern was not 
substantiated. Both high and low performing organizations were reasonably represented. Hence, a non-response bias 
due to the above concern was unlikely. 
44 A project was considered as having a high strategic value if its strategic importance index is equal or greater than the 
grand average of 4.01. 
91 
6 Taxonomic Approach to Verifying the Theoretical Framework 
In this chapter, a taxonomic or „gestalt‟ approach to empirically test the developed theoretical 
framework is elaborated. Specifically, motivations of using taxonomic approach, assumptions, 
procedures and results are described.  
6.1 Why Taxonomic Approach? 
Taxonomic or gestalt approach is utilized because it fits with the purpose of the study. In 
particular, it is relevant to the contingent nature of the developed theoretical framework which 
involves many (more than two) interrelated determinants or independent variables. The developed 
contingency framework presented in Table 3.2 implies that different value combinations of 
determinants or independent variables would form distinct clusters of bid cases. Each bid cluster 
would, in return, yield predictable bid mark-up decisions (Y). 
Following a contingency concept (Hambrick, 1984; Miller, 1981; Venkatraman, 1989) in the 
context of bid mark-ups, taxonomic approach would facilitate classification of bidders on the 
basis of similarity of the bid profiles. In this study, bid profiles are the combined values of 
theoretically-derived independent variables or determinants of „rate of returns‟ (X1), „revenues‟ 
(X2), „project backlogs‟ (X3), and „project strategic importance‟ (X4).  Taxonomic approach 
provides a helicopter (systemic) view of the interrelated relationships among the four independent 
variables and against bid mark-up decisions
45
.  
From a statistical perspective, cluster analysis is an appropriate tool to perform taxonomic 
analysis in a confirmatory fashion. Cluster analysis could be utilized when researchers do not 
prescribe the number of groups a-priori (Garson, 2009). This non-inferential statistical procedure 
is able to generate distinctive groups of bidders as determined by value combinations of the four 
independent variables (determinants). The corresponding bid mark-up values (Y) for respective 
emerging groups would then be verified against the theoretical framework.  
                                                          
45 As a consequence of observing the big picture, this approach lacks of specificity (Venkatraman 1989) in the sense 
that individual relationships between bid mark-up values against the respective four determinants cannot be examined. 
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6.2 Assumptions and Procedures 
Multicollinearity 
As in every statistical analysis, certain assumption(s) must be satisfied to correctly utilize 
cluster analysis. In particular, the existence of multicollinearity among independent variables may 
affect validity of cluster analysis. Statistical analysis as elaborated in Section 5.3.4 showed a 
minimum threat to validity due to possible existence of multicollinearity. Cluster analysis 
therefore could be utilized. 
Cluster Formation 
Applying a hierarchical agglomeration technique, cluster analysis procedure starts with each 
bid case being considered as having its own cluster. In the subsequent step, cluster analysis would 
merge two bid cases of the most similar characteristics into a larger, new cluster. The procedure 
of the cluster formation is repeated in the following stages until all bid cases are combined into a 
single big cluster in a hierarchical manner. The researchers are then required to select on which 
stage the repeated procedures be stopped. The stopping rule, which is elaborated on the later 
section of this report, would determine the number of final clusters. 
In this cluster analysis, degree of characteristics similarity among bid cases was calculated by 
using Euclidian distances of the four independent variables (determinants). The measure was 
selected because it was the most commonly used method especially for variables with interval 
scales (Garson 2009; Hair et al. 2006). To ensure an equal weighting, the four independent 
variables (determinants) were standardized. A hierarchical agglomeration procedure was 
employed because of the small sample size in this bid mark-up study (i.e. less than 250 bid 
datasets) (Garson, 2009). A ward‟s linkage algorithm was utilized to guide clusters formations. 
This algorithm would guide the procedure of selecting and combining two clusters at any 
clustering stage when at least one of the clusters contains multiple bid cases in order to minimize 
the within-cluster variance of the newly formed cluster (Field, 2000). The variance for each 
cluster was computed by the grand sum of squared of Euclidean distance between respective cases 
and the cluster means for all independent variables (Garson, 2009) . Garson (2009) further argued 
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that some researchers preferred the Ward‟s method because this algorithm tended to create groups 
with maximum between-group and minimum within-group dissimilarities. Hair et al. (2006) 
asserted that this method tended to generate groups with a roughly equal number of members. The 
method, however, is rather sensitive towards outliers (Milligan, 1980) – i.e. markedly large 
distances to the cluster means of outliers would be amplified by the squared distance calculation.   
All the previously described procedures were carried out by using PASW Statistics v.17 
(formerly known as SPSS). One of the weaknesses of hierarchical procedures is that the clustering 
results might be affected by the sequence of analysis of the bid cases (Hair et al., 2006). Hence to 
assess the robustness of the employed hierarchical clustering procedure, a simple test was 
performed. Two independent cluster analyses were performed for the same data with different 
randomly sequenced bid cases
46
. Results of visual analysis of two dendograms (not shown here) 
indicated structure similarity of the two cluster analyses. Hence in this bid study the hierarchical 
procedure was deemed quite robust. 
Figure 6.1 shows a result of the clustering process in the form of a dendogram. The 
dendogram shows the stages of hierarchical clustering formations which started from each bid 
case as having its own cluster (at the most left-hand side) and completed when all bid cases were 
combined into a large, single cluster (at the most right-hand side, stage 49). The horizontal axis 
presents the rescaled distance among cluster members in a newly combined cluster. This indicates 
the heterogeneity level of a newly formed cluster. 
                                                          
46 Random sequences were generated by using a random number generator. 
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Outliers in this study are defined as datasets of bid cases with “a unique combination of 
characteristics identifiable as distinctly different from the other observations” (Hair et al., 2006, p. 
73). Since the main statistical analysis to be used involved multivariate analysis, a multivariate 
detection of outliers was employed. In particular, the Mahalanobis D
2
 measure would provide a 
multivariate assessment of outliers. It measures the distance of each bid case relative to the 
centroid of all observed bid cases in a multi-dimensional space (Hair et al., 2006). Outliers are bid 
case datasets with significantly large distance values compared to the rest of observations. Table 
6.11 shows ten bid cases with the highest D
2
. 
Table 6.1 Ten Bid Cases with the Highest Values of Mahalanobis Distances (D2)  
 Bid ID D
2
 
1 52a 18.22* 
2 56a 12.92 
3 17a 12.45 
4 54a 10.56 
5 57a 10.29 
6 33a 8.95 
7 2a 7.80 
8 28a 6.56 
9 1a 6.48 
10 40a 5.73 
                 Note: * Denotes exceeding the threshold level of 17.45 
 
According to a table of critical values by Barnett and Lewis (1994, p. 517), the threshold 
level of an outlier in multivariate analysis with five (5) predictors, sample size = 50 and  = 0.05 
is 17.45. Table 6.1 indicates that one dataset has a value above the threshold. Since treatment of 
outliers would depend on the context of analysis (Hair et al., 2006), a subsequent structural 
analysis of the cluster‟s dendogram is presented as follows. 
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Dendogram depicted in Figure 6.1 shows no identified outliers which are usually indicated 
by cluster(s) with a single member at the final stages of clustering process. The result is in general 
consistent to the previous assessment of outliers using Mahalanobis. The assessment indicated 
that only one bid case of 52a exceeded the threshold level and might be considered as an outlier. 
The Dendogram, however, shows that the Case 52a is not considered an outlier in the context of 
cluster analysis. Case 52a had been grouped with other cases in much early stage of clustering 
formations suggesting that the case is not an outlier. Accordingly, all bid case datasets were 
retained and included in the analysis. 
Number of Clusters  
The earlier procedure of cluster analysis had provided a means of grouping bid cases in a 
systematic way. However it did not provide a guidance to determine the optimum number of bid 
clusters. In other words, no directions were provided on which stage the agglomeration process 
needed to be stopped (i.e. the stopping rule was not available). 
Hair et al. (2006) argued that there was no standard, objective procedure to determine the 
right number of clusters because “no internal statistical criterion is used for inference” (p. 592)47.  
Hair et al. (2006) further asserted that due the lack of supporting evidence for any stopping rule, 
researchers should consider several rules when making decisions. 
In this study, both quantitative and qualitative considerations were used to determine the 
right number of bid clusters (and hence the stopping rule). Using quantitative measures, the 
agglomeration coefficient which was reported by PASW was used. The coefficient reflects the 
degree of heterogeneity of a newly formed cluster at any stage of clustering process. The larger 
the coefficient, the more heterogenic the newly formed cluster. The main principle is that a cluster 
formation should be stopped when a sudden increase of level of the heterogeneity is observed. 
Since the goal of cluster analysis is to extract characteristically similar (homogenous) clusters, a 
markedly increase of heterogeneity of a newly formed cluster should not be accepted and the 
clustering process needs to be stopped prior to the cluster formation.  
                                                          
47 For example: a significance test in linear regression analysis. 
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The principle was implemented by means of the percentage changes of agglomeration 
coefficients (Hair et al., 2006). Using the approach, the percentage changes could be computed for 
any stage of the cluster formation relative to the coefficient value at the preceding stage. A 
significant increase of the percentage would suggest that the clustering formation be stopped.   
Figure 6.2 indicates percentage changes of the agglomeration coefficients (i.e. level of 
heterogeneity) for the last ten (10) stages of cluster formations. Hair et al. (2006) suggested 
researchers observe patterns of changes in heterogeneity when determining the number of 
clusters. It is further argued that naturally, there would be an increase of heterogeneity in the last 
few stages of clustering process. Figure 6.2 confirms such an assertion. A relatively constant 
change of heterogeneity is observed from stage 40 to 46 which is followed by a steady increase of 
changes from 47 to the final stage (49).  
The first marked increase of changes could be roughly observed somewhere between x = 46 
and 47 in Figure 6.2. For a marked increase of agglomeration coefficient at x = 46, it indicates a 
significant raise of heterogeneity on the cluster formation on the stage 46 if compared to the 
preceding cluster formation on stage 45. It means that clustering process might be stopped before 
the marked increase of heterogeneity – i.e. after carrying out stage 45. Stage 45 is a process of 
transforming 6-cluster to 5-cluster solutions. Hence the process should end with a 5-cluster 
solution. Using the same line of reasoning for a marked increase at x = 47, a 4-cluster solution 
would be the favorable result.  
The above quantitative assessment had narrowed the possible number of clusters down to 
four (4) or five (5). A qualitative analysis was then conducted to provide a further deliberation on 






















Figure 6.2 Changes of Agglomeration Coefficients for the Last Ten Stages of Cluster Formations 
 
The appropriate number of bid clusters should be judged against the purpose of the study. 
Since the main objective of this empirical study was to verify the developed theoretical 
framework, it was expected that only few clusters would emerge from cluster analysis. Since the 
developed theoretical framework has a low level of specificity (i.e. expressed on three contingent 
scenarios with two categorical measurement level of „high‟ and „low‟ for each determinant) it 
would only capable of differentiating emerging clusters with highly distinctive characteristics. 
Having too many clusters would result in less distinctive characteristics across bid clusters 
leading to difficulty on verifying them against the framework. This concern was in line with the 
previous quantitative result that 4- or 5-cluster solution was considered to be the acceptable 
solutions of the number of bid clusters. 
Another qualitative consideration is related to the profile of the bid clusters. To facilitate 
profile analysis, respective attributes (i.e. means of determinants) of emerging clusters were 
normalized against the respective overall sample means and standard deviations. Normalized 
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values would provide a much clearer graphical representation due to the standardized scaling
48
. 
Normalization would also facilitate easier pattern comparisons among between-cluster profiles
49
. 
Figure 6.3 shows the normalized profiles of the emerging five (5) clusters in a pictorial 
representation. A visual observation of Figure 6.3 depicts a variety of bid profiles with relatively 
distinct patterns
50
. Specifically, for the purpose of selecting whether 4- or 5-cluster solution would 
become the right number of clusters, patterns of clusters one (1) and three (3) should be observed. 
It must be noted that during cluster formations, a 4-cluster solution is derived from a 5-cluster 
solution by merging clusters one (1) and three (3) on stage 46 as shown in Figure 6.1. The two 
mentioned clusters exhibit markedly different patterns as seen in Figure 6.3  therefore the two 
clusters could not be merged. Hence a 5-cluster solution seems to be the most appropriate solution 
for this bid mark-up study. Summing up, a 5-cluster solution was selected for the bid mark-up 
study due to previously mentioned considerations. The emerging clusters 1 to 5 are shown in 
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Figure 6.3 Normalized Profiles for a 5-Cluster Solution 
                                                          
48 By conducting normalizations, values of variables of most bid cases would fall in between +3 (i.e. 3 x SD above the 
grand mean) and -3 (i.e. 3 x SD below the grand mean).  
49 For instance, referring to Figure 6.3, the bid profile of cluster 4 indicates an extreme case of poor performers. 
Normalized means of performance indicators, namely: „relative rate of return‟, „relative revenue‟, and „relative backlog‟ 
are all less than -1.5. It means that contractors belong to Cluster 4 were experiencing significantly poor performance if 
compared to the overall observations – i.e. 1.5 x standard deviation below average of the overall samples. 
50 Normalized profile is an effective tool for attribute comparisons across clusters. However, it should not be used for 
profile interpretations or theory verification since it will give misleading results.  
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6.3 Identified Clusters 
In this section, results of the cluster analysis are discussed. In particular, profiles of the 
emerging five (5) bid clusters in light of the four determinants of „rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, 
„project backlogs‟, and „project strategic importance‟ are elaborated. The bid mark-up values (the 
dependent variable) of the corresponding groups are then evaluated and verified against the 
theoretical framework in the subsequent section. 
6.3.1 Profiles of Emerging Clusters 
To provide a correct interpretation of the bid clusters, bid profiles of emerging clusters 
should be presented in their original (non-normalized) forms. Table 6.2 depicts descriptive data of 
the five (5) bid clusters as a result of the cluster analysis. It is clearly shown that bid cases were 
not distributed evenly across clusters. Cluster 1 was the largest cluster with 22 bid cases which 
was followed by cluster two (2) with 16 bids. Three remaining clusters had respectively four (4), 
five (5) and three (3) members. The disproportionate results suggested that the previous 
expectation for evenly distributed clusters could not be met. 
Observing profiles of bid clusters as reflected by descriptive statistics of the four 
independent variables, some findings are noteworthy. Cluster 1, which was the largest cluster, 
represented a group of bidders who, at the time the bids were conducted, had considered their 
respective organizations as having performed below their own subjective expectations for all three 
performance criteria of rate of returns, revenues, and project backlogs as indicated by the negative 
means. On average, bidders from this cluster also thought that the reported projects were not 
strategically important as indicated by a cluster mean of less than the grand mean of 4.01. The 
second cluster represented bidders from contractors with mixed reported performances: below 
expectations of prior revenues and future project backlogs and above expectation for prior profits 
(rate of returns). An interesting fact from Cluster 2 is that this was the only cluster of bidders who 
had considered the reported project bids as being highly strategic important. The third cluster 
represented another different combination of mixed performances: rate of returns were below 
aspirations while revenues and future backlogs were above aspirations. The fourth cluster 
101 
represented an extreme case of Cluster 1 where bidders considered their own companies had 
performed significantly below their expectations for all three performance indicators. The last 
cluster represented the smallest cluster of bidders from contractors with prior performances above 
expectations yet they were facing a pessimistic outlook for the near-future performance (as 
indicated by negative backlogs).  
To provide a more objective assessment on whether cluster analysis produces distinctive bid 
clusters, five independent ANOVAs were carried out across clusters for respective independent 
variables. The last row of Table 6.2 shows results of the analyses of variance. All five ANOVAs 
indicate significant results (p = 0.000). Hence it could be inferred that the five emerging clusters 
have distinct characteristics as reflected by divergent values of their determinants or independent 
variables. 










X1 X2 X3 X4
n 22 22 22 22
Mean -3.05 -5.64 -11.80 3.58
Std.  Dev. 6.90 12.70 12.63 0.44
n 16 16 16 16
Mean 3.06 -2.25 -5.59 4.75
Std.  Dev. 4.96 13.89 11.32 0.33
n 4 4 4 4
Mean -5.32 22.50 18.50 4.00
Std.  Dev. 3.57 9.57 8.10 0.00
n 5 5 5 5
Mean -17.00 -46.00 -48.00 3.73
Std.  Dev. 12.04 15.17 4.47 0.76
n 3 3 3 3
Mean 1.67 23.67 -63.33 3.67
Std.  Dev. 10.41 22.94 15.28 1.04
n 50 50 50 50
Mean -2.39 -4.58 -14.10 4.01
Std.  Dev. 8.85 21.45 22.39 0.70




























                                                          
51 Non-parametric analyses of Kruskal-Wallis for respective variables yielded consistent results. H(4) = 18.36  p = 
0.001 (significant) for X1; H(4) = 24.16 p = 0.000 (significant) for X2; H(4) = 28.22 p = 0.000 (significant) for X3; and 
H(4) = 28.68 p = 0.000 (significant) for X4. See Appendix 5 for details. 
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6.3.2 Does Contractor Size as a Covariate Matter? 
In this section, the variation of the bid mark-up as the dependent variable is investigated in 
light of „contractor size‟ as a covariate. Discussions on the theoretical part suggested that 
„contractor size‟ should be considered as a covariate for this bid markup study. The assertion was 
empirically tested by using a procedure described by Field (2009, pp. 404-406). Two independent 
analyses of means were carried out for the values of the dependent variable (Y, „bid mark-up 
values‟) across different clusters. The first analysis was ANOVA and the second was ANCOVA 
with the „contractor size‟ served as a covariate. The covariate would be considered as an 
important element of the theoretical model if the ANCOVA model yields a markedly better 
prediction than the ANOVA does. 
It must be highlighted that before performing the ANCOVA, an assumption that there is no 
significant correlation between the contractor size and respective determinants must be met. It 
was shown in Section 5.3.5 that the assumption was satisfied; hence ANCOVA could be 
performed. Table 6.3 shows a comparison of ANOVA and ANCOVA results for bid mark-up 
values (Y) across five bid clusters.  As can be seen, the inclusion of „contractor size‟ as a 
covariate in the model had resulted in marked improvement of the amount of bid mark-up (Y) 
variation which could be explained. The amount of variation explained by the model (SSM, 
corrected model) had increased from 229.38 (without covariate) to 1000.78 points (with 
„contractor size‟ as a covariate). This was followed by a reduction on the error variation (i.e. 
variation which cannot be explained by the model) from 3388.00 to 2616.60 units. The reduced 
error variation was caused by some variations being explained by the covariate (771.40 units). 
Observing the ANCOVA table, it was also found that the p-value for covariate was 0.001 
(significant, p < 0.05). From this analysis it could be inferred that „contractor size‟ was a valid and 
significant covariate. Accordingly, all subsequent statistical analyses involving bid mark-up 
values (Y) should employ values which had been adjusted by the influence of the covariate 
(termed Yadj). PASW statistical package provided the values of Yadj for respective clusters as one 
of the outputs of ANCOVA. 
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ANCOVA    
(i.e. with covariate) 
Sum of Squares of 
corrected model 
SSM 229.38 1000.78 
Sum of Squares of Errors 
SSE 3388.00 2616.60 
Sum of Squares of 
Covariates 
SScov N/A 771.40 
Sum of Squares of Total SST 3771.91 3771.91 
p-value of covariate p N/A 0.001 
 
A calculation of parameter estimates  showed  that the value of covariate coefficient       was 
-0.038. Despite the reported small value, it was significant (as mentioned earlier, p = 0.001). It 
means that a negative relationship between „contractor size‟ and „the bid mark-up‟ value was 
evident. The larger the construction company, the lower the percentage of the bid mark-up.
52
 
 Discussions with some respondents suggested that large contractors seemed to experience 
more intense competitions than the smaller ones. It is because large contractors would tend to 
pursue large-scale projects and in Singapore, most large project bids are opened for international 
companies leading to fierce competitions. Hence bidders from large contractors would tend to set 
lower bid mark-ups. While the speculation is consistent to the empirical result, further studies 
would be needed to verify the assertion.  
                                                          
52 Due to the small sample size, results of the parametric analysis might be interpreted with caution. The non-parametric 
test similar to ANCOVA pertinent to this study is the Friedman‟s test on „bid mark-ups‟ with „cluster‟ and „financial 
grades‟ as the treatment and block. This test however cannot be carried out because not every cell of the matrix of 
„treatment‟ x „block‟ contains data. Accordingly to provide additional evidence to the result of the ANOVA vs. 
ANCOVA analysis, two additional analyses are carried out. Firstly, regression analysis (N=50) with „contractor size‟ as 
a predictor and „bid mark-ups‟ as the criterion was carried out. It yielded the coefficient value for „contractor size‟     of 
-0.03632 with  p = 0.001, and R2(adj) = 19.6%. The result showed that even without the presence of „clusters‟ as the 
focal predictor, the model yielded a significant result. Secondly, a non-parametric analysis of correlation showed a 
Spearman's rho of -0.222737. The result suggests that to some extent there is a tendency of a negative rank correlation 
between „contractor sizes‟ and „bid mark-ups‟. This result is consistent to this by the regression analysis.  
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6.4 Bid Clusters and the Theoretical Framework 
In this section, the empirically derived bid clusters were utilized to verify the developed 
theoretical framework. It is noteworthy to reiterate that the emerging clusters were extracted from 
samples of bid cases in light of the four independent variables of „rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, 
„project backlogs‟, and „project strategic importance‟. The dependent variable (Yadj, the adjusted 
bid mark-ups) which was not involved in cluster analysis was then used for the theory verification 
purpose. 
The developed theoretical framework is re-presented and juxtaposed with the 






Table 6.4 Part I provides the contingency table of the theoretical framework consisting three 
possible major bid scenarios according to the bid profiles (columns [a], [b], [c], [d]) along with 
respective predictions of the bid markup values (column [e]).  
In contrast, Part II depicts the empirically generated data. Due to the low level of 
the theoretical framework, values of extracted bid clusters which were originally elicited 
interval measurement scale were transformed into those in a categorical scale. For „rate of 
(X1), „revenues‟ (X2), and „project backlogs‟ (X3) a negative [positive] value in an interval 







Table 6.4 Part II columns [a], [b], and [c] depict bid profiles in an interval scale (means) and 
the corresponding categorical scale („Below‟ or „Above‟ aspiration, in squared brackets). For 
„project strategic importance‟ (X4), the grand mean of all observations (4.01) served as a threshold 
to classify the respective groups‟ average of Strategic Importance Index into two categories: Low 







Table 6.4 Theoretical Framework and Emerging Bid Clusters 
Rate of Return 
(X1)
Revenue (X2) Backlog (X3) Strategic 
Importance (X4)
[a] [b] [c] [d] [e] [f]
Scenario 1 irrelevant irrelevant irrelevant H L
Scenario 2 irrelevant irrelevant A L H
Scenario 3 L L
Cluster 1 (n=22) -3.05 [B] -5.64 [B] -11.80 [B] 3.58 [L] -2.00 [L] Supporting Scenario 3
Cluster 2 (n=16) 3.06 [A] -2.25 [B] -5.59 [B] 4.75 [H] -1.82 [L] Supporting Scenario 1
Cluster 3 (n=4) -5.32 [B] 22.50 [A] 18.50 [A] 4.00 [L] 4.85 [H]## Supporting Scenario 2
Cluster 4 (n=5) -17.00 [B] -46.00 [B] -48.00 [B] 3.73 [L] -3.42 [L] Supporting Scenario 3
Cluster 5 (n=3) 1.67 [A] 23.67 [A] -63.33 [B] 3.67 [L] -5.68 [L] Supporting Scenario 3
note: #Yadj. is  bid mark-up w hich is adjusted by the effect of 'contractor size' as a covariate or control variable
            ## indicates the cluster mean of the adjusted  bid mark-ups (Yadj) is signif icantly larger than the grand mean of -1.76 (alpha=0.05)
            Letters in square brackets indicate the corresponding categorical values of cluster means in light of the theoretical framew ork






At least one of the three variables is B
II. Means of Empirically-Derived Clusters
 
 
A similar approach was used to categorize Yadj. A cluster mean of Yadj less [more] than the 
grand mean (-1.76) is translated into Low [High] adjusted bid mark-ups. In addition, five 
independent one-tailed t-tests of the means of Yadj against the grand mean revealed that except for 
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Cluster 3, respective means of other clusters were not significantly different from the grand mean 
(insignificant result at α = 0.05). 
As can be seen in Part II, Cluster 2 which is the second largest group of the participating 
bidders exhibits bid profiles consistent to Scenario 1.  On average, participating bidders in this 
cluster had considered the reported project bid as having high strategic importance to their 
organizations. The One Reason Decision Model of the framework (Scenario 1) suggests that in 
such a scenario, bidders after scanning through the four determinants would eventually focus on 
this single consideration (high strategic importance of the project bidding) and make bid decisions 
accordingly – i.e. bid low to secure the projects. The empirical result provided a supporting 
evidence to the theoretical prediction that the cluster‟s mean of bid markups was lower than the 
grand mean of -1.76 (i.e. bid mark-up is on average „low‟). 
Result of Cluster 2 to some extent provides a further confirmation to past studies‟ 
findings that managers in construction industry had highly regarded the strategic value of 
management decisions (Dikmen and Birgonul, 2003; Egemen and Mohamed, 2007; 
Hillebrandt and Cannon, 1990).  Nevertheless, a careful interpretation should be exercised 
for the result of Cluster 2. It is because an alternative explanation could be provided. As 






Table 6.4, in addition to perceiving that the projects were having a strategic value, bidders in 
this cluster on average had seen their own firm‟s performance in terms of „project backlogs‟ as 
„below aspirations‟. Proposition 3 suggests that project backlogs below aspirations could also lead 
to low bid mark-ups. Hence the assertion that „project strategic importance‟ is the single predictor 
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for determining bid mark-ups in Cluster 2, as conjectured by One Reason Decision Model, is not 
very conclusive. 
Cluster 3 reflects Scenario 2 of the framework. Bidders in this cluster deemed the reported 
projects being non-strategically important. Furthermore, bidders assessed that, at the time the bid 
decisions were made, their own companies had performed above their expectations in terms of 
project backlogs. Based on the framework, bidders would shift their attention from the most 
important consideration (i.e. strategic importance which is „low‟) to the project backlogs (which is 
„above expectations‟) and make decision accordingly. Prospect Theory of the theoretical 
framework suggests that in such a scenario 2, bidders tend to bid high. The theory was supported 
by the empirical results of Cluster 3 where the cluster‟s mean of bid markups was higher than the 
grand mean (i.e. bid mark-up is „high‟). It should also be noted that as mentioned earlier, Cluster 
3 was the only cluster of the five which yielded a mean value of adjusted bid mark-ups which was 
statistically larger than the grand mean.  
Result of Cluster 3 indicates that despite the economic recession, some construction firms 
had performed quite well; they were able to secure work volumes more than what had been 
aspired. This condition indicates that in the near-future, the firms would have high resource 
utilizations; additional works were not essential. This group of bidders nevertheless participated 
in the reported bid process due to various reasons. For instance, bidders might want to maintain 
good relationships with the clients (Skitmore and Lo, 2002). Some bidders might have been 
invited by clients to participate in particular project bids and they thought that rejecting invitations 
to bid might not be a good move. Accordingly the bidders would submit covering price with 
markedly high bid mark-ups. Other bidders in this cluster may participate in the bid process to get 
the feel of the market (Skitmore and Lo, 2002). When bidders think that it is important to monitor 
the market conditions they would participate in the bid process and the less incentive to win could 
lead to high bid mark-ups. In any case, setting high bid mark-ups would be necessary due to high 
utilization of the current resources. Adding extra work volumes in such a condition would require 
the firms to extend current capacity leading to premium costs (Fayek et al., 1998). A bid 
simulation study by de Neufville and King (1991) revealed that bidders were willing to add a 
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premium as high as 3% of the total estimated cost to the bid price to reflect their lack of 
enthusiasm to do the job. A 3% premium is considered significant given that the median value of 
bid mark-ups in this current study is 8%. 
On a broader perspective, data from Cluster 3 provides another interesting insight. It has 
become a common understanding among scholars that prevailing market conditions need to be 
considered when investigating bid mark-ups (Oo et al., 2007). It is widely believed that during 
recession times the availability of works would decrease significantly. Hence bidders would adopt 
a more aggressive approach to secure new projects (Shash and Abdul-Hadi, 1992).   
While the above assertion may be true in most cases, this study had shown that a particular 
group of Singapore bidders who were experiencing the economic downturn had acted on the 
contrary to a common wisdom of bidding aggressively. Cluster 3 represents a group of bidders 
who had made bid mark-ups which were significantly higher than the average bid mark-ups of the 
entire respondents. As mentioned earlier, a detail observation shows that bidders in this cluster 
came from contractors which had performed quite well in the difficult time. De Neufville and 
King (1991) pointed out that such construction firms might have adopted specific approaches to 
perform better even during economic decline, for instance: establishing long-term relationships 
with major clients with continuous works. 
The above elaboration provides an initial evidence to the assertion that the relationships 
between „economic condition‟ and „bid mark-ups‟ may not be direct. It could be mediated by the 
firm‟s performance. The assertion however needs further study.  
The bid profile of Cluster 5 corresponds to a subset of Scenario 3. A small number of 
bidders in this cluster were on average facing a gloomy future (as indicated by project backlogs of 
below aspirations) yet they had earned profits and revenues above their own expectations prior to 
the bids. Despite the satisfactory past performances, bidders seemed to focus on the downside of 
the firms‟ other performance-related determinant of project backlog. Project backlogs below 
aspirations might indicate a high need for work for company survival in hard times (Oo et al., 
2007). The consideration on „project backlogs‟ could have subdued concerns on „revenues‟ and 
„rate of returns‟ and therefore bidders took risk taking decisions by bidding low.  
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The profile of Cluster 1 resembles a specific subset of Scenario 3: bidders considered the 
specific bids being non-strategically important; they thought that, at the time of respective bids, 
project backlogs were below aspirations while prior company performances in terms of revenues 
and returns were also below expectations. This group accounts for 44% of total respondents in 
this study. Empirical result of Cluster 1 shows that on average bidders in this cluster had provided 
low bid mark-ups. Hence the result supports a subset of Scenario 3.  
The bid profile of Cluster 4 represents yet another subset of Scenario 3 of the theoretical 
framework. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Cluster 4 resembles an extreme case of Cluster 1. On 
average, bidders from this cluster had reported low bid mark-ups. This is consistent to Scenario 1 
of the theoretical framework. 
Results of Cluster 1 and 4 further confirmed past empirical studies (Bowman, 1982; 1984; 
MacCrimmon et al., 1988; Shapira, 1986) that managers from troubled firms tended to exhibit 
risk taking behaviors. Bidders in these two groups with combined members of 54% out of total 
respondents had seen poor performance of their own construction firms in all three indicators: 
„rate of returns‟, „revenues‟, and „project backlogs‟. Boughton (1987) asserted that bidders who 
were experiencing in such a survival mode would be prepared to bid at cost to keep labor and 
equipment. Moreover, such bidders understood that winning bids and securing new projects were 
the only entry point to improve the firms‟ performances. Hence they took more aggressive, risk 
taking decisions by bidding low. 
From the above discussions, it can be said that empirical evidence had supported various 
subsets of scenarios of the developed theoretical framework. Clusters 1, 4 and 5 which 
respectively exhibited distinctive group of bid profiles had provided some confirmations to 
different subsets of Scenario 3 leading to the same category of „low‟ bid mark-ups. This is 
consistent to the equifinality concept of contingency theory which suggests that different value 
combinations of determinants could lead to the same result of the dependent variable (Hambrick, 
1984). Clusters 2 and 3 respectively confirmed Scenarios 1 and 2. 
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6.5 Further Discussions 
In general it could be said that the developed theoretical framework seems to be quite 
effective for explaining and predicting bid mark-up decisions. As for the verification of the 
contingency-based theoretical framework; some considerations are noteworthy, as follows: 
a. The emerging clusters from the empirical study do not cover the all possible subsets of 
the three scenarios in the theoretical framework; 
b. The small sample sizes for certain sub-scenarios (i.e. one sub-scenario from scenario two 
and two sub-scenarios from scenario three) could lead to errors in the final results. Due to 
the small sample sizes, reporting errors from respondents –if any- would not be averaged 
out and they would be reflected in the final results. 
Specifically; one subset (n=15) out of eight possible subsets of Scenario 1, one subset (n=4) 
out of four subsets of Scenario 2, and three subsets (n=22, n=5, n=3) out of four subsets of 
Scenario 3 were empirically verified. Results from sub-scenarios with small sample sizes (n=4, 5, 
and 3), however, should be treated with cautions. For those sub-scenarios, reporting errors from 
respondents might not be averaged out leading to errors of the final results. 
 Accordingly, at best, the study would only claim to have provided an initial empirical evidence to 
support some (but not all) subsets of bid scenarios. Moreover, the empirical results should be 
interpreted with cautions due to the limited sample size. Nevertheless, the study had provided 
some contributions in theoretical development and research methods as well as some useful 
insights on bid mark-ups. 
This study also revealed the important effect of „project strategic importance‟ towards bid 
mark-up decisions. While past studies in bid mark-ups tended to overlook this determinant, this 
study had highlighted its importance by providing some theoretical and empirical evidence. Such 
a result could encourage researchers from the prescriptive camp to venture beyond profit 
maximization bid models. 
More importantly, it has been demonstrated in this study that a contingency approach 
provides a better explanation and prediction to the bid mark-ups. Cluster 5 is a good example on 
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the advantage of utilizing contingency perspective in bid mark-up. Despite its small size, Cluster 
5 is especially important in this study because of its unique bid profile. In this group, the „rate of 
returns‟ and „revenues‟ indicated performances of „above aspiration‟ while „project backlogs‟ 
showed „below aspiration‟ performances. If each determinant in the model is dealt independently 
in isolation, as in most previous studies, the value contradiction of determinants will lead to 
conflicting predictions of bid mark-ups: the two first determinants would predict high bid mark-
ups and the last determinant would predict low bid mark-ups. The contradiction is reconciled in 
the proposed theoretical framework by utilizing the One Reason Decision Model in a contingency 
fashion. Thus the framework conjectures that bidders would focus on determinant(s) which 
represent losses and make bid decisions accordingly – in this case project backlog below 
aspiration leading to low bid mark-ups.  
The finding confirms a speculation prior to this study that the level of importance of a 
particular determinant on bid mark-ups was contingent to the states or values of other 
determinants. It provides a clear indication to the merits of this bid mark-up study which extends 
the knowledge of similar past studies which generally took an isolated approach to the 
relationships between respective determinants and bid mark-ups. 
From an academic point of view, further empirical study is required. It is because the current 
empirical study is not able to verify all different subset of scenarios of the theoretical framework. 
For instance, a profile of bid cases with high project strategic importance and project backlogs 
which is above aspiration was not observed in this study. An isolated prediction for this scenario 
would lead to conflicting results: high project strategic importance leads to low bid markups, 
above aspirations of project backlogs results in high bid mark-ups. An empirical study which 
involves such bid profiles would provide a further verification of the framework‟s theoretical 
rigor. 
From a practical perspective, however, the above concern may be considered less serious. 
While the verification process could not include all subsets of theoretically-possible scenarios, 
this study might have covered major practically-possible bid scenarios, especially those in the 
recession time. From a practical point of view, some combinations of determinants (or bid 
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profiles) might hardly occur in the real bidding context hence empirical verification of such 
scenarios may not be necessary. As stated elsewhere, this study focused on identifying major 
patterns of bid profiles, it did not aim at examining all theoretically-possible scenarios of bid 
profiles. The major patterns of bid profiles are those which are most likely encountered by 
practicing bidders when attempting to predict the competitors. 
From a practical perspective, the verified framework seems to be simple and practicable to 
be used by bidders who intend to get a better approach in deciding bid mark-ups. The framework 
is considered being sufficiently robust for predictions of likely behavior of competitors. 
Moreover, only few data would be required for prediction: i.e. the four determinants of „rate of 
returns‟, „revenues‟, „project backlogs‟ and „project strategic importance‟. Information related to 
the four determinants could be gathered by various means. Mochtar and Arditi (2001) highlighted 
the important role of marketing intelligence when determining bid price. Market intelligence was 
related to a company‟s ability in discovering market information. Studies in the Singapore 
construction industry, for instance, revealed the common practices of gathering information of 
competitors for tendering activities under the direction of senior management albeit informality 
(Vennila, 2003). The study found that 77% of the Singapore respondents had been practicing 
business intelligence and most of them (90%) had conducted the intelligence in an informal way. 
The study also revealed various methods and sources which were applied for information 
gathering, including personal communications with clients, subcontractors, or suppliers; and 
research for published information such as government filing about awarded tenders. 
From the same practical perspective, some drawbacks were identified. Firstly, since the 
determinants are measured against aspirations, bidders who wish to utilize the framework to 
predict a competitor‟s likely behavior need to estimate the competitors‟ aspiration levels for a 
particular bid occasion. Past studies had presumed different aspiration levels, such as industry-
wide performance indicators in terms of median (Fiegenbaum and Thomas, 1988) or average 
(Tenah and Coulter, 1999) or a firm‟s past performance (Lee, 1997). However the validity of such 
estimates in the bid context has yet to be verified.  
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The second drawback with the theoretical framework from a practical viewpoint is its lack of 
precision or detail. Since the framework utilizes a categorical measurement scale in a sub-group 
analysis fashion, the outputs are qualitative predictions. Bidders would not be able to use it to get 
precise predictions of the competitors‟ bid mark-ups.  
Nevertheless, the qualitative prediction is still useful for bidders who wish to improve their 
own bidding approach. As asserted by Boughton (1987), the qualitative profile could be used in 
conjunction with a more quantitative model of bid decisions to achieve a better bid mark-up 
decisions. Alternatively, the theoretical framework could also be used for a more systematic 
prediction when a bidder performs competitor analysis. This, in turn, would result in better-
informed intuitive decisions. A study in Singapore construction industry found that such a 
practice resulted in improved chance of securing projects by certain construction firms (Vennila, 
2003). In addition, results of this study would motivate researchers from the prescriptive camp to 
venture beyond profit maximization bid models. 
6.6 Limitations and Future Extensions 
6.6.1 Validity of Instrument 
One of the limitations of this study could be related to the procedure of validity assessment. 
As mentioned earlier, a rigorous method of validity assessment such as Multi-traits Multi-
Methods (MTMM) or confirmatory Principal Component Analysis (PCA) could not be applied. 
The chosen method of visual inspections on correlation matrix was less rigorous. 
Another instrument validity-related concern was the assessment of possible threats of 
common method biases. The assessment involved Harman‟s one factor test. KMO test of the 
assessment indicated that the sample size was „marginally acceptable‟. Hence the negative result 
of possible threats of common method biases should be interpreted cautiously.    
6.6.2 Representativeness and Non-Response Bias 
Another point to consider when contemplating with the results of this study is related to 
profiles of participating respondents. As elaborated in the previous chapter, descriptive statistics 
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of respondents reveal a rather disproportionate representation of respondents. Contractors of 
larger size are over-represented while contractors of smaller size are under-represented – hence 
results may be biased toward larger contractors. However since „contractor size‟ was chosen as a 
control variable in this study, the effect of contractor size had been considered and isolated 
statistically. Accordingly, the bias effect due to over- and under- representativeness is deemed 
minimum. 
In addition, there was a concern, as stated by a pilot respondent, that respondents 
representing high performing contractors would be more willing to participate than those coming 
from low performing organizations. In such conditions, results would better represent high 
performers than the entire population – a non-response bias takes place. The descriptive analysis 
on the previous chapter provided evidence that the concern was not substantiated. Both high and 
low performing organizations were reasonably represented. 
Due to research constraints, a more comprehensive non-response bias test such as a post-
survey evaluation (Krenzke et al., -) or a combined phone-survey (e.g. Whitehead et al., 1993) to 
compare key characteristics of respondents and non-respondents could not be utilized. 
Specifically, since this empirical study provides anonymity for respondents, there was no reliable 
means for identifying respondents and non-respondents and to compare the profiles of the two 
groups. 
6.6.3 Sample Size and Selected Statistical Analysis 
As discussed earlier, the sample size of this bid mark-up study was rather small. More 
importantly, bid cases were not evenly distributed to the emerging clusters. Clusters three (3), 
four (4), and five (5) respectively had a few members. For these clusters, bid profiles analysis was 
prone toward extreme values and reporting errors since they would not be averaged out. Thus 
results and insights from the above three clusters must be taken with care.  
In addition, the relatively small sample size hindered the utilization of inferential, 
multivariate statistical analysis such as multiple linear regression methods. For regression 
analysis, the minimum acceptable sample size is a function of the number of predictors, the effect 
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size, and the desired statistical power (i.e. the probability of correctly detecting an effect when in 
fact it does exist) (Babbie, 2010; Dattalo, 2008; Kraemer and Thiemann, 1987). Using a statistical 
power level of 0.8 (as suggested in (Cohen, 1988)), an expected medium effect size (coefficient of 
correlation is around 0.3) and five predictors (four independent variables and one covariate), a 
linear regression analysis of this bid mark-up study would require around 90 samples (see Figure 
7.1. on Field  (2009, p. 223)) which is much larger than the 50 collected datasets. As a 
consequence of not being able to use inferential statistical methods, the generalization of the 
finding beyond the sample is rather limited. Nevertheless the emerging bid clusters and the 
associated bid mark-ups from the empirical study, to some extent, provide a means of verifying 
the theoretical framework.  
From a technical consideration, the most challenging step in utilizing cluster analysis is the 
determination of the appropriate number of clusters. Stopping rules were problematic and a great 
deal of subjective judgment was involved in the process. Hence from this perspective, the 
clustering process could be considered as being less robust than other statistical procedures such 
as linear regressions. 
6.6.4 Future Extensions 
A possible direct extension is to closely relate results of this study to the specific context of 
Singapore construction industry. For instance, whether there is distinct bid behavior across 
companies with different sizes; whether there is a distinct behavior of bidders on general building 
vs. civil engineering. A different empirical study such as case studies may reveal much richer 
insights beyond numbers, figures, and statistics.  
A possible extension of this study would be carrying out a similar survey study in countries 
other than Singapore. While it is believed by the researcher that results of this particular study 
could be extrapolated beyond Singapore construction industry to cover countries with similar 
competitive bidding practices, the assertion needs to be empirically tested. A similar extension 
could be done to carry out the study in a different economic condition. As mentioned, the reported 
empirical study was carried out when the construction firms were experiencing economic crisis. A 
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study which is conducted in a good economic condition would reveal the effect of different 
economic conditions toward bid mark-up behaviors.    
Another possible future extension of this study is the utilization of experimental methods as 
a complementary method of data inquiry. As mentioned elsewhere, experiment was not chosen as 
a method of inquiry for this bid mark-up study due to external validity concerns. Since this study 
has provided some initial empirical evidence which supports the theoretical model in a real world 
setting, concerns of external validity of a similar study in a laboratory context could be 
minimized. A laboratory experiment could complement the current study because the researchers 
could carry out an experiment with carefully designed hypothetical scenarios. Variables of 
interest could be systematically manipulated hence confounding effects and noises could be 
controlled. This would lead to more powerful results. 
For researchers in the descriptive decision theory camp, this research could be extended to a 
series of follow-up studies focusing on identifications of the possible existence of judgmental 
biases in bid mark-up decisions and ways of reducing them. The confirmation of a theoretical 
framework which was developed on the basis of Prospect Theory to some extent provides initial 
evidence to the existence of judgmental errors in bid mark-up decisions. This current study had 
laid groundwork for such studies. 
Another interesting venture is a study on aspiration levels. In this bid mark-up study, 
aspiration levels were seen as a reference point on which the bidders would frame their own 
conditions leading to systematic bid decisions. In this study, „aspiration levels‟ was treated as an 
exogenous factor where the pertinent data was provided by respondents. From a practical 
perspective, bidders who intend to use the verified framework for predicting competitors‟ bid 
mark-ups would find some difficulties on determining what reference points were being used by a 
specific competitor on a specific bid context.  A study could be carried out to identify factors 
affecting bidders‟ level of aspirations for different bidding contexts. 
A study could also be carried out to investigate bid mark-up decisions under different bid 
methods. This current study is limited to study bid mark-ups under a pure competitive bidding 
process where clients select the contractor on the basis of the lowest bid prices. There are 
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increasing concerns and practices among construction clients to go beyond cost leaderships when 
selecting contractors to do their works (Betts and Ofori, 1992). The inclusion of other bidding 





This study has three important theoretical implications. Firstly, the simple model involving 
few determinants facilitates an in-depth examination on the relationships between determinants 
against bid mark-ups. For instance, the possible mediation effect of „contractor performance‟ is 
observed on the relationships between „economic condition‟ and „bid mark-ups‟.  
In addition, it is found that „project strategic importance‟ is considered as an essential 
determinant affecting bid mark-ups. In particular, when bidders value that the strategic 
importance of a project and bid is high; they tend to bid aggressively to secure the project – 
regardless their perceptions on other determinants. This could further motivate researchers under 
the prescriptive camp to develop bid models beyond achieving profit maximizations. The result is 
consistent with a theoretical work by Runeson and Skitmore (1999) which asserted that tendering 
theory, on which many existing bid models were based on, overlooked many essential aspects 
other than profit maximizations such as firm capacity and changes in demand.  
Secondly, a theoretical model which is developed by using a contingency perspective 
provides a better explanation and prediction of bid mark-ups, as shown earlier for Cluster 5. 
When each determinant in the model is dealt independently in isolation, as in most previous 
studies, a value contradiction of determinants could lead to conflicting predictions of bid mark-
ups. The seemingly contradiction is reconciled in the theoretical model by utilizing the One 
Reason Decision Model in a contingency fashion. From a different perspective the finding 
confirms a previous assertion suggesting that the level of importance of a particular determinant 
on bid mark-up decisions cannot be determined individually in isolation because it is contingent 
to the values of other determinants. The contingency-based model also demonstrates the existence 
of systematical changes in bid behavior with respect to variations of determinants. This is in line 
with the assertion by Runeson and Skitmore (1999) which urged the revision of the tendering 
theory which originally assumed a random (non-systematical) bid behavior. 
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Thirdly, the utilization of Prospect Theory and One Reason Decision Model provides 
opportunities to study the bid problem from the descriptive decision theory research perspective. 
Following a typical research direction in the descriptive camp, this study lays a ground work for a 
series of follow-up descriptive studies focusing on identifications of the possible existence of 
judgmental errors (i.e. systematic departure from rationality) in bid mark-ups and on finding ways 
to reduce them.  
From a practical perspective, the verified model seems to be simple and practicable to be used 
by bidders who intend to get a better approach in deciding bid mark-ups by predicting likely 
behavior of competitors. Only few data would be required for the prediction, namely: „rate of 
returns‟, „revenues‟, „project backlogs‟ and „project strategic importance‟. Information related to 
the four determinants could be gathered by various means such as marketing intelligence 
(Mochtar and Arditi, 2001). Studies in the Singapore construction industry, for instance, revealed 
the common practices of gathering information of competitors for tendering activities under the 




(Hegazy and Moselhi, 1995; Kahneman, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Shafir et al., 1993; Tenah and Coulter, 1999; Tversky and Kahneman, 
1986) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) (Qualls and Puto, 1989) (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996; Levy, 1997; 2003) (Elliott and Archibald, 1989; Kühberger, 1998; Lee, 1997) (Bromiley, 
1991; Jegers, 1991) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) (Heath et al., 1999) (Mullins et al., 1999) (Tenah and Coulter, 1999) (Cyert and March, 1992) (Ling and Peh, 2005) 
(Brandstätter et al., 2006) (Bröder, 2000; Bröder and Schiffer, 2003) (Spector, 1992) (Litwin, 1995) (Babbie, 2010) (Dattalo, 2008) (BCA, 2009a; Braumoeller, 2004; Cohen, 




Ahmad, I., and Minkarah, I. (1988). "Questionnaire Survey on Bidding in Construction." Journal of 
Management in Engineering, 4(3), 229-243. 
Akintoye, A., and Skitmore, M. (1992). "Pricing Approaches in the Construction Industry." 
Industrial Marketing Management, 21(4), 311-318. 
Arditi, D., Koksal, A., and Kale, S. (2000). "Business Failures in the Construction Industry." 
Engineering Construction and Architectural Management, 7(2), 120-132. 
Babbie, E. R. (2010). The Practice of Social Research, 12th Ed., Wadsworth, Belmont, CA. 
Barnett, V., and Lewis, T. (1994). Outliers in Statistical Data, 3rd Ed., Wiley & Sons, Chichester. 
Bazerman, M. H. (1998). Judgment in Managerial Decision Making, John Wiley & Sons, New 
York. 
Bazerman, M. H., and Samuelson, W. F. (1983). "I Won the Auction but Don't Want the Prize." 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27(4), 618-634. 
BCA. (2009a). "Contractors Tendering Limits." 
<http://www.bca.gov.sg/ContractorsRegistry/contractors_tendering_limits.html> (June 
30, 2009). 
BCA. (2009b). "Directory of BCA Registered Contractors and Licensed Builders." 
<http://dir.bca.gov.sg/bca/AdvSearchList.asp?actual_pg=1&ListAbsolutePage=1> 
(February 1, 2009). 
Betts, M., and Brown, P. (1992). "Construction Tender Bid Variability in Singapore." AACE 
Transactions, 2, Q.6.1.-Q.6.12. 
Betts, M., and Ofori, G. (1992). "Strategic Planning for Competitive Advantage in Construction." 
Construction Management and Economics, 10(6), 511-532. 
Bhattacharjee, V., Cicchetti, C. J., and Rankin, W. F. (1993). "Energy Utilities, Conservation, And 
Economic Efficiency." Contemporary Economic Policy, 11(1), 69-75. 
Birnbaum, M. H. (2008). "Evaluation of the Priority Heuristic as a Descriptive Model of Risky 
Decision Making: Comment on Brandstätter, Gigerenzer, and Hertwig (2006)." 
Psychological Review, 115(1), 253-260. 
Boughton, P. D. (1987). "The Competitive Bidding Process: beyond Probability Models." 
Industrial Marketing Management, 16(2), 87-94. 
Bowman, E. H. (1982). "Risk Seeking by Troubled Firms." Sloan Management Review, 23(4), 33-
42. 
Bowman, E. H. (1984). "Content Analysis of Annual Reports for Corporate Strategy and Risk." 
Interfaces, 14(1), 61. 
Brandstätter, E., Gigerenzer, G., and Hertwig, R. (2006). "The Priority Heuristic: Making Choices 
Without Trade-Offs." Psychological Review, 113(2), 409-432. 
Braumoeller, B. F. (2004). "Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Interaction Terms." 
International Organization, 58, 807-820. 
Bröder, A. (2000). "Assessing the Empirical Validity of the "Take-the-best" Heuristic as a Model 
of Human Probabilistic Inference." Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 26(5), 1332-1346. 
Bröder, A., and Schiffer, S. (2003). "Take The Best versus Simultaneous Feature Matching: 
Probabilistic Inferences from Memory and Effects of Reprensentation Format." Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: General, 132(2), 277-293. 
Bromiley, P. (1991). "Testing a Causal Model of Corporate Risk Taking and Performance." 
Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 37-59. 
Chinowsky, P. S., and Meredith, J. E. (2000). "Strategic Management in Construction." Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 126, 1. 
121 
Chua, D. K. H., and Li, D. (2000). "Key Factors in Bid Reasoning Model." Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, 126, 349. 
Clemen, R. T., and Reilly, T. (2001). Making Hard Decisions with Decision Tools, Duxbury, Pacific 
Grove, CA. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd Ed., Academic Press., 
New York. 
Cohen, L., and Manion, L. (1980). Research Methods in Education, Croom Helm, London. 
Creswell, J. W. (2008). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods 
Approaches, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Cronbach, L. J. (1951). "Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests." Psychometrika, 
16(3), 297-334. 
Cyert, R. M., and March, J. G. (1992). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Wiley-Blackwell. 
Dattalo, P. (2008). Determining Sample Size: Balancing Power, Precision, and Practicality, Oxford 
University Press, USA, Oxford. 
Dawes, J. (1999). "The Relationship between Subjective and Objective Company Performance 
Measures in Market Orientation Research: Further Empirical Evidence." Marketing 
Bulletin, 10, 65-75. 
de Neufville, R. M., and King, D. (1991). "Risk and Need-for-Work Premiums in Contractor 
Bidding." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 117(4), 659-673. 
Dess, G. G., and Robinson Jr, R. B. (1984). "Measuring Organizational Performance in the 
Absence of Objective Measures: The Case of the Privately-Held Firm and Conglomerate 
Business Unit." Strategic Management Journal, 5(3), 265-273. 
Dias, W. P. S., and Weerasinghe, R. L. D. (1996). "Artificial Neural Networks for Construction Bid 
Decisions." Civil Engineering and Environmental Systems, 13(3), 239-253. 
Dikmen, I., and Birgonul, M. T. (2003). "Strategic Perspective of Turkish Construction 
Companies." Journal of Management in Engineering, 19(1), 33-40. 
Dozzi, S. P., AbouRizk, S. M., and Schroeder, S. L. (1996). "Utility-Theory Model for Bid Markup 
Decisions." Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 122(2), 119-124. 
Dulaimi, M. F., Ling, F. Y. Y., Yean, F. Y. L., and Ofori, G. (2001). Building a World Class 
Construction Industry: Motivators and Enablers, NUS Press, Singapore. 
Dulaimi, M. F., and Shan, H. G. (2002). "The Factors Influencing Bid Mark-up Decisions of Large-
and Medium-size Contractors in Singapore." Construction Management and Economics, 
20(7), 601-610. 
Dun, and Bradstreet. (1989-1993). U.S. Business Failure Records, Dun & Bradstreet Publication, 
NY. 
Edwards, K. D. (1996). "Prospect Theory: a Literature Review." International Review of Financial 
Analysis, 5(1), 19-38. 
Egemen, M., and Mohamed, A. N. (2007). "A Framework for Contractors to Reach Strategically 
Correct Bid/no bid and Mark-up Size Decisions." Building and Environment, 42(3), 1373-
1385. 
Elliott, C. S., and Archibald, R. B. (1989). "Subjective Framing and Attitudes towards Risk." Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 10(3), 321-328. 
Fayek, A., Young, D. M., and Duffield, C. F. (1998). "A Survey of Tendering Practices in the 
Australian Construction Industry." Engineering Management Journal, 10, 29-34. 
Fellows, R., and Liu, A. M. M. (2000). "Human Dimensions in Modelling Prices of Building 
Projects." Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management, 7(4), 362-372. 
Fiegenbaum, A. (1990). "Prospect Theory and the Risk-return Association: an Empirical 
Examination in 85 Industries." Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 14(2), 
187-203. 
Fiegenbaum, A., Hart, S., and Schendel, D. (1996). "Strategic Reference Point Theory." Strategic 
Management Journal, 17(3), 219-235. 
122 
Fiegenbaum, A., and Thomas, H. (1988). "Attitudes Toward Risk and the Risk-return Paradox: 
Prospect Theory Explanations." Academy of Management Journal, 31(1), 85-106. 
Field, A. (2000). "Postgraduate Statistics: Cluster Analysis." 
<http://www.statisticshell.com/cluster.pdf > (January 9, 2010. 
Field, A. (2009). Discovering Statistics using SPSS, 3rd Ed., Sage Publications Ltd, Los Angeles. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2003). "How Common and How Large are Cost Overruns in Transport Infrastructure 
Projects?" Transport Reviews, 23(1), 71-88. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). "From Nobel Prize to Project Management: Getting Risks Right." Project 
Management Journal, 37(3), 5-15. 
Flyvbjerg, B., Glenting, C., and Rønnest, A. K. (2004a). "Procedures for Dealing with Optimism 
Bias in Transport Planning: Guidance Document." The British Department for Transport, 
London. 
Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M. K. S., and Buhl, S. L. (2004b). "What Causes Cost Overrun in Transport 
Infrastructure Projects?" Transport Reviews, 24(1), 3-18. 
Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M. K. S., and Buhl, S. L. (2005). "How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in 
Public Works Projects?: The Case of Transportation." Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 71(2), 131-146. 
Flyvbjerg, B., Holm, M. S., and Buhl, S. (2002). "Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: 
Error or Lie?" Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3), 279-295. 
Friedman, D., and Cassar, A. (2004). First Principles: Induced Value Theory, Routledge, London. 
Friedman, L. (1956). "A Competitive-Bidding Strategy." Operations Research, 4(1), 104. 
Garson, G. D. (2009). "Cluster Analysis. Statnotes: Topics in Multivariate Analysis." 
<http://faculty.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/statnote.htm> (October 21, 2009. 
Gates, M. (1983). "A Bidding Strategy based on ESPE." Cost Engineering, 25(6), 27-35. 
Gigerenzer, G., and Goldstein, D. G. (1996). "Reasoning the Fast and Frugal Way: Models of 
Bounded Rationality." Psychological Review, 103(4), 650-669. 
Gorsuch, R. L. (1983). Factor Analysis, 2nd Ed., Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Gunner, J., and Skitmore, M. (1999). "Comparative Analysis of Pre-bid Forecasting of Building 
Prices based on Singapore data." Construction Management and Economics, 17(5), 635-
646. 
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B., Anderson, R. E., and Tatham, R. L. (2006). Multivariate Data 
Analysis, 6th Ed., Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, NJ. 
Hambrick, D. C. (1984). "Taxonomic Approaches to Studying Strategy: Some Conceptual and 
Methodological Issues." Journal of Management, 10(1), 27. 
Hardie, B. G. S., Johnson, E. J., and Fader, P. S. (1993). "Modeling Loss Aversion and Reference 
Dependence Effects on Brand Choice." Marketing Science, 12(4), 378. 
Hartono, B. (2009). "The Effects of Perceived Prior Performance, Project Backlog, and Project 
Strategic Importance on Contractors’ Bid Mark-Up Decisions." National University of 
Singapore, Singapore. 
Hasegawa, F. (1988). Built by Japan: Competitive Strategies of the Japanese Construction 
Industry, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York. 
Hastie, R., and Dawes, R. M. (2001). Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: The Psychology of 
Judgment and Decision Making, Sage Publications, Inc, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., and Wu, G. (1999). "Goals as Reference Points." Cognitive Psychology, 
38(1), 79-109. 
Hegazy, T., and Moselhi, O. (1995). "Elements of Cost Estimation: A Survey in Canada and the 
United States." Cost Engineering, 37, 27-27. 
Hilbig, B. E. (2008). "One-reason Decision Making in Risky Choice? A Closer Look at the Priority 
Heuristic." Judgment and Decision Making, 3(6), 457-462. 
Hillebrandt, P., and Cannon, J. (1990). The Modern Construction Firm, Macmillan, London. 
123 
Hogarth, R. M. (1980). Judgement and Choice: the Psychology of Decision, John Wiley & Sons 
Inc., Chichester. 
Jegers, M. (1991). "Prospect Theory and the Risk-return Relation: Some Belgian Evidence." 
Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 215-225. 
Kahneman, D. (2002). "Maps of Bounded Rationality: A Perspective on Intuitive Judgment and 
Choice." <http://www.nobel.se/economics/laureates/2002/kahnemann-lecture.pdf> 
(September 15, 2008. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979). "Prospect Theory: an Analysis of Decision under Risk." 
Econometrica, 47(2), 263-292. 
Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1984). "Choices, Values, and Frames." American psychologist, 
39(4), 341-350. 
Kale, S., and Arditi, D. (2002). "Competitive Positioning in United States Construction Industry." 
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 128(3), 238-247. 
Kirchhoff, B. A. (1977). "Organization Effectiveness Measurement and Policy Research." 
Academy of Management Review, 2(3), 347-355. 
Koskela, L., and Howell, G. (2008). "The Underlying Theory of Project Management is Obsolete." 
IEEE Engineering Management Review, 36(2), 22-34. 
Kraemer, H. C., and Thiemann, S. (1987). How Many Subjects?: Statistical Power Analysis in 
Research, Sage Publications, Inc, Newbury Park. 
Kühberger, A. (1998). "The Influence of Framing on Risky Decisions: A Meta-analysis." 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75(1), 23. 
Lee, D. Y. (1997). "The Impact of Poor Performance on Risk Taking Attitudes: a Longitudinal 
Study with a PLS Causal Modelling Approach." Decision Sciences, 28(1), 59-80. 
Levin, I. P., Louviere, J. J., Schepanski, A. A., and Norman, K. L. (1983). "External Validity Tests of 
Laboratory Studies of Information Integration." Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 31(2), 173-193. 
Levin, I. P., Schneider, S. L., and Gaeth, G. J. (1998). "All Frames Are Not Created Equal: A 
Typology and Critical Analysis of Framing Effects." Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 76(2), 149-188. 
Levy, J. S. (1997). "Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations." International 
Studies Quarterly, 41(1), 87-112. 
Levy, J. S. (2003). "Applications of Prospect Theory to Political Science." Synthese, 135(2), 215-
241. 
Li, H., and Love, P. E. D. (1999). "Combining Rule-based Expert Systems and Artificial Neural 
Networks for Mark-up Estimation." Construction Management and Economics, 17(2), 
169-176. 
Lim, K. (2009). "Singapore Recession Deepens, Govt Cuts 09 Outlook." In: Reuters, Singapore. 
Ling, F. Y. Y., and Peh, S. (2005). "Key Performance Indicators For Measuring Contractors' 
Performance." Architectural Science Review, 48, 357-365. 
Ling, Y. Y., and Liu, M. (2005). "Factors Considered by Successful and Profitable Contractors in 
Mark-up Size Decision in Singapore." Building and Environment, 40(11), 1557-1565. 
Litwin, M. S. (1995). How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity, Sage Publications, Inc, 
Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Loewenstein, G. F., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., and Welch, N. (2001). "Risk as Feelings." 
Psychological bulletin, 127(2), 267-286. 
Loomes, G., and Sugden, R. (1982). "Regret Theory: an Alternative Theory of Rational Choice 
under Uncertainty." The Economic Journal, 92(368), 805-824. 
Lovallo, D., and Kahneman, D. (2003). "Delusions of Success. How Optimism Undermines 
Executives' Decisions." Harvard Business Review, 81(7), 56. 
MacCrimmon, K. R., Wehrung, D., and Stanbury, W. T. (1988). Taking Risks: The Management of 
Uncertainties, The Free Press., New York. 
124 
Mak, S., and Raftery, J. (1992). "Risk Attitude and Systematic Bias in Estimating and Forecasting." 
Construction Management and Economics, 10(4), 303-320. 
Male, S. (1991). "Strategic Management for Competitive Strategy and Advantages." In: 
Competitive Advantage in Construction, M. Male and R. Stocks, eds., Butterworth-
Heinemann, Oxford, 5-44. 
March, J. G., and Shapira, Z. (1987). "Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking." 
Management science, 33(11), 1404-1418. 
Mayer, P. C. (1995). "Electricity Conservation: Consumer Rationality versus Prospect Theory." 
Contemporary Economic Policy, 13(2), 109-118. 
Menard, S. W. (2002). Applied Logistic Regression Analysis, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, 
CA. 
Miller, D. (1981). "Toward a New Contingency Approach: the Search for Organizational Gestalts." 
Journal of management studies, 18(1), 1-26. 
Miller, K. D., and Leiblein, M. J. (1996). "Corporate Risk-Return Relations: Returns Variability 
versus Downside Risk." Academy of Management Journal, 39(1), 91-122. 
Milligan, G. W. (1980). "An Examination of the Effect of Six Types of Error Perturbation on 
Fifteen Clustering Algorithms." Psychometrika, 45(3), 325-342. 
Mochtar, K., and Arditi, D. (2001). "Pricing Strategy in the US Construction Industry." 
Construction Management and Economics, 19(4), 405-415. 
Montier, J. (2007). Behavioural Investing: A Practitioners Guide to Applying Behavioural Finance, 
John Wiley & Sons Inc, Chichester, England. 
Mullins, J. W., Forlani, D., and Walker, O. C. (1999). "Effects of Organizational and Decision-
Maker Factors on New Product Risk Taking." Journal of Product Innovation 
Management, 16(3), 282-294. 
Neuman, W. L. (2000). Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 4th 
Ed., Allyn and Bacon, Boston. 
Núñez-Nickel, M., and Rodríguez, C. (2002). "A Review of Research on the Negative Accounting 
Relationship between Risk and Return: Bowman's Paradox." Omega, 30(1), 1-18. 
Ofori, G. (1993). Managing Construction Industry Development: Lessons from Singapore's 
Experience, Singapore University Press, Singapore. 
Oo, B. L., Drew, D., and Lo, H. P. (2007). "Modelling Contractors' Mark-up Behaviour in Different 
Construction Markets." Engineering Construction and Architectural Management, 14(5), 
447. 
Oo, B. L., Drew, D. S., and Lo, H. P. (2008). "A Comparison of Contractors’ Decision to Bid 
Behavior according to Different Market Environments." International Journal of Project 
Management, 26(4), 439-447. 
Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J. Y., and Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). "Common Method 
Biases in Behavioral Research: a Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended 
Remedies." Journal of applied psychology, 88(5), 879-903. 
Podsakoff, P. M., and Organ, D. W. (1986). "Self-reports in Organizational Research: Problems 
and Prospects." Journal of Management, 12(4), 531-544. 
Punch, K. (2000). Developing Effective Research Proposals, Sage Publications Inc., London, UK. 
Qualls, W. J., and Puto, C. P. (1989). "Organizational Climate and Decision Framing: an Integrated 
Approach to Analyzing Industrial Buying Decisions." Journal of Marketing Research, 
26(2), 179-192. 
Roth, A. E. (1995). "Introduction to Experimental Economics." In: The Handbook of Experimental 
Economics, J. H. Kagel and A. E. Roth, eds., Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. 
Runeson, G., and Skitmore, M. (1999). "Tendering Theory Revisited." Construction Management 
and Economics, 17, 285-296. 
Sapsford, R. (1999). Survey Research, Sage Publications, Inc., London, UK. 
125 
SCAL. (2008). "The Contractor's Directory 2008." Singapore Contractors Association Limited, 
Singapore. 
Shafir, E. B., Osherson, D. N., and Smith, E. E. (1993). "The Advantage Model: A Comparative 
Theory of Evaluation and Choice under Risk." Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 55(3), 325-378. 
Shapira, Z. (1986). "Risk in Managerial Decision Making." Hebrew University. 
Shash, A. A. (1993). "Factors Considered in Tendering Decisions by Top UK Contractors." 
Construction Management and Economics, 11(2), 111-118. 
Shash, A. A. (1995). "Competitive Bidding System." Cost Engineering, 37(2), 19-20. 
Shash, A. A., and Abdul-Hadi, N. H. (1992). "Factors Affecting a Contractor's Mark-up Size 
Decision in Saudi Arabia." Construction Management and Economics, 10(5), 415-429. 
Shash, A. A., and Abdul-Hadi, N. H. (1993). "The Effect of Contractor Size on Mark-up Size 
Decision in Saudi Arabia." Construction Management and Economics, 11(6), 421-429. 
Shu, L. L., and Bazerman, M. H. (2010). "Cognitive Barriers to Environmental Action: Problems 
and Solutions." Working Paper, 11-046, Harvard Business School. 
Simon, H. A. (1957). Models of Man, Wiley, New York. 
Sinha, T. (1994). "Prospect Theory and the Risk Return Association: Another Look." Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 24(2), 225-231. 
Skitmore, M., and Lo, H. P. (2002). "A Method for Identifying High Outliers in Construction 
Contract Auctions." Engineering Construction and Architectural Management, 9(2), 90-
130. 
Skitmore, M., and Pemberton, J. (1994). "A Multivariate Approach to Construction Contract 
Bidding Mark-up Strategies." Journal of the Operational Research Society, 45(11), 1263-
1272. 
Spector, P. E. (1992). Summated Rating Scale Construction: an Introduction, Sage Publications, 
Inc., Newbury Park, CA. 
Sunstein, C. R. (2003). "Terrorism and Probability Neglect." Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 
26(2), 121-136. 
Tan, W. (1995). Research Methods in Real Estate and Construction, National University of 
Singapore, Singapore. 
Tenah, K. A., and Coulter, C. (1999). "Bid Markup Methodologies." Cost Engineering, 41(11), 39-
44. 
Todd, P. (2002). "Fast and Frugal Heuristics for Environmentally Bounded Minds." In: Bounded 
Rationality: the Adaptive Toolbox, G. Gigerenzer and R. Selten, eds., MIT press. 
Trochim, W. M. (2006). "Construct Validity." Research Methods Knowledge Base, 
<http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/constval.php> (October 19, 2009). 
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." 
Science, 185(4157), 1124-1131. 
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1981). "The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice. 
Science." Science, 211(4481), 453-458. 
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1986). "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions." Journal of 
Business, 59(4), S251-278. 
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1991). "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: a Reference-dependent 
Model." The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(4), 1039-1061. 
Venkatraman, N. (1989). "The Concept of Fit in Strategy Research: Toward Verbal and Statistical 
Correspondence." Academy of Management Review, 14(3), 423-444. 
Vennila, V. (2003). "Competitor Intelligence in Construction Industry in Singapore," Master's 
Thesis, NTU, Singapore. 
Wall, T. D., Michie, J., Patterson, M., Wood, S. J., Sheehan, M., Clegg, C. W., and West, M. (2007). 
"On the Validity of Subjective Measures of Company Performance." Personnel 
Psychology, 57(1), 95-118. 
126 
Wallwork, J. W. (1999). "Is There a Right Price in Construction Bids?" Cost Engineering, 41(2), 41. 
Wang, W. C. (2002). "SIM-UTILITY: Model for Project Ceiling Price Determination." Journal of 
Construction Engineering and Management, 128(1), 76-84. 
Wanous, M., Boussabaine, A. H., and Lewis, J. (2000). "To Bid or Not to Bid: a Parametric 
Solution." Construction Management and Economics, 18(4), 457-466. 
Wu, A. D., and Zumbo, B. D. (2008). "Understanding and Using Mediators and Moderators." 
Social Indicators Research, 87(3), 367-392. 
Xu, T., and Tiong, R. L. K. (2001). "Risk Assessment on Contractors' Pricing Strategies." 






Appendix 1: Evaluation Form for the Qualitative Pilot Study 
Appendix 2: NUS – Institutional Review Board‟s Research Approval Certificate 
Appendix 3: Cover Letter for Main Empirical Study 
Appendix 4: Survey Instrument or Questionnaire for the Main Empirical Study 
 













[Pilot Study of the Bid Mark-Up Study - Stage 2] 
Date  : ____________________ 
 
The purpose of this pilot study is to evaluate the effectiveness and validity of a survey instrument.  
Findings on this pilot study would be very essential to improve the quality of the instrument so 
that it can accurately elicit information that is set to be measured by the researchers. Hence your 
contribution as a respondent is highly appreciated. 
Section A Respondent Profile 
 
Name : ____________________________________________________________ 
Email address : ______________________________________________________ 
Designation : ______________________________________________________ 
How long have you been working in construction industry: __________________years  
Section B Questions 
We require you to read the survey instrument draft before answering the following 
questions.  
 
 Question Answer 
1 Do you find any terminologies 
which are not familiar? Any 
suggestions for improvement? 
<you may provide the answers by highlighting or 
commenting on the instrument> 
2 Are the instructions clear enough 
to follow? Any suggestions for 
improvement? 
 
3 Are the questions clear enough to 









5 Is the survey too long? Do the 
item numbers make sense? Any 





6 How long would you think to 





7 Do you find certain items which 
are too sensitive to be asked? 





8 Overall, are the respective 
question items appropriate and 
relevant for measuring the 





9 Overall, does the instrument seem 
like a reasonable way to gain the 
information the researchers are 








10 Do you think that providing an 
internet-based survey [in addition 
to the mailed survey] would be 
helpful to increase the chance of 
getting more responses? 
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11 Any other comments to improve 
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[Date] 






Dear [Respondent Name], 
 
You are invited to participate in a research entitled „The Bid Mark-up Study‟ which is conducted by 
Budi Hartono, a PhD candidate in the Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering at the 
National University of Singapore. This survey is part of his PhD research project under the supervision 
of Dr. Yap Chee Meng, CFA.  
 
The objective of this research project is to investigate the behavior of senior professionals in 
construction industry when conducting bid mark-up (profit margin) decisions. The study would 
eventually benefit both practitioners and academic scholars to better understand the systematic patterns 
of bid behavior. From a practical perspective, the research findings may assist bidders to evaluate 
and to improve their own bidding strategy by incorporating insights taken from this research to 
anticipate the likely behavior of their competitors. 
 
Without the help of people like you, this research could not be conducted. We specifically target senior 
professionals who have some exposures to determinations of bid mark-ups (profit margins) in 
competitive bids to participate in this study. This survey would take around 20 minutes to complete. 
To appreciate your contribution, an executive summary of the survey key results will be sent to 
you upon request.  
 
To return this questionnaire, simply fold the answered form and mail it back to us using the provided 
business reply envelope. We expect to receive your reply within three weeks since our submission date 
as stated above. Alternatively, you may participate to the online version of the survey: 
www.ise.nus.edu.sg/survey/bid 
 
We assure that your responses will be held in the strictest confidentiality. Only aggregated data will be 
reported. Moreover, you may participate in the survey as an anonymous respondent. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study, you may contact Budi Hartono at (65) 8262 
0874 or at budi.hartono@nus.edu.sg. For an independent opinion regarding the research and the rights 
of research participants, you may contact a staff member of the NUS Institutional Review Board (Attn: 












YAP Chee Meng, PhD, CFA 
Co-investigator (Supervising) 
Deputy Head, Undergraduate Studies 
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering 
National University of Singapore 
Block E1A, 1 Engineering Drive 2 #06-25, Singapore 
Tel:  (65) 6516 3070  




PhD Candidate  
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering  
National University of Singapore 
Block E1A, 1 Engineering Drive 2 #06-25, Singapore 
Tel: (65) 6516 4606; mobile: (65) 8262 0874  
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 In Sections A & B, you are required to provide information related to your company and 
yourself. ‘Company’ in this survey refers to your construction firm or the construction-
related business unit in the case where your firm is a holding corporation with diverse 
business interests. 
Section A – Company Profile 
1. Your company’s financial grade for the workhead of CW01 (General Building):                                                                                                                                                    
        
A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3 Not applicable 
2. Your company’s financial grade for the workhead of CW02 (Civil Engineering):                                         
        
A1 A2 B1 B2 C1 C2 C3 Not applicable 
3. Your estimate on company’s average number of permanent employees in the last 
three years: 
____________________________________ employees 
4. Most frequently used method which has been applied in your company to determine 
bid mark-up (profit margin): 
 Intuitive judgment 
 Statistical analysis 
 Other, please specify ______________________________________ 
 
5. Are you comfortable with the current method for determining bid mark-up (profit 
margin)? 
     
very 
uncomfortable 
uncomfortable neutral comfortable very 
comfortable 
 
6. Average success rate of your company’s competitive bid attempts in the last three 
years: 




Section B – Respondent Profile 
1. Which of the following best describes your current position in the company? 
 Director, Senior Management 
 Contract Manager, Project Manager, Quantity Surveyor, Construction Manager 
 Other, please specify ______________________________________________________________________ 
  
2. How long have you been working in construction industry? ____________________________ 
years 
3. How long have you been in the current position?                    ____________________________ 
years 
4. How many bid mark-up decisions have you been involved so far (in any company)? 
 No involvement (please proceed directly to page 5) 
 1 to 4 bids 
 5 to 10 bids 
 More than 10 bids 
 
 
Section C – Project & Bid Profile 
 
Special Instructions for Section C (C-1 and C-2) 
 
 We require you to provide information on a specific project bid on which you were or are 
directly involved, regardless of the outcome of the bids. The bids must fall under the 
category of competitive bidding without negotiations. Most recent bids are preferred.  
 





















     Section C – Profile for the Chosen Competitive Bid  
 Kindly provide the set of information from a competitive bidding of your  choice by 
answering questions in this section.    
1. On which workhead this particular project belongs to?                                                                                                                                  
 CW01 (General Building)  Other, please specify:  
_________________________ 
 
 CW02 (Civil Engineering)  
2. How recent the decision for the bid mark-up was?                                                                                                                              
 Less than 2 weeks ago  2 to 4 weeks ago  Older than 4 weeks 
 
3. Bid mark-up* (profit margin) which was set for this particular project:                                                   
[*note: see page 2 for the definition of bid mark-up] 
 
              ____________________________________________ % of the estimated project-related total cost 
4. At the time when the bid was carried out, what did you believe of your company’s (or 
business unit’s) actual performance, if compared to what you had expected, in terms of 
revenue*? 
[*note: see page 2 for the definition of revenue] 
Definitions: 
a) Company: your construction firm or construction-related business unit in the case where 
your company is a holding corporation with diverse business interests; 
 
b) Bid mark-up: the percentage value to be added on top of the estimated project-related total cost 
to reflect the project’s profit margin; 
 
c) Rate of return: your personal judgment on the company’s (or construction-related business 
unit’s) total gross profit at the stipulated financial year, prior to the bid. It is expressed in the 
percentage of revenue. 
 
d) Revenue: your personal judgment on the income generated by the company (or construction-
related business unit) at the stipulated financial year, prior to the bid; 
 
e) Ongoing-and-forthcoming workload: your personal judgment on your company’s performance 
prior to the bid in terms of work volume from on-going as well as secured, forthcoming 
projects. It is expressed in dollar values. 
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 My company’s revenue was approximately ________________%  below what I had expected 
 My company’s revenue was approximately ________________%  above what I had expected 
 
5. At the time when the bid was carried out, what did you think of your company’s (or 
business unit’s) actual ongoing-and-forthcoming workload* if compared to what you had 
expected? 
[*note: see page 2 for the definition of ongoing-and-forthcoming workload] 
 My company’s workload was approximately ________________%  below what I had expected 




6. At the time when the bid was carried out, what did you feel of your company’s (or business 
unit’s) actual performance, if compared to what you had expected, in terms of rate of 
return*? 
[*note: see page 2 for the definition of rate of return; example: if the actual company’s rate-of-return was 
15% while your personal expectation was 20% then it was 5 %~ points below expectation] 
 My company’s rate of return was approximately ________________ %~points below my expectation 
 My company’s rate of return was approximately ________________ %~points above my expectation 
 
7. At the time when the bid was carried out, what was your expectation on the overall gross 
profit that your company (or business unit) ought to have earned?  
 
____________________________________________ % (as percentage of the company’s revenue) 
 For question number 8 to 19, kindly rate the following statements regarding to the Project: 
Winning this project may contribute to the attempt:                                                                                                              
                 
 
 
8. to break into a new market with prospective future      
9. to build a foothold in a new sector      
10. to expand existing business lines      
11. to get easier access on future works the client carries out 
regularly  
     
12. to obtain repeat business from the client      
13. to acquire lucrative, follow-on projects from the client       
14. to upgrade my company’s workhead tendering limit      
15. to improve my company’s track record in the construction 
market 
     
16. to acquire new experience or new skills in construction methods       
17. to deter competitor(s) on taking over my company’s market share      
18. to defend existing market from competitor(s) trying to break into       
19. to prevent main rival(s) from entering the sector      
strongly disagree neutral strongly agree 
neutral strongly disagree strongly agree 
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Section D – Follow up and Contact Information (optional) 
 
1. Would you like to get a summary of this research report? 
 Yes (please provide a correct email address in contact details (question 3)) 
 No 
 
2. Do you agree to be re-contacted for a further interview on the general finding of this 
bid-markup research? The interview would be conducted roughly within 1 month 
after this survey. 
 Yes (please fill in the contact details in question 3)  
 No 
 
3. Contact Details (optional)  
 
Name   : Mr. /Ms. /Mdm. /Dr. ______________________________________________________ 
Specific Job Title :____________________________________________________________________ 
___________  
Email address* :____________________________________________________________________ 
___________ 
Phone   :____________________________________________________________________ 
___________ 
Company Name :____________________________________________________________________ 
___________   
Address  :____________________________________________________________________ 
___________   
 
* Required if you would like to get a summary of this research report 
 


















End of Survey – Thank you for your participation. 
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Appendix 5: Results of Non-parametric Statistical Analyses 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis tests are carried out to complement one-way ANOVAs: 
1. „Success rates‟ vs. „financial grades‟ (page 86 – footnote#39)  
 result: H(6) = 5.51  P = 0.480,  Not significant 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Bid Success Rates versus Financial Grades  
 
46 cases were used 
4 cases contained missing values 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Bid Success Rates 
 
Financial 
Grades      N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1          12   10.00      21.6  -0.56 
2           5   60.00      29.1   0.99 
3           7   10.00      17.4  -1.32 
4           7   10.00      20.1  -0.73 
5          12   23.75      28.0   1.35 
7           1   10.00      15.5  -0.60 
8           2   25.00      31.3   0.83 
Overall    46              23.5 
 
H = 5.40  DF = 6  P = 0.494 







2. „Success rates‟ vs. „bid methods‟ (page 86 – footnote#40) 
 result: H(2) = 1.10  P = 0.577, Not significant. 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Bid Success Rates versus Bid Methods  
 
45 cases were used 
5 cases contained missing values 
 
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Bid Success Rates 
 
Bid Methods   N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1            23   16.00      22.1  -0.48 
2            17   20.00      25.4   0.94 
3             5   10.00      19.2  -0.69 
Overall      45              23.0 
 
H = 1.08  DF = 2  P = 0.584 





3. Respective independent variables vs. „clusters‟ (page 101 – footnote#51) 
 „rate of returns‟ vs. „clusters‟: H(4) = 18.36  p = 0.001, significant 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Rate of Return versus Cluster (Ward)  
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Relative Rate of Return 
 
Cluster 
(Ward)    N   Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        22   -3.250      23.0  -1.06 
2        16    5.000      35.4   3.31 
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3         4   -5.000      16.9  -1.23 
4         5  -10.000       7.3  -2.94 
5         3    5.000      32.3   0.84 
Overall  50               25.5 
 
H = 17.91  DF = 4  P = 0.001 
H = 18.36  DF = 4  P = 0.001  (adjusted for ties) 
 
 
 „revenues‟ vs. „clusters‟: H(4) = 24.16 p = 0.000, significant 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Revenue versus Cluster (Ward)  
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Relative Revenue 
 
Cluster 
(Ward)    N   Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        22   -6.500      23.4  -0.92 
2        16    5.000      26.7   0.41 
3         4   25.000      46.0   2.93 
4         5  -50.000       3.9  -3.49 
5         3   13.000      43.3   2.19 
Overall  50               25.5 
 
H = 23.96  DF = 4  P = 0.000 
H = 24.16  DF = 4  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties) 
 
 „backlogs‟ vs. „clusters‟: H(4) = 28.22 p = 0.000, significant 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Backlog versus Cluster (Ward)  
 




(Ward)    N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        22  -15.00      25.2  -0.12 
2        16  -10.00      30.9   1.79 
3         4   17.50      47.5   3.15 
4         5  -50.00       5.6  -3.22 
5         3  -60.00       2.7  -2.80 
Overall  50              25.5 
 
H = 27.97  DF = 4  P = 0.000 




 „strategic importance‟ vs. „clusters‟: H(4) = 28.68 p = 0.000, significant 
Kruskal-Wallis Test: Strategic Importance versus Cluster (Ward)  
 
Kruskal-Wallis Test on Strategic Importance 
 
Cluster 
(Ward)    N  Median  Ave Rank      Z 
1        22   3.585      16.3  -3.98 
2        16   5.000      40.9   5.13 
3         4   4.000      26.0   0.07 
4         5   3.670      19.0  -1.05 
5         3   4.000      21.3  -0.51 
Overall  50              25.5 
 
H = 27.97  DF = 4  P = 0.000 
H = 28.68  DF = 4  P = 0.000  (adjusted for ties) 
 





Testing the importance of the control variable 
 
Non-parametric analysis of correlation (N=50) 
 result: Spearman's rho is -0.222737 
Tabulated statistics: Bid Mark-up Value, Employee  
 
Rows: Bid Mark-up Value   Columns: Employee 
Pearson's r     -0.248047 
Spearman's rho  -0.222737 
 
 
